University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2022

Essays On The Economics Of Disaster Risk
Philip Cook Mulder
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Mulder, Philip Cook, "Essays On The Economics Of Disaster Risk" (2022). Publicly Accessible Penn
Dissertations. 5483.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5483

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5483
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Essays On The Economics Of Disaster Risk
Abstract
This dissertation explores disaster risk in the context of a changing climate, imperfect public policies, and
frictions that limit the capitalization of current and future climate risk in housing markets. The chapters'
results suggest how better provision of information and policies that internalize homeowners' and
lenders' climate exposure can ameliorate the costs of climate change in real estate markets.
In my first chapter, I study the economic consequences of using better flood risk models to more
accurately identify and price flood insurance for high-risk homes. I estimate my results with
administrative flood insurance policy data and a novel survey measuring flood insurance demand, risk
perceptions, and objective risk. To identify the effects of risk information, I use variation created by
outdated elevation data and risk models that caused high-risk homes to be misclassified as low-risk. My
findings show that flood risk classification provides valuable information not only for insurers, but also for
homeowners. Misclassifying high-risk homes as low-risk causes owners to underestimate their current
and future flood risk, invest less in risk-reducing adaptation, and buy less flood insurance despite
substantially lower premiums. Embedding these estimates in a sufficient statistics model with dynamic
risk and endogenous risk beliefs and adaptation, I find that identifying and pricing the estimated six
million high-risk homes outside the floodplain would increase social welfare by \$138 billion.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Professor Benjamin Keys, we explore dynamic changes in the
capitalization of sea level rise (SLR) risk in housing and mortgage markets. Our results suggest a
disconnect in coastal Florida real estate: From 2013-2016, home sales volumes in the most-SLR-exposed
communities declined 20\% relative to less-SLR-exposed areas, even as their sale prices grew in lockstep.
By 2019, however, relative prices in these at-risk markets finally declined 5\% from their peak. Over this
period, home sellers accumulated an excess inventory of unsold properties as they maintained high list
prices and transaction volumes declined. Lender behavior cannot reconcile these patterns, as both allcash and mortgage-financed purchases similarly contracted, with little increase in loan denials or
securitization. We propose a demand-side explanation for our findings where SLR risk has become more
salient in the home price expectations of prospective buyers than sellers. The lead-lag relationship
between transaction volumes and prices in SLR-exposed markets is consistent with dynamics at the peak
of prior real estate bubbles.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Dr. Yanjun Liao, we study how home equity influences homeowners'
decisions to insure flood risk. We show that low home equity is an important driver of low flood insurance
take-up. To isolate the causal effect of home equity on flood insurance demand, we exploit price changes
over the housing boom and bust. Insurance take-up follows house price dynamics closely, with a home
price elasticity around 0.3. Multiple mechanism tests show evidence consistent with a debt overhang
channel, whereby uninsured households with low equity rely on mortgage default to manage their flood
risk. As a result, households do not fully internalize their disaster risk.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISASTER RISK
Philip Mulder
Benjamin J. Keys
This dissertation explores disaster risk in the context of a changing climate, imperfect public
policies, and frictions that limit the capitalization of current and future climate risk in
housing markets. The chapters’ results suggest how better provision of information and
policies that internalize homeowners’ and lenders’ climate exposure can ameliorate the costs
of climate change in real estate markets.
In my first chapter, I study the economic consequences of using better flood risk models to
more accurately identify and price flood insurance for high-risk homes. I estimate my results
with administrative flood insurance policy data and a novel survey measuring flood insurance
demand, risk perceptions, and objective risk. To identify the effects of risk information, I use
variation created by outdated elevation data and risk models that caused high-risk homes to
be misclassified as low-risk. My findings show that flood risk classification provides valuable
information not only for insurers, but also for homeowners. Misclassifying high-risk homes
as low-risk causes owners to underestimate their current and future flood risk, invest less in
risk-reducing adaptation, and buy less flood insurance despite substantially lower premiums.
Embedding these estimates in a sufficient statistics model with dynamic risk and endogenous
risk beliefs and adaptation, I find that identifying and pricing the estimated six million highrisk homes outside the floodplain would increase social welfare by $138 billion.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Professor Benjamin Keys, we explore dynamic
changes in the capitalization of sea level rise (SLR) risk in housing and mortgage markets.
Our results suggest a disconnect in coastal Florida real estate: From 2013-2016, home sales
volumes in the most-SLR-exposed communities declined 20% relative to less-SLR-exposed
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areas, even as their sale prices grew in lockstep. By 2019, however, relative prices in these atrisk markets finally declined 5% from their peak. Over this period, home sellers accumulated
an excess inventory of unsold properties as they maintained high list prices and transaction
volumes declined. Lender behavior cannot reconcile these patterns, as both all-cash and
mortgage-financed purchases similarly contracted, with little increase in loan denials or
securitization. We propose a demand-side explanation for our findings where SLR risk has
become more salient in the home price expectations of prospective buyers than sellers. The
lead-lag relationship between transaction volumes and prices in SLR-exposed markets is
consistent with dynamics at the peak of prior real estate bubbles.
In the third chapter, co-authored with Dr. Yanjun Liao, we study how home equity influences
homeowners’ decisions to insure flood risk. We show that low home equity is an important
driver of low flood insurance take-up. To isolate the causal effect of home equity on flood
insurance demand, we exploit price changes over the housing boom and bust. Insurance takeup follows house price dynamics closely, with a home price elasticity around 0.3. Multiple
mechanism tests show evidence consistent with a debt overhang channel, whereby uninsured
households with low equity rely on mortgage default to manage their flood risk. As a result,
households do not fully internalize their disaster risk.
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CHAPTER 1
Mismeasuring Risk:
The Welfare Effects of Flood Risk Information

1.1

Introduction

Increasingly accurate risk models enable insurers and lenders to identify and appropriately
price high-risk buyers. From vehicle monitoring devices that track driving habits in real time,
to genetic tests that identify health risk factors, to algorithms that predict borrower default
probabilities, there have never been more data about risk in financial markets.1 Improved
technology to predict risk changes not only supply-side behavior, but it also alters how consumers perceive and react to their risk. In the area of flooding, low-cost, accurate elevation
data and hyrdological models have democratized access to property-level information about
sea level rise and flood risk (First Street Foundation 2021; NOAA 2021).
Despite the promise of new flood models, it is uncertain how they will affect the dominant
provider of flood insurance, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Despite insuring
nearly $1.5 trillion in property value, the publicly run NFIP has long relied on out-of-date
and infrequently updated flood maps to set premiums, regulations, and provide flood risk
information to coastal residents.2 Under ambitious but politically controversial ongoing
reforms, the NFIP has recently started to incorporate newer data and models into its premiums. Flood insurance reform advocates hope that risk-rated premiums will inform coastal
residents and encourage developers to invest in risk-reducing adaptation, yet critics fear that
higher premiums will drive down already low flood insurance take-up rates (Flavelle, 2021).
This paper explores the impact of new risk information on homeowner risk perceptions,
investment in adaptation, and welfare in the NFIP. Discerning the economic effects of im1

See Blattner and Nelson (2021), Fuster et al. (2019), and Jin and Vasserman (2021) for examples of the
economic effects of new risk rating technology in financial markets.
2
See Armal et al. (2020) for a comparison of aggregate flood risk measures between the FEMA flood
maps used by the NFIP and a current risk model.

1

proved risk rating requires understanding how homeowners will respond to new information
about their risk. To do so, I build a dynamic disaster insurance model where homeowners’
risk perceptions endogenously respond to new information. A public insurer classifies homes
as “high-risk” or “low-risk” to set their premiums. The insurer’s classification is not only
a price but also an information signal for homeowners who use it to guide their insurance
and adaptation decisions. The model identifies sufficient statistics for estimating the welfare
effects of reducing the misclassification of high-risk homes.
The model emphasizes three novel effects of risk rating in insurance markets. First, reclassifying a household as high-risk has an ambiguous effect on its insurance take-up because, even
as owners face higher premiums, reclassification provides information that changes their risk
perceptions. Second, the information effect and premium incentives of high-risk classification increase investment in risk-reducing adaptation. Third, when changes in risk over time
are correlated with current risk, misclassification causes owners to also misperceive their
future risk.
A challenge to identifying the information effect of risk rating is that changes in risk classification are correlated with changes in premiums. The NFIP provides an ideal empirical
setting to separately identify the price and information effects of risk classification. The
NFIP’s flood maps classify homes as either inside the floodplain (i.e. high-risk) or outside
the floodplain (low-risk). As these flood maps are updated with better data, many homes
are reclassified from outside to inside the floodplain (from low-risk to high-risk).
Because the NFIP holds the premiums of homes newly mapped into the floodplain fixed for
two years, I can identify the information effect of reclassification separately from the price
effect of higher premiums. Using administrative policy data, I compare the change in the
number of flood insurance policies for newly mapped floodplain homes with homes in the
same zip codes that remained outside the floodplain. The flood insurance take-up rate of
newly mapped homes more than doubles in the first two years after remapping relative to
homes that remain outside the floodplain.

2

I use the gradual phase-out of the newly mapped floodplain subsidy to identify the price
effect of risk reclassification. To identify the price elasticity of flood insurance demand, I
compare the renewal rates of newly mapped policyholders who first bought flood insurance
around the same time but face different premiums at renewal due to the structure of the
newly mapped subsidy. I find a 1% increase in premiums decreases policy renewal by 0.17
percentage points.
Some of the higher flood insurance take-up inside the floodplain can be attributed to floodplain homeowners required to purchase flood insurance by their lenders. To directly identify
the information effect separately from this regulatory requirement, I field a survey of 2,167
homeowners in high-risk, coastal areas. The survey instrument measuring flood insurance
take-up distinguishes voluntary buyers from those subject to lender-mandated flood insurance, a distinction that is impossible to measure in administrative policy data. In addition, I
elicit perceptions of current and future flood risk to directly estimate the effect of floodplain
status on risk beliefs. The survey links the address of each respondent to risk information
from their flood map, updated elevation data, and two independent risk models, to compare
the risk perceptions and voluntary flood insurance demand of homeowners inside and outside
the floodplain with similar risk.
I find that homeowners outside the floodplain are about 13 percentage points less likely to
voluntarily buy flood insurance than floodplain homeowners with similar risk, despite enjoying 60% lower premiums. The survey’s risk perception measures show that non-floodplain
homeowners perceive both their current and future flood risk as lower relative to floodplain
owners with similar risk. The survey results show that homeowners infer their flood risk
from their floodplain status, increasing the flood insurance demand of high-risk homeowners
inside relative to those outside the floodplain.
Floodplain classification may not only affect risk perceptions, but also how new homes are
adapted to reduce flood risk. Property elevation, the single most important predictor of flood
damages (Wing et al., 2020), is priced into premiums inside but not outside the floodplain,
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creating an incentive for developers to adapt high-risk properties by placing them on taller
foundations. Differences in perceived flood risk may further increase the relative demand
for elevated homes inside the floodplain. The choice of home elevation at construction is
particularly important given the high costs of raising an existing home, essentially making
adaptation fixed over a home’s structural life.3
An empirical challenge to estimating the difference in adaptation between floodplain and
non-floodplain homes is that comparing their claims conflates differences in underlying risk
with differences in adaptation. I address this source of endogeneity by comparing the claims
of newly mapped floodplain homes with homes that were built inside the floodplain, or
“floodplain-built.” According to current flood maps, both sets of homes face similar flood
risk, but only the floodplain-built homes were constructed under the information and premium incentives inside the floodplain.
To estimate the difference in adaptation between newly mapped and floodplain-built homes,
I compare the claims of over 100,000 policies, controlling for specific flooding events at
the census tract by floodplain level and a host of structure and policy characteristics. I
find that newly mapped homes suffer 14% larger claims than their similar floodplain-built
counterparts. The adaptation advantage of floodplain-built homes is even larger for new
construction. Robustness tests rule out floodplain elevation mandates or adverse selection
as driving these adaptation differences.
In total, these empirical results suggest that the misclassification of high-risk homes leads to
less investment in their adaptation and decreases the risk perceptions and flood insurance
take-up of their owners.
I then use these estimates as sufficient statistics to calculate the welfare effects of reducing
misclassification. Correctly classifying a high-risk home produces two primary welfare bene3

A 2008 FEMA report estimates that elevating a new home by an extra two feet increases construction
costs by 1 to 5% (FEMA 2008). By contrast, contractors currently advertising house lifting for existing
homes quote comprehensive costs of $60-$90 per square foot, or well over $100,000 for a 2,000 square foot
home (Dawson Foundation Repair 2021).
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fits. First, it increases demand for flood insurance and adaptation by informing homeowners
about their risk. Second, it reduces moral hazard by setting premiums that incentivize
adaptation.
Correctly classifying a high-risk home at construction produces approximately $1,000 in
social welfare gains in the first year. With increasing risk and dynamic misperceptions,
these annual welfare gains rise to over $3,000 after 30 years. The present value welfare gains
of eliminating risk misclassification is approximately $22,945 for each existing home and
$48,840 for each new home that can adjust its adaptation. These gains represent 10-20%
of median home values, suggesting that risk misclassification significantly distorts coastal
housing markets.
Most closely related to this work is a series of new papers on information frictions in disaster
insurance markets. Wagner (2021a) finds that flood insurance take-up rates are lower than
would be suggested by plausible risk aversion parameters, no evidence of adverse selection
conditional on adaptation, and that homes built before the implementation of the NFIP’s
minimum elevation standards have higher claims on average than those built after the program started. Lee (2021) shows that floodplain home sale disclosure requirements lower
sales prices and increase vacancy rates inside the floodplain. In Hu (2021), the author finds
that the digitization of flood maps and flooding in socially connected areas increased flood
insurance take-up and decreased floodplain home sale prices.
My paper extends this growing literature along several dimensions. In Wagner (2021a),
both adaptation and risk misperceptions are treated as exogenous. These assumptions imply
that risk rating premiums produces significant deadweight loss. I allow adaptation and risk
misperceptions to respond to new risk information, and show that when risk classification
informs homeowners, risk-rated premiums can be welfare improving. Both Lee (2021) and
Hu (2021) allow new information to affect flood insurance demand, but not the adaptation
of new construction. In contrast, I find that the endogenous response of adaptation to
risk classification and risk-based premiums is the most important welfare effect of new risk
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information. Furthermore, by separately identifying and estimating adaptation, information,
and price effects from risk reclassification, I calculate the first empirical welfare estimates
of the effects of new risk information in an insurance setting with endogenous beliefs and
adaptation as well as dynamic risk.
My study also adds to the literature on how climate risk affects housing markets. Studies
have found that home prices reflect increasing risk from hurricanes, wildfires, flooding, and
sea level rise (Bernstein et al., 2019; Addoum et al., 2021; Giglio et al., 2021a,?; Gibson and
Mullins, 2020a; Hino and Burke, 2021; Keys and Mulder, 2020; McCoy and Walsh, 2018;
Ortega and Taspınar, 2018) with implications for lenders
(Issler et al., 2020; Keenan and Bradt, 2020; Ouazad and Kahn, 2019) and governments
(Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2019).4 By modeling insurance demand and adaptation in a real
estate market with dynamic risk, this paper demonstrates that the effects of climate change
will depend on the efficiency of disaster insurance markets and quality of risk information.
My welfare model results show that quickly identifying and pricing high-risk areas can
attenuate climate damages.
My results are related to an urban economics literature on adaptation to disaster risk as a
function of income, location, and housing supply (Baylis and Boomhower, 2019, 2021; Boustan et al., 2012; Kahn, 2005). This paper shows that disaster insurance markets, through
both their price-setting and information provision functions, are key drivers of adaptation.
Furthermore, I place disaster adaptation in an empirically estimable model that calculates
the welfare implications of new risk information with dynamic climate risk.
I also contribute to the literature on welfare in insurance markets, which has used insights
from the sufficient statistics literature to estimate welfare counterfactuals from empirically
estimable reduced form parameters (Chetty et al., 2009; Chetty, 2009; Einav et al., 2010;
Handel et al., 2019; Kleven, 2021). I enrich these frameworks by allowing consumers’ risk
4

For a contrasting study that finds no effect of sea level rise risk on home prices, see Murfin and Spiegel
(2020).
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beliefs and adaptation to endogenously respond to new information from insurers. Even
with dynamic risk, prices, information, and moral hazard, my model’s results still turn on
quasi-experimentally identified reduced-form parameters with minimal assumptions about
information or expectations.
My model of insurance demand and adaptation uses the proposition, extending back to
Ehrlich and Becker (1972), that consumers substitute between formal insurance and adaptation, or “self-protection”. Another of my model’s main motivations, that consumers learn
from the same information insurers use to set prices, is reflected in Kunreuther and Pauly
(2004). My paper combines these two insights, allowing new information from insurers to
change consumers’ risk beliefs and their demand for self-protection. My results on the effect
of risk rating on adaptation provide some of the first empirical evidence on how insurance
pricing affects self-protection, or “ex-ante moral hazard” (Dave and Kaestner, 2009; Zweifel
and Manning, 2000).
My paper adds to our understanding of how financial and risk literacy affect welfare in
household finance. Previous studies have shown that consumers often underweight “low
probability, high consequence” risks (Dimmock et al., 2021; Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1989;
Meyer and Kunreuther, 2017). Risk misperceptions can cause households to make suboptimal financial and insurance decisions (Behrman et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2021). My survey
evidence reveals that correct risk classification can change risk perceptions and increase
demand for flood insurance, showing how information can reduce financial literacy biases.
Finally, my results add to a literature studying the determinants of flood insurance demand.
This literature has identified a puzzlingly low flood insurance take-up rate and offered explanations such as risk misperceptions, crowd-out from disaster aid or mortgage default, and
learning frictions (Bradt et al., 2021; Gallagher, 2014; Kousky, 2017; Kousky et al., 2018;
Liao and Mulder, 2021; Mulder, 2019; Netusil et al., 2021a; Petrolia et al., 2013). I identify
miclassification of high-risk properties as one contributor to low flood insurance demand.
My survey provides the first evidence of the effect of floodplain designation on risk percep-
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tions and insurance demand while controlling for differences in prices and lender-required
insurance.
In what follows, I first discuss institutional details around the NFIP. Next, I model the
endogenous relationships between risk classification, risk perceptions, and adaptation. Then,
I describe the data, empirical strategies, and results for calculating welfare from the model.
Finally, I discuss welfare counterfactuals from using new risk information to improve risk
classification.

1.2

The National Flood Insurance Program

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a publicly run flood insurer. The program
is the primary provider of flood insurance in the United States, writing over 95% of flood
insurance policies (Kousky et al., 2018). Below, I describe the NFIP’s rate-setting practices
over the estimation sample period, before its recent “Risk Rating 2.0” reforms (FEMA 2021).
The program’s insurance underwriting is based on flood maps produced by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA flood maps use elevation data and hydrological models to delineate the land area that has at least a 1% chance of flooding each
year, and the corresponding flood depth with a 1% chance of being exceeded (“100-year flood
depth”). Inside the floodplain, a property’s premiums are based on the elevation of its first
floor relative to the 100-year flood depth. Outside the floodplain, premiums are independent
of elevation or any other measure of flood risk and generally lower than premiums inside the
floodplain.
The floodplain is not only used to set premiums but also to guide relevant regulations. The
NFIP requires all floodplain homes built since the community’s first flood map, typically
1975-1985, to be built so that their first floor elevation equals or exceeds the 100-year
flood depth. Mortgage borrowers inside the floodplain are often subject to mandatory flood
insurance. Lenders who are federally regulated or selling a loan to a federally backed agency
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must require their borrowers inside the floodplain to carry flood insurance equal to the
minimum of the structure’s replacement cost, loan value, or the coverage limit of $250,000.5
Starting in the early 2000s, new lidar data made it possible to gather inexpensive and increasingly accurate ground elevation data over large areas (GAO 2004). These new elevation
data led to many map revisions, prompting the NFIP to offer the Newly Mapped Subsidy
program in 2015. Under the Newly Mapped Subsidy, a homeowner whose property was
remapped into the floodplain may still purchase flood insurance within two years of remapping at lower, non-floodplain premiums. Beginning in the second calendar year after the new
flood map, renewing remapped policies are subject to approximately 15% annual premium
increases. Even in the oldest remapped areas, premiums under the Newly Mapped program
remain below their corresponding floodplain rates.

1.3

Theoretical Framework

This model describes a housing market with disaster insurance and dynamic risk when
beliefs, adaptation, and premiums are all endogenous to information. An insurer’s riskrating technology provides public signals that simultaneously inform premiums and buyers’
beliefs about their risk. Buyers choose how much to insure and how much to invest in
risk-reducing adaptation based on their beliefs and premiums. Although the setting here
considers flood insurance, the model could be applied to wildfire risk, auto insurer driver
monitoring devices, wellness incentives in health insurance, or the pricing of risk in lending.

1.3.1

A Model of Flood Insurance in Housing Markets with Endogenous
Adaptation and Beliefs

Consider a model that proceeds over t = 0, ..., T periods with a population of homes h
each occupied by a homeowner i. Each home is endowed with a flood risk type Fh ∈
5
A history of federal reports have suggested that the mandatory purchase requirement may not be well
enforced, and no administrative data can actually measure compliance (GAO 2021). In my survey of coastal
homeowners, I find that most floodplain mortgage borrowers report being subject to the mandatory purchase
requirement.
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{0, 1} denoting low-risk and high-risk, respectively. In each period t ≥ 1, homes flood with
probability p causing flood damage RtFh where Rt0 < Rt1 . At t = 0, homeowners can invest
in adaptation Ah ≥ 0 to decrease their home’s flood damage to (1 − Ah )RtFh . Adaptation
incurs ch (A) in maintenance costs each period where

dch
dA

≥ 0,

d2 ch
dA2

≥ 0, and ch (0) = 0. For

t > 0, adaptation is fixed. Before flooding is realized each period, homeowners can insure
share 0 ≤ Iiht ≤ 1 of their flood damage at rate Pht from a public insurer. After flooding is
realized, owners pay their adaptation maintenance, insurance premiums, and any uninsured
flood damage and consume their remaining per-period income Y .
Premiums are set according to a public signal fh ∈ {0, 1} at t = 0 from the insurer’s risk
modeling technology correlated with each home’s true risk type Fh . We will assume that
the risk model always correctly classifies low-risk homes, but misclassifies high-risk homes
as low-risk with probability ρ.6 If its risk model shows a home as high-risk, the insurer
measures a property’s adaptation and sets its premiums equal to its expected costs, times
1 = κp(1 − A )R1 = D . For low-risk homes, the insurer
a loading fee κ, denoted Dht : Pht
h
ht
t
F 0 = P .7
does not measure adaptation and sets a flat premium Pht
t

The insurer must be budget neutral at the end of each period and levies taxes or remits
surpluses, equal to τt per household, to meet ex-post discrepancies between premiums and
claims. The following budget constraint holds in expectation:

Z
τt = E


Iiht ∗ (Pht − Dht )

(1.1)

h

Owners do not observe their homes’ risk types directly, but they do observe some private
information about their risk type and the public classification signal fh from the insurer’s
6

For clarity of exposition and to focus on the empirical application of identifying and pricing homes with
high flood risk, we ignore the case where the model misclassifies low-risk homes as high-risk. The model
can be extended without loss general of generality to incorporate such two-sided misclassification, and the
welfare effects of reducing low-to-high misclassification can be estimated in the same framework.
7
Transaction costs are one reason an insurer would measure adaptation for high-risk but not low-risk
homes. The cost of elevation certificates, estimated to average $600, has led the National Flood Insurance
Program not to use elevation to set premiums outside the floodplain (Price, 2019).
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model. If the insurer’s model shows a low-risk signal, the owner perceives their risk type as
B0 = (1−α )R0 +α R1 , where α is the probability that the owner’s home was misclassified
Riht
h
h t
h
t

as low-risk based on ρ and their private information. If the model shows a high-risk signal,
B1 = R1 .
the owner knows they are high-risk with certainty and forms risk type beliefs Riht
t

Let wi (R) be owner i’s willingness-to-pay to fully insure flood damage R, where
d2 wi
dR2

dwi
dR

> 0,

> 0, and wi (0) = 0.8 In each period, owners choose insurance take-up Iiht to maximize

their expected utility, which we approximate by the quasilinear function:9

BF
argmax ui(ht) = Yi − ch (Ah ) − Iiht ∗ Pht − wi (1 − Iiht )(1 − Ah )Riht



(1.2)

h,Ii(h)

Homeowner i’s insurance decision in each period is given by the first-order condition:

BF
BF ′
wi (1 − Iiht )(1 − Ah )Riht
Pht = (1 − Ah )Riht



(1.3)

Owners insure until the expected marginal utility of reducing losses equals the marginal
price of insurance.
Next, we turn to owners’ adaptation decisions, which follow the first-order condition:

" T
#
F
X

dPht
dc(Ah )
BF ′
BF
=E
(1 − Iiht )Riht wi (1 − Iiht )(1 − Ah )Riht − Iiht
dA
dA

(1.4)

t=1

Owners adapt until maintenance costs equal the expected future sum of benefits from reduced uninsured risk and lower premiums. Note that owners of homes classified as low-risk
by the insurer have no premium incentive to adapt because

dPh0
dA

= 0.

8
For a buyer with concave utility u and income Y facing a loss R with probability p, w is defined such
that u(Y − w) = (1 − p) ∗ u(Y ) + p ∗ u(Y − R). This approximation and the quasilinear approximation used
in equation (1.2) assume away insurance demand income effects.
9
The insurance willingness-to-pay of owners classified as low-risk will be w(RB0 ) = (1−α)w(R0 )+αw(R1 ),
reflecting the probability of misclassification, while w(RB1 ) = w(R1 ). For notational simplicity I simply write
w(RBF ) = w(RBF ).
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Welfare estimation will require placing some structure on risk dynamics and owners’ beliefs.
I assume that from t = 0 to t = T , low-risk homes’ flood damages remain constant while
high-risk homes’ damages increase by a constant factor γ. That is:
Assumption 1. The dynamic flood damages of low-risk and high-risk homes are, respectively:
Rt0 = R00
Rt1 = (1 + t ∗ γ)R01
The respective flood damage expectation of buyers classified as low-risk and high-risk are:

 B0 
E Riht
= (1 − αh )R00 + αh (1 + tγ)R01
 B1 
E Riht
= (1 + tγ)R01

I will assume that the insurer adjusts premiums continuously for the changing expected costs
1 = (1 + tγ)P 1 and P = (1 + tγ 0 )P .
according to the respective γ terms, such that Pht
t
h0

Although assumption 1 does not incorporate much of the fundamental uncertainty or heterogeneity in climate projections, it does capture the most salient feature of relative flood
risk dynamics between low-risk and high-risk homes. In section 1.6.1, I describe the calibration of γ 1 and provide evidence that assumption 1 is plausible. The First Street Foundation
Flood Model, described in section 1.4.2, projects little change in the expected flood damages
of homes with minimal flood exposure today through 2050. By contrast, a large majority
of homes today with high flood risk today will see substantial increases in their expected
losses by 2050.
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1.3.2

Welfare Effects of Risk Information

Next, I describe how information from improved risk modeling technology affects social welfare by reducing the insurer’s misclassification rate ρ of high-risk properties. A household’s
f
classified risk type, f ∈ {0, 1}, determines its choices of insurance and adaptation, Iiht
and

Afiht . Using this notation, we express each household’s net impact on social welfare by the
F (I f , Af ) = uF (I f , Af ) + τ F (I f , Af ),
sum of its private utility and net fiscal impact viht
iht iht
iht iht
iht
h
h
h

where F ∈ {0, 1} is the home’s actual risk type. Total welfare is:

TW = E

T
X

β t−1

Z
i

t=1


f
F
viht
(Iiht
, Afh )

Consider a counterfactual risk model improvement that reduces the misclassification rate by
dρ and denote dfh ∈ {0, 1} as the change in home h′ s risk classification. I assume that all
misclassified homes are equally likely to be correctly classified by the improved model. I also
assume that the change in welfare for households that continue to be classified as low-risk
are negligible. Under these assumptions, the change in welfare from dρ is:

T

 X t−1
TW
=E
β
dρ

Z

β t−1

Z

=E

=E



t=1
T
X



t=1
T
X
t=1


0
1
1
1
, A0h )
(Iiht
, A1h ) − viht
(Iiht
viht

dfh =1


0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
(Iiht
, A0h ))
(Iiht
, A1h ) − viht
, A1h )) + (viht
, A1h ) − viht
(Iiht
(Iiht
(viht

dfh =1

β

t−1

Z
dfh =1

Z

1
Iiht

0
Iiht

1 (I, A1 )
dviht
h
dI +
dI

Z

A1h

A0h

1 (I 0 , A)

dviht
iht
dA
dA

(1.5)

Equation (1.5) shows that the welfare gains from better risk information are the sum of
the effects from changing the insurance take-up and adaptation of otherwise misclassified
households. How does reclassification change these decisions? Consider a high-risk household
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with higher premiums post-reclassification, so that pκ(1 − A1 )Rt1 > P t .10 Equation (1.3)
implies that the sign of I 1 −I 0 is ambiguous. Reclassification causes an insurance price effect
that dampens insurance demand as P 1 > P , but also an information effect that increases
insurance demand if RB0 < R1 . By contrast, the first-order condition in equation (1.4)
unambiguously implies that A1 > A0 . After being reclassified as high-risk, the household
has an extra premium incentive to adapt, the insurance price effect leads the household
to substitute from insurance to adaptation, and any information effect further moves the
household to adapt by increasing their perceived uninsured risk.
We will simplify equation (1.5) by aggregating insurance demand and adaptation up to
the market of reclassified households and approximating the differences in welfare with
R
R
f
and Af = dfh =1 Af , and Dtf =
trapezoidal Harberger triangles. Let Itf = dfh =1 Iiht
R
f
f
f
1
dfh =1 p(1 − Ah )κR . Define Wt (I, A ) as the insurance willingness-to-pay curve such that
R
f
(P, A0h ) = I q . We can approximate equafor insurance premium P = Wtf (I q , Af ), dfh =1 Iiht
tion (1.5) as:11

Public Funds

T
{ 1

T W X t−1 z 0 }|0
=
β (λIt ∗ (Dt − P t ) + ∗ (It1 − It0 )(Wt1 It0 , A1 − Dt1 )
dρ
2
|
{z
}
t=1

Take-Up

(1.6)

Adaptation
}|
{
z



(1 − A1 )
+
(1 − It0 )(Wt1 (It0 , A0 ) − Et=0 Wt0 (It0 , A0 ) ) + (1 + λ)It0 Dt0 )
0
(1 − A )
|
{z
}

Moral Hazard

Equation (1.6) divides the welfare effects of improved risk-rating into four terms that reflect
the deadweight losses caused by misclassification:
1. Public Funds: Raising public funds to cover net outlays on misclassified homes creates
10

This describes the large majority of floodplain NFIP premiums relative to their counterfactual nonfloodplain premiums.
11

Equation (1.6) includes an additional second order welfare term, 12 (A1 − A0 )
for clarity.
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dvt1 (I 0 ,A1 )
,
dA

that I omit here

social costs, reflected by λ
2. Take-Up: Due to a combination of the price effect and information effect of misclassification, insurance take-up is too low (I 1 > I 0 ) or too high (I 1 < I 0 ) so that marginal
willingness-to-pay does not equal marginal costs to the insurer
3. Adaptation: Households underinvest in adaptation because they underestimate their
uninsured flood risk due to misclassification
4. Moral Hazard: Households underinvest in adaptation because they have no premium
incentive to reduce their insured risk
The adaptation and take-up terms highlight the importance of accounting for the information
effects of improved risk rating. If reclassification has no information effect, or F B0 = R1 ,


then the adaptation effect is 0 because Wt1 = Et=0 Wt0 (It0 , A0 ) . In the take-up effect, when
I 0 > I 1 this implies that W 1 (I 0 , A1 ) < P 1 . In this case, the take-up can be evaluated as a
standard deadweight loss triangle that results from pricing a good below its marginal cost.12
By contrast, if I 0 < I 1 then W 1 (I 0 , A1 ) > P 1 . In this scenario, because the information
effect overpowers the price effect, misclassified households would purchase too little insurance
despite their lower premiums.
Equation (1.6) also shows how dynamic risk changes the welfare effects of risk information. Applying Assumption 1, Dtf = (1 + tγ)D0f for risk growth rate γ. As risk changes
dynamically, so do risk perceptions. Increasing risk effectively erodes adaptation, so that
Wt1 (I, (1 − A)) = W01 (I, (1 + tγ) ∗ (1 − A)).13 While correctly classified households update
their insurance willingness-to-pay according to their increasing risk, misclassified households
only have willingness-to-pay Wt0 (I, (1 − A)) = W00 (I, (1 + tγ 0 ) ∗ (1 − A)). If γ 0 < γ, then
the wedge between Wt1 and Wt0 will increase with t.
12

However, one must still correctly estimate W 1 to estimate the area of the deadweight loss triangle. If
there was an information effect so that F B0 < R1 , then W 1 (I 0 , A0 ) > P , whereas a revealed preference
analysis assuming no information effect would conclude W 1 (I 0 , A0 ) = P .
13
I express W as a function of (1 − A) rather than A here to simplify its expression with γ.
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1.3.3

Heterogeneity and Sorting

As emphasized in the sufficient statistics literature dealing with biased agents, heterogeneous
frictions can substantially affect welfare conclusions (Handel et al., 2019; Lockwood, 2020;
Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, 2018). In the model described above, I allow for heterogeneity
in the information effect of reclassification, F B1 − F B0 . My welfare calculations take the
most conservative approach to how this heterogeneity might interact with welfare in terms
of take-up. To illustrate, say the price effects and information effects exactly cancel out so
that I 0 = I 1 . The take-up effect in equation (1.6) would equal zero in this case. In reality,
risk classification likely creates a more efficient ordering of households along the insurance
demand curve, so that I 1 has a different distribution of take-up across households than I 0 .
Thus, the welfare effect would actually be positive unless all households maintain the exact
same insurance take-up under I 1 and I 0 .
The model assumes that risk information does not change where homeowners live and does
not allow household to move. Allowing for sorting would increase the welfare effects of
risk information. If risk information changes households’ willingness-to-pay for different
homes, subsequent resorting represents an additional welfare effect similar to the take-up
and adaptation terms in equation (1.6).14
Finally, implicit in the model is an assumption of no adverse selection for correctly classified
high-risk households. I argue this assumption is plausible for flood insurance. As discussed in
section 1.2, the last decade has seen rapid advances in flood risk modeling technology. The
granular data on elevation and historical flooding used in advanced flood models surpass
the information available to most homeowners. An extensive literature has documented
homeowners’ difficulties gauging flood risk due to biased and costly learning about rare
events and cognitive biases.15 More generally, the insurance literature has found mixed or
14

Bakkensen and Ma (2020) find evidence that households sort of flood insurance preferences in MiamiDade county.
15
See Bakkensen and Barrage (2017); Gallagher (2014); Kunreuther and Pauly (2004); Mulder (2019);
Wagner (2021a) for examples of frictions in flood risk perceptions and the relationship between risk and
insurance demand.
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weak evidence of selection due to asymmetric information in settings such as life, health, and
auto insurance, even under minimal risk adjustment.16 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
under improved risk rating counterfactuals the flood insurance market would have minimal
adverse selection on fully risk rated policies.

1.3.4

Empirical Parameters for Welfare Estimation

I will estimate welfare from my model described above in the setting of the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP). The model’s risk types correspond to FEMA’s mapping of
properties inside (“high-risk”) or outside (“low-risk”) the floodplain. The counterfactual of
interest is the welfare effects of new technologies that allow the NFIP to identify high-risk
areas more quickly and accurately.
Following the literature of sufficient statistics models, the welfare formula described in equation (1.6) is made up of terms that can be empirically estimated with reduced form methods
(Chetty, 2009; Einav et al., 2010; Kleven, 2021; Wagner, 2021a). Several of the parameters
can be calibrated from data summary statistics, risk models, or adopted from relevant papers. Unlike these terms, however, the adaptation and insurance behavioral responses must
be causally identified.
To calculate equation (1.6), I need to identify three causal effects: The price elasticity of
insurance demand (“price effect”), the information effect of risk classification on insurance
demand (“information effect”), and the effect of risk classification on adaptation investment
(“adaptation effect”).
The next sections describe the data and empirical strategies used to estimate each of these
causal effects.
16

See for example Cohen (2005); Cutler et al. (2008); Einav et al. (2010); Finkelstein and Poterba (2004);
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006); McCarthy and Mitchell (2010).
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1.4

Data

To estimate the sufficient statistics for welfare analysis, I combine several data sources to
compare the flood insurance demand and adaptation of properties classified as low- and
high-risk. First, I use administrative data on National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
policies and claims in zip codes where homes outside the floodplain have been remapped
into the floodplain. Second, I design and field a survey of the flood insurance demand and
risk perceptions of homeowners in flood-exposed coastal areas. Survey responses are merged
to two property-level risk models and flood map information. The section below describes
how these data are used to construct the analysis samples and variables.

1.4.1

National Flood Insurance Program Policy and Remapping Data

I use data on National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) policies and claims from the OpenFEMA Redacted Policies and Redacted Claims databases (OpenFEMA 2021). These data
show the universe of policies and their respective claims from 2009-2020 with information on
the amount of coverage purchased and deductible, the date the policy was originally written
and most recently renewed, location at the census tract level, and the property year built
and number of stories. The claims data record the date of loss and amount paid for each
claim.
The primary empirical variation for estimating the Floodplain Adaptation Effect, Floodplain
Demand Effect, and flood insurance demand function come from areas that have been newly
mapped into the floodplain by the NFIP from 2015-2019. As described in Section 1.2, the
Newly Mapped Subsidy program started by the NFIP in 2015 allows homes newly mapped
into the floodplain to purchase flood insurance at their original non-floodplain rates. Two
years after remapping, newly mapped homes’ premiums begin to increase by approximately
15% per year. The policy data have indicators for policies written under the Newly Mapped
Subsidy program. Using these indicators and the schedule for Newly Mapped premium
increases, I identify zip codes where properties were newly mapped into the floodplain and
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the year that the remapping occurred.
The top panel of Figure 1.1 maps the counties with zip codes with newly mapped policies
and the year they were remapped. The estimation sample contains 359 counties with approximately 900,000 active flood insurance policies as of 2020. The bottom panel of Figure
1.1 plots the distribution of remapping years across newly mapped policies active in 2020.
In these zip codes, average annual premiums are $530 and $1,330 outside and inside the
floodplain, respectively, prior to remapping.

1.4.2

Flood Insurance Survey

Working with the Wharton Risk Center, I designed and fielded a survey of high-risk coastal
homeowners to test the robustness of and mechanisms driving the Floodplain Demand Effect
estimated from the newly mapped policy data. The survey was conducted through Online
Qualtrics Panels from March-May 2021. Participants were screened for single-family homeowners living in one of 950 highest risk coastal zip codes identified from the First Street
Foundation Flood Model, or FSF-FM (First Street Foundation 2021).17
2,167 participants completed the survey. Of these, the estimation sample was limited to the
1,080 respondents age 25 or older willing to volunteer their home address and who provided
a purchase year for their homes within two years of CoreLogic deed records. Of these, the
sample was further restricted to 885 participants who passed an attention check, and finally
to 702 participants whose homes were within one mile of the floodplain boundary. Figure
1.2 maps the number of respondents by county in the survey estimation sample.
The survey elicited whether each participant had flood insurance. A common misperception
among homeowners is that flood insurance is included in their standard homeowners insurance policy, but this is almost uniformly untrue. Among participants who reported having
flood insurance, the survey asked if the policy was included in their homeowner’s insurance
policy and whether they paid a separate premium for their flood insurance. Respondents
17

The detailed methodology behind the FSF-FM is described in First Street Foundation (2020).
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who indicated that their flood insurance was part of their homeowner’s policy and that
they did not pay a separate flood insurance premium were not counted as flood insurance
purchasers.18
A challenge assessing flood insurance demand is the mandatory purchase requirement imposed by most lenders on borrowers inside the floodplain. As described in Section 1.2,
federally regulated lenders or lenders writing a loan securitized with federally backed enterprises must require floodplain borrowers to carry flood insurance. All respondents reporting
flood insurance and a mortgage were asked if their lender requires flood insurance. Respondents indicating that they face a mortgage purchase requirement were asked how likely
they would be to buy flood insurance if their lender didn’t require it on a 1-5 Likert scale.
Only respondents that indicate they would be “Somewhat likely” or “Extremely likely” to
buy flood insurance in the absence of the mandatory purchase requirement are counted as
voluntary flood insurance purchasers. The survey asks participants about their flood risk
perceptions. The primary risk perceptions measure is “What is the chance that your home
will be damaged by a flood in the next ten years?”, which participants answered from 0 to
100%. Table A.1 reports summary statistics from the survey estimation sample.
The survey also assesses risk perceptions with an incentivized hypothetical insurance purchase scenario. Participants were asked how much they would be willing to pay for an annual
flood insurance policy on their homes. Each respondent was told that their (hypothetical)
home may be damaged by a flood, which will be determined by a randomly selected claim
from a zip code with risk similar to their (actual) home’s risk.19 If they bought flood insurance, they suffered no damage from any claim but paid a randomly drawn premium instead.
If they did not buy flood insurance, they paid any realized claim but no premium. Their
maximum willingness-to-pay for this hypothetical insurance product was elicited through
a series of potential prices that narrowed their minimum and maximum willingness-to-pay
18
16% of respondents thought flood insurance was a standard part of their homeowner’s policy. This
misperception was more common outside the floodplain (18%) than inside the floodplain (9%).
19
The claims were randomly drawn from the last ten years of NFIP claims in a zip code that matches the
predicted claims of the respondent’s zip code according to the FSF-FM.
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before asking their exact willingness-to-pay within that range. The bonus was paid as a 1%
chance of having a $100 Amazon gift card mailed to their address, minus flood insurance
premiums or flood losses.
Each survey respondent in the estimation sample was linked to their property-specific FSFFM and KatRisk flood risk models. Both models estimate average annual flood losses and
expected flood depths across different return periods (e.g. the “500-year” or “100-year” flood).
The primary risk model measure is the average 100-year flood depth between the two models.
Averaging the results of the two models attenuates the idiosyncracies of relying on any one
flood risk estimation methodology. Reassuringly, even though the two models were built
independently with different methodologies, their 100-year flood depths have a correlation
coefficient of 0.58 in the estimation sample. The survey also asked each participant if their
current home had been damaged by a flood while they lived there.
The FSF-FM includes a climate projection of the changes in expected flood depths through
2050. I use the change in average annualized losses between 2020 and 2050 as a measure of
the expected 30-year change in flood risk.
Respondents’ homes’ locations were linked to their most recent flood map and elevation data.
I measure properties’ current FEMA floodzones and distances from the nearest floodplain
boundary. For homes inside the floodplain, I record the associated 100-year flood depth. For
homes outside the floodplain, I measure the 100-year flood depth of the nearest floodplain.
The FSF-FM includes the most recent ground elevation of each property according to the
USGS National Map data.

1.5

Estimating Sufficient Statistics for Welfare

In this section, I describe the methods and results for estimating the three sufficient statistics
to calculate welfare with equation (1.6): The price effect, information effect, and adaptation
effect.
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1.5.1

Remapping, Take-Up, and Premiums

A challenge estimating the price elasticity of flood insurance demand is that different premiums can also imply different risk classifications, conflating the information and price effects.
The National Flood Insurance Program’s Newly Mapped Subsidy program, described in
section 1.4.1, delays flood insurance premium increases for homes newly remapped into the
floodplain for two years, after which their rates increase by approximately 15% annually,
independent of risk. This variation separates premium increases from initial reclassification,
which I use to identify the price effect.
I first study how remapping affects flood insurance take-up and premiums for newly mapped
properties using the sample of remapped counties described in section 1.4.1. Although
providing suggestive evidence of a positive information effect and negative price effect, I
will argue that this empirical exercise alone does not identify either effect. In subsequent
sections, I will use additional data and variation to causally identify both effects.20
My estimating equation is given by:

P oliciesinmt = αimt + αinm +

t=2020
X

λt−m I[N ewlyM appedn = 1] + ϵinmt

(1.7)

t=m

where P oliciesinmt is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformed count of active policies in
county i that were remapped into the floodplain (n = 1), “newly mapped”, or remained
outside the floodplain (n = 0), “non-floodplain”, during remapping that occurred in year m
as of year t. To estimate changes in premiums, I replace policies with log average premiums
as the dependent variable. αimt is county by remapping year by year interacted fixed effects,
and αinm is county by newly mapped status by remapping year interacted fixed effects. λt−m
traces out the dynamic effects of remapping on the number of newly mapped policies from
the year of remapping (m = t) through 2020.21 The key identifying assumption is that, in
20
This initial empirical exercise is still useful as the first empirical evaluation of the Newly Mapped Subsidy
program, even if the welfare implications of its results are ambiguous.
21
b coefficients from differences in the timing of flood map
Note that equation 1.7 does not estimate the λ
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the absence of remapping, the premiums and policy counts of these two sets of non-floodplain
policies would have remained on parallel trends.
Figure 1.3 plots the estimated remapping coefficients from Equation (1.7) for policy counts
(top panel) and premiums (bottom panel) of homes remapped into the floodplain relative
to homes that remained outside the floodplain. By the first year after remapping, the
relative number of policies in areas remapped into the floodplain approximately doubled.
By contrast, premiums one year after remapping are less than 5% higher for homes moved
inside the floodplain, an increase that reflects an extra 25$ policy fee levied on policies under
the Newly Mapped Subsidy program.
In the second year after remapping, newly mapped premiums begin to increase more sharply
as the statutory 15% annual price increase at policy renewal take effect. Five years after
remapping, premiums are 45% higher on the policies of homes moved into the floodplain.
As premiums increase, the relative increase in the number of policies on homes moved into
the floodplain stalls and declines. By the fifth year after remapping, there is only a 55%
relative increase in newly mapped policies.
The results in Figure 1.3 suggest a positive information effect from the initial increase in
newly mapped policies and a price effect from their subsequent relative decline. These
patterns, however, do not identify the price or information effects. As described in section
1.2, some newly mapped homeowners may have bought flood insurance to satisfy the federal
mandatory purchase requirement on their mortgage, confounding the information effect. The
declining flood insurance take-up result conflates the effect of increasing premiums with any
non-premium dynamic remapping effects. In particular, some of the dynamic take-up effects
may be specific to the Newly Mapped Subsidy program as any newly mapped homeowner
buying flood insurance more than two years after remapping would buy a normal floodplain
policy.
changes. Rather, the αimt fixed effects restrict the empirical comparisons to variation between newly mapped
and non-floodplain homes within the same county in the same year. This approach avoids the dynamic biases
in staggered difference-in-difference settings (Baker et al., 2021; Goodman-Bacon, 2021).
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I return to the issue of identifying the information effect in section 1.5.2. Next, I describe
how to separately identify the price effect from the remapped policy data.

Price Effect Estimation Strategy
Separating the price elasticity of flood insurance demand requires comparing newly mapped
policies making similar renewal decisions but facing different premiums. The structure
of the Newly Mapped Subsidy mimics this ideal premium variation with situations where
newly mapped policies originally written in the same year nonetheless face different premium
changes at renewal.
To illustrate, consider a “homeowner A” mapped into the floodplain in October 2015 who
buys flood insurance under the Newly Mapped Subsidy in January 2016. When they decide
whether to renew in January 2017, their premium will be 15% higher because the flood
map will be two (calendar) years old. By contrast, consider a “homeowner B” mapped into
the floodplain in January 2016 who buys flood insurance in April 2016. When they decide
whether to renew in April 2017, their premium will be unchanged because their flood map
will only be one (calendar) year old.
I identify the price elasticity from the extent to which homeowner A is less likely to renew
than homeowner B. The estimating equation is:

Renewiqt = αqt + βXiqt + σ∆Piqt + ϵiqt

(1.8)

where Renewiqt is an indicator variable for whether policy i originally written in year q
renews in year t. The equation includes originally written year by renewal year interacted
fixed effects and additional controls.22 Standard errors are clustered by county.
∆Piqt is the percent increase in premiums according to the Newly Mapped Subsidy schedule.
22
Similar to the discussion around equation 1.7, comparing renewal rates within the same renewal year,
and not across years, avoids the dynamic biases in staggered difference-in-difference settings.
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σ is the price elasticity of flood insurance demand, or the change in the probability of renewal
from a 1% increase in premiums. The key identifying assumption is that the policies with
different underlying map years but written in the same year would have had the same
propensity to renew, absent their different premium inflation.

Price Effect Results
Table 1.1 shows the results from estimating Equation (1.8). The baseline specification, with
only first policy year by renewal year interacted fixed effects, suggests that a one percent
premium increase decreases the probability of renewal by 0.15 percentage points. Subsequent
columns add increasing controls: State fixed effects, controls for the past two years of claims
in the renewing policy’s county, and fixed effects for the month of year written. Across all
of these specifications, the renewal elasticity remains around 0.17.
The results in Table 1.1 suggest that flood insurance demand is inelastic, a finding similar
to other estimates which have found elasticities of 0.25 and 0.29 (Bradt et al., 2021; Wagner,
2021a). Part of the reason for this low elasticity may because some policyholders cannot drop
their coverage due to the mandatory purchase requirement associated with their mortgage.
In section 1.5.2, I adjust the estimated price elasticity for the share of mandatory purchasers
from the survey data described in section 1.4.2.
What does this estimated price elasticity project for the relative take-up rate of newly
mapped policies once their premiums rise to floodplain levels? I use the average nonfloodplain and floodplain premiums of $530 and $1,330 from the the sample of remapped zip
codes described in section 1.4.1. Applying the estimated price elasticity of 0.17 to an isoelastic demand function implies that the estimated 100% relative increase in newly mapped
policies one year after remapping in Figure 1.3 would remain elevated by 71% even after
premiums fully adjust to floodplain levels.
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1.5.2

Information Effect

The results in Figure 1.3 suggest that remapping homes into the floodplain increases flood
insurance demand. This increase in demand may be driven by both changes in the risk
perceptions of remapped homeowners (the “information effect”) and the mandatory purchase
requirement for floodplain mortgages. Thus, although remapping and the newly mapped
subsidy was useful for identifying the price elasticity of flood insurance demand, it cannot
separately identify the information effect.
This section uses evidence from the flood insurance demand survey to identify the information effect. The key innovation of the survey is that it measures flood insurance demand
independent of lender purchase requirements while including rich measures of objective flood
risk and demographics to compare the voluntary flood insurance demand of floodplain homeowners with similar misclassified non-floodplain homeowners.

Voluntary Flood Insurance Demand Methodology
As described in section 1.4.2, the survey directly measured whether homeowners in highrisk areas were bound by the mandatory purchase requirement, creating a novel measure of
voluntary flood insurance demand inside the floodplain. By linking respondents’ addresses
to flood risk models and flood map data, I can estimate the difference in voluntary flood
insurance demand for homes inside versus outside the floodplain but with similar risk. The
estimating equation for voluntary flood insurance demand is:

V oluntaryInsuredi = α0 + β0 Xi + β1 P AST F LOODi + β2 100Y EARi + β3 F loodplaini + ϵi
(1.9)
where V oluntaryInsuredi is an indicator variable for respondent i voluntarily buying flood
insurance (i.e. not due to a mandatory purchase requirement). Xi is self-reported controls
for log income, education, risk preferences, liquidity, sex, age, time in home, political party
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affiliation, mortgage status, and log home structure value. P AST F LOODi is an indicator
for whether the respondent reports their home being previously flooded, and 100Y EARi is
the average 100-year flood depths from the two property-level risk models. F loodplaini is
an indicator variable for whether respondent i was inside the floodplain. β3 identifies the
difference in flood insurance demand inside and outside the floodplain, inclusive of both
the negative price effect and any information effect. The identifying assumption is that the
floodplain indicator and error term are uncorrelated outside of these price and information
components. Standard errors are clustered by county.
A key innovation of my survey is the ability to identify homes with similar risk inside and
outside the floodplain. By FEMA’s definition, any home outside the floodplain should have
a less than 1% annual chance of flooding. However, according to the average 100-year flood
depth measure from the two risk models, 52% of the non-floodplain homes in the survey
estimation sample are above the 1% risk threshold, compared with 86% of floodplain homes.
Figure A.1 plots the average 100-year flood depth of floodplain and non-floodplain homes
with at least a 1% annual chance of flooding (i.e. a positive 100-year flood depth). Although
the expected 100-year depths of floodplain homes are generally higher than non-floodplain
homes, there is substantial overlap between the two distributions.
A concern with this identification strategy is that the risk model flood depths may be
measured with error, leading the floodplain coefficient to reflect measurement error in the
risk controls rather than the pure information effect. To address this concern, I apply the
“Obviously Related Instrumental Variables” (ORIV) method from Gillen et al. (2019). The
intuition of the method is to efficiently address measurement error by exploiting the fact
that I have two draws of each home’s risk from the two different flood models. The ORIV
estimates β2 in a stacked regression where each observation is duplicated (and standard
errors appropriately clustered) such that, first, the Kat Risk depth instruments the First
Street depth, and, second, the First Street depth instruments the Kat Risk depth.
As long as the measurement errors in the two flood depth measures are independent, the
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ORIV estimates will be consistent, unlike wit a simple average of the two measures, and
more efficient than arbitrarily choosing one measure to instrument the other. Fortunately for
this design, the two risk models were developed by independent researchers using different
methodologies, limiting the potential for correlated errors.
All standard errors are clustered by county, with 500 bootstrap samples in the ORIV specification.

Voluntary Flood Insurance Demand Results
Table 1.2 shows the results from estimating equation (1.9) with an indicator for voluntary insurance purchase as the dependent variable. Column (1) includes only demographic controls
and shows that floodplain homes were about 23 percentage points more likely to voluntarily
buy flood insurance than non-floodplain homes. Column (2) adds the average 100-year flood
depth control calculated from the two flood models, an indicator term if both flood depths
are 0, and an indicator for respondents who report their home being previously damaged by a
flood. Even controlling for these differences in risk, floodplain homes were about 15 percentage points more likely to voluntarily buy flood insurance than non-floodplain homeowners.
These results are surprising given that floodplain respondents reported paying $1,100 per
year higher flood insurance premiums than their non-floodplain counterparts (Table A.1).
Column (3) applies the ORIV method for the 100-year flood depth to address potential
measurement error. This specification shows that floodplain households were 13 percentage
points more likely to voluntarily buy flood insurance, an estimate that is similar to the OLS
estimate in column (2).
The results in Table 1.2 suggest that higher floodplain take-up is not primarily driven by
lender mandatory purchase requirements. To provide direct evidence for whether floodplain
classification drives risk perceptions, I re-estimate Equation (1.9) with the incentivized risk
perceptions elicitation described in Section 1.4.2 as the dependent variable, with results in
Table A.2. Under this measure, which incentivizes a hypothetical flood insurance purchase
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with past flood insurance claims of homes with similar risk as the respondent’s, floodplain
homeowners are willing to pay over 40% more for flood insurance than non-floodplain homeowners with similar risk.
Given the correlation between current risk and expected future risk, it is plausible that
floodplain classification may also affect future risk perceptions.23 To estimate how risk
classification affects future risk perceptions, I re-estimate Equation (1.9) with a binary indicator for whether the respondent believed their flood risk will be higher in 30 years. I
replace the elevation difference controls with controls for the property’s change in flood risk
as a quadratic function of the difference in the property’s average annualized loss between
2020 and 2050.
Table 1.3 shows the results from estimating Equation (1.9) with respondents’ future risk
beliefs as the dependent variable. The estimate indicates that floodplain respondents were
12 percentage points more likely to believe their flood risk would be higher in 30 years, a
27% relative increase from the non-floodplain baseline rate.

The Magnitude of the Information Effect
The results in Table 1.2 are evidence of the information effect. Despite their much higher
premiums, homeowners inside the floodplain (classified as high-risk) are 13 percentage points
more likely to buy flood insurance than non-floodplain owners with similar risk (misclassified
as low-risk).
One way to gauge whether this information effect is reasonable is by comparing it with the
change in take-up caused by reclassification into the floodplain after premiums fully adjust
implied by the newly mapped policy estimates. As discussed in section 1.5.1, the takeup and price elasticity estimates from Figure 1.3 and Table 1.1 imply that take-up would
still be 71% higher for policies remapped into the floodplain relative to those remaining
23

See section 1.6.1 for more discussion of the empirical relationship between current flood risk and projected
future risk.
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outside the floodplain even after premiums fully adjust. In the survey data, 17% of insured
floodplain homeowners are involuntary purchasers, implying a relative increase of 41%, or
15 percentage point, increase in the number of voluntary purchasers. The newly mapped
result’s implied 15 percentage point increase in voluntary take-up is consistent with the
estimated 13 percentage point increase from the survey data.
We can use the flood insurance price elasticity estimate in Table 1.1 to calculate the implied
difference in flood insurance willingness-to-pay between floodplain and non-floodplain highrisk homeowners. I calibrate an isoelastic flood insurance demand curve for homes moved
inside the floodplain from the adjusted voluntary price elasticity of 0.37, described in section
A.3, and the average floodplain premiums of $1,330 from the policy data in newly mapped
zip codes described in section 1.4.1.
Given average non-floodplain premiums of $530, revealed preference shows that high-risk
households have a marginal willingness-to-pay for flood insurance of $530 at an average takeup rate of 36% when misclassified as low-risk. However, once moved inside the floodplain,
this same revealed preference argument suggests that their marginal willingness-to-pay for
flood insurance is $1,330 at an average voluntary take-up rate of 50%. The isoelastic demand
curve implies that marginal willingness-to-pay for flood insurance of correctly classified highrisk households would be $3,315 at the non-floodplain 36% take-up rate.
This exercise frames the information effect as a dollar value; Reclassifying a high-risk household from low-risk to high-risk increases its marginal willingness-to-pay for flood insurance
from $530 to $3,315.

1.5.3

Adaptation Effect

This section describes the methodology for and results of estimating the adaptation effect.
The adaptation effect is defined as the difference in relative claims between two homes with
similar underlying risk but built with different high- versus low-risk classifications. In the
context of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), this means comparing the flood
30

damages of homes with similar risk built inside (high-risk) versus outside (low-risk) the
floodplain.
A challenge to estimating the adaptation effect is that flood risk outside the floodplain is
usually much lower than inside the floodplain. Given that the NFIP claims and policy
data lack granular location data, any comparison of claims inside and outside the floodplain
would confound differences in adaptation with differences in underlying risk.
To address this challenge, I compare the claims of policies on homes newly mapped into
the floodplain (“newly mapped”) between 2010-2019 with the claims of policies on homes
that were built inside the floodplain (“floodplain-built”) in the same census tracts. Although
newly mapped and floodplain-built homes now have the same risk-rating, differences in their
adaptation investments at construction should be persistent because of the prohibitively high
costs of elevating existing homes.24 Whereas newly mapped homes were classified as lowrisk with no premium incentives to elevate at construction, floodplain-built homes were built
with risk-rated premiums and information about 100-year flood depths from FEMA flood
maps.
To construct my estimation sample, I identify census tracts with both newly mapped and
floodplain-built policies that experienced large floods, or “loss events”. I define a loss event
as total flood insurance claims in a single day in a single county. I subset the data to the 479
largest loss events in the 2010-2019 claims data, accounting for about 85% of total claims
over the period.25 I omit all policies written on homes built prior to FEMA’s first flood
map in their communities, usually introduced between 1975 through the mid 80s. I also
omit homes built after the NFIP started its newly mapped policy in 2015. The estimation
sample consists of the 102,527 policies with 18,978 claims.
Before estimating their difference in claims, I first present evidence that floodplain-built
homes are better adapted than their newly mapped counterparts. The single most important
24
As cited in section 3.1, elevating a home at construction increases construction costs by 1-5%, whereas
raising an existing home costs over $100,000 (FEMA 2008, Dawson Foundation Repair 2021).
25
Results are similar when I expand the set of loss events to cover 95% of total claims.

31

predictor of a home’s damages during a flood is the net depth of water above its first floor.
Even a few feet can make a large difference; the average flood damages of homes with a
one-foot net flood depth was $17,000, whereas homes with three-feet net flood depths had
$33,500 average damages.26 The strong relationship between flood depths and damages
makes elevating a home’s first floor the most important adaptive investment to reduce flood
risk.
Although the NFIP policy data do not record the first floor elevations of newly mapped
homes, they do contain an indicator for whether newly mapped and floodplain-built homes
qualify as an “elevated buildings.” A building is considered elevated by the NFIP if its
living space is entirely above ground level (e.g. no basement) and it’s raised on a secure
foundation.27 In the estimation sample, the average first floor elevation above ground level
is 4.5 feet higher for floodplain-built homes that qualify as elevated buildings, suggesting
the variable is a good proxy for first floor height.
Figure A.2 plots the share of floodplain-built and newly mapped homes in the estimation
sample that qualify as elevated buildings by construction year, binned into five year intervals.
For all construction vintages, floodplain-built homes are consistently two to three times more
likely to be elevated than newly mapped homes. In addition, whereas the share of floodplainbuilt homes that are elevated has been increasing over time, the share of remapped homes
that are elevated has remained relatively flat.
The trends in Figure A.2 suggest that floodplain-built homes are more adapted than their
newly mapped counterparts, and that this gap in adaptive investment is larger for newer
construction. For the welfare-relevant adaptation effect, the key question is how these differences in adaptation affect relative damages.
26

See Supplementary Table 2 of Wing et al. (2020).
See the April 2020 NFIP Flood Insurance Manual Appendix C for examples of structures that
would be considered elevated versus non-elevated. Available at https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance/
work-with-nfip/manuals/archive.
27
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Adaptation Effect: Estimation Strategy
I estimate the difference in flood insurance claims between policies covering newly mapped
and floodplain-built homes conditional on census tract by loss event interacted fixed effects
and a variety of property and policy characteristics from the NFIP policy and claims data.
My identifying assumption is that newly mapped and floodplain-built homes have similar
underlying risk conditional on being in the same census tract during the same loss event, so
that any differences in claims reflect differences in adaptation investment.
To address the excess mass of zeroes and skewed distribution of claims (see Figure A.3), I use
a hurdle model to estimate the difference in claims between newly mapped and floodplainbuilt policies. The first stage of the model estimates the probability of having a claim in a
linear probability model, and the second stage estimates the size of the log claim conditional
on having a claim.28
The first stage of the hurdle model is given by:

1
I[Claim > 0]iqL = αqL
+ βi1 Xi + A1 ∗ F Bi + ϵiqL

(1.10)

and the second stage by:

2
ln(Claim)iqL = αqL
+ βi2 Xi + A2 ∗ F Bi + µiqL

(1.11)

In the equations above, i indexes policies, q census tracts, and L loss events. Standard errors
are clustered by loss event. αqL are the census tract by loss event interacted fixed effects,
and Xi is a vector of fixed effects for the year the home was built and policy deductible, and
the amount of coverage purchased in $10,000 increments.
The primary dependent variable is the F B indicator, which equals 1 for policies on floodplain28

Results are similar when I estimate the first stage with a fixed effects logit model.
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b1
built. The adaptation effect is the relative difference in claims implied by the estimated A
b2 . In order to capture the differences in adaptation between homes built in differand A
ent periods, I also estimate equations (1.10) and (1.11) interacting the F B indicators with
decade-of-construction.

Adaptation Effect: Results
Table 1.4 shows the baseline results of the floodplain adaptation effect from estimating equations (1.10) and (1.11). The first column shows the conditional differences in the probability
of having a claim between floodplain-built and newly mapped homes. The floodplain-built
coefficient on having a claim is close to zero and precisely estimated. Column (2) shows that,
conditional on having a claim, floodplain-built homes had 12% lower claims. Combined with
the null claim probability result in column (1), the hurdle model suggests that floodplainbuilt properties had approximately 12% lower claims on average than newly mapped properties.
To explore whether the floodplain adaptation effect differs between older and newer construction, I interact the F B indicators in equations (1.10) and (1.11) with decade of construction
(1975-1984,1985-1994,1995-2004, and 2005-2014). Figure 1.4 plots the estimated coefficients
on the floodplain-built indicator by decade of construction coefficients, with newly mapped
homes as the omitted category. The top panel shows results for the probability of having a
claim, and the bottom panel shows results for the log claim conditional on having a claim.
As in Table 1.4, the results in the top panel of Figure 1.4 show little difference in the
probability of having a claim regardless of period of construction. The bottom panel shows
that, conditional on having a claim, floodplain-built homes tend to have smaller damages.
Consistent with the differences in adaptation investment from Figure A.2, the difference
in expected claims between newly mapped and floodplain-built homes is larger for newer
construction. Whereas floodplain-built homes constructed in 1975-1984 have approximately
7% lower expected claims than newly mapped homes built over the same period, floodplain-
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built homes constructed in 2005-2014 have 24% lower expected claims than their newly
mapped counterparts.
One plausible explanation for the difference in adaptation between floodplain-built and
newly mapped homes is the National Flood Insurance Program’s (NFIP) minimum elevation standards. All homes built inside the floodplain must be elevated at least to the
100-year flood elevation, beyond which homes receive premium discounts for additional elevation. The welfare implications of the adaptation effect depend on whether its driven by
the the minimum elevation requirement or the floodplain’s elevation-based premiums and
risk information. Due to the lack of first floor elevation data, we cannot observe how many
newly mapped homes are below the minimum elevation standard. The fact that approximately 97% of floodplain-built properties in the estimation sample are elevated above the
minimum elevation suggests that this requirement is not binding.
To provide further evidence on whether the minimum elevation standard is driving floodplain adaptation, I infer the first floor elevations of newly mapped policies by re-estimating
equations (1.10) and (1.11) with indicator variables for floodplain-built elevations as dependent variables. Figure A.4 shows the results of this estimation, where the top panel shows
the results for the probability of having a claim, and the bottom panel shows the results for
log claims conditional on a positive claim. The figures plot the coefficients of each half-foot
floodplain-built elevation indicator with newly mapped properties as the omitted category
(labelled as “remapped” in the figure). Property elevation is defined as the difference between
a home’s first floor height and the 100-year flood elevation.
In both models, newly mapped properties’ average claims were similar to those of floodplainbuilt properties one to two feet above the 100-year flood elevation. This suggests that the
minimum elevation requirement, (i.e. a property elevation of zero) would not have been binding for most newly mapped properties. Thus, we can attribute most of the adaptation effect
to risk-rated premiums and information rather than the minimum elevation requirement.
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One concern about the results in the Table 1.4 is that they may reflect biased sample selection
in which properties are insured due to asymmetric information. I only observe the claims of
insured properties, so differential adverse selection between newly mapped and floodplainbuilt properties could bias adaptation estimates. As newly mapped premiums are uniformly
low under the Newly Mapped Subsidy, we would expect any adverse selection to primarily
affect floodplain-built homes, which would understate the adaptation effect. Studies in flood
and other insurance settings have found little evidence of adverse selection (Cutler et al.,
2008; Wagner, 2021a), and the mandatory flood insurance purchase requirement further
reduces the possibility of adverse selection.
Nevertheless, to directly test for adverse selection, I conduct a positive correlation test as
described in Chiappori and Salanié (2000). The positive correlation test assesses whether
expected losses and opting-in to higher insurance coverage are independent conditional on
the information used by the insurer to set premiums. In the presence of adverse selection,
there would be a positive correlation between these two outcomes. The test proceeds by
estimating two models. One focuses on choosing more insurance coverage, while the other
examines having a loss event including controls for all variables used by the insurer (and
only those variables). The residuals of these two models form a test statistic for the null
hypothesis of no asymmetric information.
Although I cannot compare the losses of homes with and without insurance, I can compare
the losses of floodplain-built homes that do and do not choose to supplement their standard
flood insurance policy with contents coverage. The dependent variable in the first model
is choosing non-zero contents coverage; in the second it is having a claim on their primary
structure coverage. Whereas the null hypothesis in a traditional positive correlation test can
be rejected due to moral hazard as well as adverse selection, a benefit of my specification
is that contents coverage is unlikely to induce moral hazard on structural damage claims,
making it a plausibly pure test of adverse selection. The controls are property elevation by
flood zone type indicators and the number of stories in the insured home.
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In the data, 75% of floodplain-built homes in the sample opt-in to contents coverage. The
share of homes with structure claims is actually slightly lower for homes with contents
coverage, at 19%, compared to 19.4% of homes without contents coverage. The formal
positive correlation test bears out the absence of adverse selection in this raw data.29

1.6

Welfare Results

This section embeds the sufficient statistics estimated in section 3.4 to equation 1.6 to
calculate the welfare effects of better flood risk information. First, I describe the calibration
of each welfare parameter. Then, I describe the welfare effects of using better risk information
to reduce the misclassification of high-risk homes.

1.6.1

Fitting Empirical Estimates to Model Parameters

Below, I describe the empirical counterparts for the welfare parameters in equation (1.6), repeated below for the reader’s convenience. Table 1.5 provides a summary of these calibrated
parameters and sources, which I describe in further detail below.
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Price Effect and Flood Insurance Demand
In the survey data, the flood insurance take-up rate for non-floodplain homeowners who
should be in the floodplain according to my elevation difference measure is 36% (I 0 ). The
29

The chi-squared test statistic p-value is 0.867.
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results in Table 1.2 show that under the counterfactual where these households were correctly
classified inside the floodplain, voluntary flood insurance demand would be 50%. Including
mandatory purchasers, counterfactual take-up is 58% (I 1 ).
The calibration of flood insurance demand from the estimated price elasticity (Table 1.1)
adjusted for the share of mandatory purchasers in the survey (section A.3) is described in
section 1.5.2. The demand curve implies that the marginal willingness-to-pay of high-risk
households at 36% flood insurance take-up would be $3,315, corresponding to the W 1 (I 0 , A1 )
parameter.30
In the terminology of Bernheim and Rangel (2009), W 0 is the “decision utility” of high-risk
households misclassified as low-risk, whereas W 1 is their “true utility” under their correct risk
classification. As such, I assume that take-up beyond the voluntary flood insurance demand
of correctly classified high-risk households is inefficient. In equation 1.6, the mandateinduced take-up from 0.5 to 0.58 appears as a deadweight loss term where W 1 (0.58, A1 ) <
D1 , attenuating the information effect welfare gains.31
It is possible that some mandatory purchase of flood insurance for high-risk households
could be socially efficient, whether due to externalities imposed by uninsured flood losses
or if W 1 still understates the private welfare value of flood insurance (Liao and Mulder,
2021; Wagner, 2021a). Equation (1.6) can be easily extended to incorporate estimates of
additional internalities and externalities.

Adaptation Effect
The results in Table 1.4 imply that floodplain-built homes suffer 12% lower flood damages
1

= 0.88). However, the results in Figure 1.4
than their newly mapped counterparts ( 1−A
1−A0
shows that these differences in adaptation are larger for newer construction. For new homes,
30

Rather than using the trapezoidal approximation for the take-up effect in equation (1.6), I calculate the
exact area implied by the isoelastic functional form for W 1 .
31
Ultimately, the offsetting deadweight loss imposed by the mandatory purchase requirement is only about
$10 per year.
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I parameterize the adaptation effect as

1−A1
1−A0

= 0.76.

Given the high cost of elevating existing construction, I assume that reclassified existing
homes cannot change their adaptation. Any new construction in a high-risk area will have
24% lower costs if correctly classified relative to if it is misclassified as low-risk. Applying
these relative levels of adaptation to the average premiums data described in section 1.4.1,
this implies that D00 =

1330
0.88

≈ $1, 510 and D01 = 1510 ∗ 0.76 ≈ $1, 150.

Dynamic Risk and Perceptions
I calibrate expected risk dynamics using the First Street Foundation Flood Model (FSF-FM)
described in Section 1.4.2. The details of FSF-FM climate projections are described in First
Street Foundation (2020). I look at the FSF-FM’s projections for the 1 million high-risk
single family homes in Florida, defined as a home built on ground with at least a 1% annual
chance of flooding.
To determine the annual risk growth rate, I compare high-risk properties’ average annual
flood losses (AAL) according to the model in 2020 and 2050. Over this period, the high-risk
AALs increase 79% from $3,170 to $5,660. Assuming linearly increasing risk, this is an
annual growth rate of 2.6% of the 2020 AAL (γ = .026).
Figure A.5 plots 2020 and 2050 AALs for high-risk and low-risk properties. In contrast to
the sharp increase in expected losses for already high-risk properties, low-risk homes see a
muted increase from $5 in 2020 to $90.32 The relatively flat AAL trajectory of low-risk
homes justifies assumption 1, which holds that low-risk homes’ expected losses will remain
constant over time. The stark contrast in Figure A.5 also forms the basis for the hypothesis
that misclassification may cause households to underestimate the dynamic increase in their
flood risk.
They dynamic risk perception results in Table 1.3 imply that misclassified high-risk house32

For low-risk homes built on ground with at least a 0.2% annual chance of flooding, AALs increase from
$10 in 2020 to $125 in 2050.
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holds underestimate their increase in risk by

0.43
0.43+0.12

= 22%. This implies γ 0 = 0.78 ∗ γ =

.02.
As discussed in section 1.3.2, increasing risk erodes adaptation over time. The demand curve
W 1 predicts insurance take-up for a given proportional increase in risk and change in premiums for period t relative to period one. The first-order condition in equation (1.3) implies
households will increase their insurance take-up in response to their perceived increasing
risk such that Ptf = Wtf (Itf , Af ) in all periods.33

1.6.2

Welfare Counterfactual Results

I use equation (1.6) to calculate the welfare effects under a counterfactual where the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) used better risk modeling technology to misclassify fewer
high-risk homes as outside the floodplain. The welfare effects of this improved risk modeling
technology are quantified in terms of the present value welfare gain over 30 years (2020-2049)
per high-risk home that would otherwise be misclassified.
I consider three baseline misclassification scenarios: A new high-risk home misclassified for
30 years, a new high-risk home misclassified for 10 years, and an existing misclassified home
that would continue to be misclassified for 30 years. Figure 1.5 plots the annual welfare
gains of correctly classifying a high-risk home relative to these three baseline scenarios in
panels (a)-(c). The total welfare effect is divided into four components corresponding to the
terms in equation (1.6), as indicated by the legend in panel (d).
Panel (a) of Figure 1.5 shows the annual welfare gains of correct risk classification relative to
the first baseline scenario: A new home that would otherwise be misclassified for the full 30
year window. Because the high-risk home is new, the homeowner can adjust its adaptation
in response to their risk classification. In the first year, correct classification increases social
welfare by nearly $1,000. Over 70% of this welfare gain comes from the adaptation bias
33

I assume that buyers constrained by the mandatory purchase requirement proportionally become voluntary purchasers as insurance take-up increases over time.
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term, which accounts for a $700 welfare gain, with the moral hazard, cost of public funds,
and take-up bias terms each contributing approximately $100 to social welfare.
By 2049, flood risk will have increased 80%, but the annual welfare gains from correct
risk-rating will increase even more quickly, tripling relative to 2020. Growth in the moral
hazard and cost of public funds terms are driven by increasing flood insurance take-up and
claims under the baseline scenario. The adaptation bias and take-up bias terms grow as the
misclassified household’s dynamic risk misperceptions cause their flood insurance take-up
to decline relative to its privately efficient level. The 30-year present value welfare gains in
panel (a) accumulate to approximately $48,840.
Panel (a) emphasizes the importance of accounting for both dynamic risk and information
effects when considering the welfare effects of new information. Treating improved riskrating as a simple pricing reform - assuming that flood insurance demand was unbiased
prior to the new risk information or that any bias was fixed - would ignore the substantial
adaptation bias term and underestimate the take-up bias effects by assuming that take-up
would decline slightly rather than increase substantially.
Ignoring risk dynamics would also understate the welfare benefits of correct risk classification. Simply extrapolating the 2020 effects through 2049 would underestimate the 30-year
present value welfare gains by nearly 50%. Alternatively, assuming that the difference in
counterfactual welfare grows linearly with risk would underestimate the 30-year present value
welfare gains by nearly 30%.
Panel (b) calculates the welfare counterfactual of correctly mapping a new high-risk home
inside the floodplain relative to a baseline where the home would be misclassified outside
the floodplain and then moved inside the floodplain after 10 years. As in panel (a), correct
classification generates substantial welfare gains in the first 10 years primarily driven by
the adaptation bias term. After the home would be reclassified inside the floodplain under
the baseline scenario, the annual welfare gains of correct classification drop from $1,540 in
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2029 to only $260 in 2030. This decline is due to the homeowner correctly perceiving their
risk after being remapped in 2030 even though they were initially misclassified in 2020 at
construction. As a result, the take-up bias term disappears in 2030, as does the cost of
public funds term because the high-risk home starts to face risk-rated premiums.
Nonetheless, there are still welfare gains in 2030 and beyond if the home were correctly
placed inside the floodplain at construction. Because the home is already built, it is too
late to re-adapt it in 2030 after it is moved into the floodplain, whereas it would have been
efficiently adapted were it inside the floodplain at construction. Inefficient adaptation drives
the moral hazard term, which grows to over $300 by 2049. The adaptation bias term nearly
disappears because the homeowner increasing their insurance take-up after reclassification
to compensate for their suboptimal adaptation.
Summarizing the results from panel (b), even if the new home were remapped 10 years
later, the 30-year present value welfare gain from correctly placing it in the floodplain at
construction would be approximately $16,905.
Panel (c) plots the welfare gains from remapping an existing non-floodplain high-risk home
into the floodplain that would otherwise remain misclassified for 30 years. Under this baseline scenario, the home cannot be re-adapted after being remapped. As a result, there are
no adaptation bias or moral hazard welfare gains from reclassification. Nonetheless, the
present value 30-year welfare gains from correcting an existing home’s misclassification total approximately $22,945. In addition to eliminating the cost of public funds, the welfare
gains in panel (c) are driven mostly by the take-up bias term. The take-up bias is even
larger relative to panel (a) precisely because the homeowner cannot re-adapt after being
remapped, causing them to respond more along the take-up margin to compensate for their
lower adaptation.
How economically significant are these effects? The present value welfare gains of nearly
$50,000 in panel (a) is over 15% of the median home value. For another measure of economic

42

significance, the First Street Foundation estimates that approximately 6 million high-risk
homes are currently misclassified outside the floodplain. The results in panel (c) imply that
remapping these homes inside the floodplain would increase present value social welfare by
nearly $138 billion.
What do these counterfactuals imply for the distributional consequences of new risk information and better risk rating? Under the baseline scenario in panel (c), remapping eliminates
a misclassified homeowner’s present value premium subsidy of approximately $18,540. By
providing them with better risk information, however, remapping also eliminates their inefficiently low flood insurance take-up. The present value of this “internality” is $17,770,
approximately canceling out the remapped household’s subsidy losses.
Once we account for the likely effects of remapping on home values, however, the reclassified
household is substantially worse off under the counterfactual. Remapping increases a home’s
perceived present value cost of flood risk from $11,150 to over $45,000 dollars due to higher
spending on flood insurance and expected uninsured flood damages. If these higher flood
costs are capitalized into the home’s value, the homeowner will be worse off despite their
better risk information. Nonetheless, because of the large fiscal externalities imposed by
flood risk misclassification, social welfare as a whole is higher with better risk information.

1.7

Conclusion

This paper finds that better classification of high-risk households in the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) can create large welfare gains by informing households about
their risk and increasing investment in adaptation to reduce risk. Risk rating technology
can facilitate adaptation to climate change, as sophisticated disaster risk models provide
valuable information to households about their current and future risk. This information
can change insurance demand and adaptation by households exposed to increasing risk.
Even as better risk modeling technology leads to higher premiums on high-risk homes, it
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creates a countervailing information effect as homeowners increase their risk perceptions.
Households moved inside the floodplain increased their flood insurance take-up even as their
premiums rose. My survey evidence shows that high-risk households misclassified outside
the floodplain underestimated their flood risk.
Better information and prices can also inform long-run adaptation decisions. Homes built
inside the floodplain had lower flood insurance claims than nearby homes built outside the
floodplain and later remapped inside. Providing price signals to inform adaptation decisions
and incentivize efficient investment in risk reduction creates long-run welfare gains.
Disaster insurance markets struggle with low take-up rates and rising premiums. Given
these challenges, policymakers fear that increasingly granular risk models will make highrisk communities less resilient to increasing risk. Yet, prices are not only incentives, but also
signals. As new information drives higher premiums, it also drives changing risk perceptions
and investment in adaptation.
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1.8

Tables
Table 1.1: Flood Insurance Renewal Price Elasticity
Probability of Renewal

Premium Increase (%)

-0.148***
(0.046)

-0.172***
(0.038)

-0.172***
(0.038)

Observations
78,174
78,174
78,174
R-squared
0.013
0.024
0.024
State FEs
N
Y
Y
Past Claims Control
N
N
Y
Month Written FEs
N
N
N
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.177***
(0.040)
78,174
0.025
Y
Y
Y

Results from estimating the renewal probability of flood insurance policies newly mapped
into the floodplain. The independent variable is an indicator variable for whether a policy
renews. The dependent variable is the percent increase in the policy’s premiums from the
previous year under the Newly Mapped Subsidy schedule. All models include first policy
year by renewal year interacted fixed effects. Additional controls, described in the bottom
section of the table, are progressively added across columns from left to right. Standard
errors are clustered by county.
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Table 1.2: Risk Classification and Voluntary Flood Insurance Demand
Outcome: Voluntarily Insured
(1)
(2)
(3)
Inside Floodplain

0.231***
(0.042)

0.153*** 0.128**
(0.046)
(0.056)
Had Past Flood
0.169** 0.166**
(0.068)
(0.071)
Flood Depth
0.024*
0.041**
(0.013)
(0.030)
I[Flood Depth = 0]
-0.055
-0.038
(0.045)
(0.052)
Observations
702
702
702
R-squared
0.128
0.149
0.141
Demographics
Y
Y
Y
ORIV
N
N
Y
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results from estimating voluntary flood insurance demand from the survey of coastal homeowners. The dependent variable is an indicator for reporting having voluntarily purchased
flood insurance. The primary independent variable of interest is an indicator for being inside
the floodplain. Column (2) adds the average model 100-year flood depth, and column (3)
instruments for the 100-year flood depth using the Obviously Related Instrumental Variables
(ORIV) method. All models include controls for respondent demographics. Standard errors
are clustered by county and bootstrapped in column (3).
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Table 1.3: Risk Classification and Beliefs about Increasing Risk
Risk Increasing
Floodplain

0.121**
(0.056)

Observations
702
R-squared
0.098
Demographics
Y
Future Risk Controls
Y
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results from estimating future flood risk beliefs from the survey of coastal homeowners.
The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the respondent believes their flood
risk will be higher in 30 years as the dependent variable. The primary independent variable
of interest is an indicator for being inside the floodplain. The model includes controls for
respondent demographics and a quadratic term for the change in average annualized losses
between 2020 and 2050. Standard errors are clustered by county.
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Table 1.4: Risk Classification and Expected Claims

VARIABLES
Floodplain-Built

(1)
Any Claim

(2)
Log Claims (Claim > 0)

-0.001
(0.007)

-0.133***
(0.044)

Observations
102,527
18,978
R-squared
0.457
0.480
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Results of the hurdle model estimating flood insurance claims. The independent variable is
an indicator for being a floodplain-built as opposed to newly mapped home. The dependent
variable in column (1) is the probability of having a positive claim and in column (2) is
the log claim conditional on having a claim. All models include census tract by loss event
interacted fixed effects and controls for property year built, deductible, and amount of
coverage purchased. Standard errors are clustered by loss event.
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Table 1.5: Welfare Parameter Estimates
Name

Model Notation

Estimate

Source

Non-floodplain Take-Up Rate
Floodplain Take-Up Rate
Adaptation Effect (New Construction)
Floodplain Premium
Non-floodplain Premium
Flood Risk Growth Rate
Misperceived Flood Risk Growth Rate
Cost of Public Funds
Discount Rate

I0
I1

0.36
0.58
-0.24
$1,330
$530
1.026
1.02
0.3
0.99

Survey Data
Survey Estimates
Remapped Claims Estimates
Floodplain Policy Data
Non-floodplain Policy Data
FSF-FM
Survey Risk Change Beliefs
Poterba (1996)
Giglio et al. (2021)

1−A1
1−A0
P1

P0
1 + γ1
1 + γ0
λ
β
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1.9

Figures
Figure 1.1: Remapping Years

The top panel maps counties with zip codes where homes were remapped into the floodplain
between 2015-2019. Shading indicates year of remapping. Clear counties did not have
floodplain newly mapped policies. The bottom panel shows the distribution of remapping
years across the sample of 2020 remapped policies. Source: OpenFEMA policy data
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Figure 1.2: Number of Respondents by County in Flood Insurance Survey Estimation Sample
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Figure 1.3: Remapping, Policies, and Premiums

Coefficients estimating the effect of remapping on the inverse hyperbolic sine transformed
number of policies (top panel) and log average premiums (bottom panel) by years since
remapping for homes moved inside the floodplain relative to homes that remained outside
the floodplain. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals with standard errors clustered by
county.
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Figure 1.4: Risk Classification and Expected Claims by Age of Construction

Results of the hurdle model estimating flood insurance claims allowing for heterogeneous
effects by decade of construction. The figure plots the estimates and 95% confidence intervals
for the coefficients on floodplain-built homes interacted with decade of construction, with
newly mapped homes as the omitted category. In the top panel, the outcome variable is
having a claim. In the bottom panel, the outcome variable is the log claim conditional on
having a claim. Both models include census tract by loss event interacted fixed effects and
controls for property year built, deductible, and amount of coverage purchased. Standard
errors are clustered by loss event.
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Figure 1.5: Risk Classification Welfare Counterfactuals
(b)
(a)

(c)
(d)

Stacked area plots describing the annual welfare gains from 2020-2049 from correctly mapping high-risk homes inside the floodplain rather than outside the floodplain. Panels (a)-(c)
give the welfare effects of correct classification relative to different baseline scenarios, and
panel (d) is the legend for the different welfare effects. The baseline scenarios are a new
high-risk home that would otherwise be mapped outside the floodplain for 30 years (panel
a), a new high-risk home that would otherwise be mapped outside the floodplain for 10 years
(panel b), and an existing high-risk home that would otherwise stay outside the floodplain
for 30 years (panel c).
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CHAPTER 2
Neglected No More: Housing Markets, Mortgage Lending, and
Sea Level Rise

2.1

Introduction

Is a U.S. coastal housing bubble bursting? Under most climate forecasts, the question is not
if but when property values will reflect expected sea level rise (SLR). A sufficiently forwardlooking house price should account for both current heightened risk of extreme weather
events, storm surges, and nuisance flooding, as well as future anticipated inundation. On
the other hand, if prices do not fully reflect future risk, then unmitigated climate change
could cause further large declines in property value. As 42% of the U.S. population resides in
a coastal shoreline county (Fleming et al., 2018), whether property and mortgage markets
are already responding to climate risk is of crucial importance as homeowners, mortgage
lenders, insurers, and policymakers try to predict how coastal real estate markets will evolve
in the coming decades.
In this paper, we study the relationship between SLR exposure and changes in housing
and mortgage markets from 2001-2019. We focus on the coastal Florida market, where the
Union of Concerned Scientists projects that over one million properties are at risk of chronic
inundation due to SLR by 2100 (Dahl et al., 2018).34 Our analysis compares housing markets
more exposed to SLR with similar coastal markets with less SLR exposure.35 Using data
on home transactions (both cash and mortgaged), sales listings, mortgage applications, and
flood insurance all linked to sea level rise forecasts at the census tract level, we examine the
mechanisms through which the increasing salience of SLR exposure over this period may
have affected housing and mortgage markets.
34

Dahl et al. (2018) note that Florida has the highest SLR exposure of any state in the U.S, motivating
our decision to make it the focus of analysis.
35
We define “more” and “less” exposed coastal tracts as those where more than 70% or less than 10% of
developed land would be inundated at 6 feet of sea level rise, respectively. Figure 2.2 shows maps of the
coastal communities included in the full sample, 771 tracts in all, that are within 1/2 mile of the coast.
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Figure C.3 presents the raw trends in home sales volume (top panel) and prices (bottom
panel) between less-SLR-exposed and more-SLR-exposed tracts normalized by their 20012012 mean. Prior to 2012, the two markets were on essentially identical volume paths.
However, we document a sharp decline in transaction volume since 2013 in housing markets
most exposed to SLR. Sales in these high-risk tracts have fallen in absolute terms since
2013, while sales in low-risk coastal tracts rose between 2013-2018. In contrast, relative
home prices follow volumes with a lag; From 2013-2016 they increase similarly in both
groups, with a relative decline in the high-risk tracts only beginning to emerge after 2016.
The staggered declines in sales volumes and prices in more-SLR-exposed markets relative to
their less-exposed coastal neighbors during a period of increasing SLR risk salience motivate
our two primary research questions.36 First, does the relative sales volume slowdown have a
direct connection to SLR exposure, or is it more plausibly explained by differences between
the markets that are only indirectly correlated with SLR? Second, what are the mechanisms
for and implications of this divergence between transaction volumes and home prices in
SLR-exposed markets?
To assess whether the housing market trends in Figure C.3 reflect a direct relationship
with climate risk, we use matching estimators in a difference-in-difference framework to
control for observable differences between markets with different SLR exposure. Using 20012012 as a baseline period, we examine whether the post-2013 volume and price trends in
more-SLR-exposed markets diverged from observationally similar areas less exposed to SLR.
We use census tract rather than property-level measures of SLR exposure to reflect the
uncertainty and community-level effects of SLR risk. To test the robustness of our results,
we compare our findings across OLS, synthetic control, and generalized propensity score
matching estimators.
All three methods produce similar results consistent with the raw trends shown above: After
2013, more-SLR-exposed markets declined in housing transaction volumes but saw compar36

We discuss the factors driving increasing climate risk salience around 2013 in more detail in Section 3.3
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atively little change in prices relative to observationally similar less-SLR-exposed markets.
By 2019, we estimate that the most-SLR-exposed census tracts in Florida had 19-26% lower
transaction volumes from their 2001-2012 annual average relative to a counterfactual where
these areas continued to follow a matched sample of markets with low SLR exposure. Our estimates imply that approximately 22,000 fewer home transactions took place from 2013-2019
among the 187 census tracts most exposed to SLR relative to counterfactual trends. On the
other hand, we find no evidence of a strong relationship between changing home prices and
SLR from 2013-2016. However, from 2016-2019 prices in more-SLR-exposed tracts declined
by 5% of their baseline value relative relative to less-exposed markets.
Next, we consider the potential mechanisms behind these changing market trends. First,
we rule out the hypothesis that lender or insurer behavior can explain these patterns: We
estimate similarly large relative declines in both cash home purchase and home purchase loan
volumes and small changes in the rate of loan denial, securitization, or refinancing volume
with respect to SLR exposure. Neither rising flood insurance premiums nor contemporaneous
flood events in exposed markets can explain our results. Second, we compare the behavior
of home buyers and sellers. Even as buyers withdrew from the market, SLR-exposed sellers
continued to list their homes in similar numbers as their less-exposed coastal neighbors. As
a result, SLR-exposed homes spent more days on the market before selling and accumulated
as unsold inventory - echoing trends from the 2007-2009 housing bust. Finally, we examine
heterogeneity in SLR-exposed market declines. Sales of SLR-exposed new homes saw the
largest transaction volume declines, suggesting lower housing supply in at-risk markets.
Using a variety of proxies for climate beliefs, we find that SLR-exposed sales volume changes
are decreasing in the share of the population worried about climate change. In sum, our
mechanism tests suggest 2013 is when buyers in climate pessimistic markets - but not sellers
or lenders - started to revise their demand for SLR-exposed homes.
We view our findings as most consistent with a framework where the increased salience of
climate change has led prospective buyers to become more pessimistic about future home
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prices in SLR-exposed areas than current homeowners. As in models of climate belief heterogeneity in Bakkensen and Barrage (2017) or Baldauf et al. (2020), SLR risk may not be
fully capitalized into home prices in areas where “climate optimists” are the marginal home
buyers.37 However, these models cannot match the pattern of declining volume but stable
relative prices that we observe until 2016 or the accumulating inventory of unsold homes.
Instead, our empirical findings are best characterized by a sudden change in the salience
of climate risk causing home buyers to stop neglecting future SLR. This “neglected risks”
framework explains the fall in transaction volume, especially among new homes (Gennaioli
et al., 2012, 2015). On the other hand, sellers, perhaps extrapolating from recent price
increases as in (Glaeser and Nathanson, 2017), set prices higher than most prospective
buyers are willing to pay. As in DeFusco et al. (2017), optimistic sellers prevented SLRexposed housing markets from clearing and creating the lead-lag relationship between volume
and price declines. By the end of our estimation sample in 2019, more-SLR-exposed home
prices had started to decline but volumes remained substantially below their long-run mean,
suggesting continued disagreement between buyers and sellers. After a significant lag, home
prices have started to follow sale volumes into a relative decline, matching the empirical
predictions from DeFusco et al. (2017).
If heightened SLR risk awareness has made prospective homebuyers more wary of at-risk
coastal markets, why have lenders been relatively unresponsive? Our interpretation, informed by conversations with multiple lenders and industry participants, is that lenders
are protected by federal programs that actively mis-price climate risk. First, for mortgage
loans held on balance sheets, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) offers generous
coverage at subsidized prices below actuarial fairness (Kousky et al., 2017). Second, for
securitized loans, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the FHA, which insure over half of the
U.S. mortgage market, do not price predictable regional variation in default risk, including
37
A related point is made by Bunten and Kahn (2017), who model how risk and amenity preference
heterogeneity, independent of beliefs, can attenuate the relationship between climate risk and house prices
in a residential sorting model.
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climate risk (Hurst et al., 2016). Thus, while lenders may have more sophisticated risk assessment capabilities relative to homebuyers, their incentives are not aligned to internalize
SLR risk, and if anything may exploit the mis-pricing of risk at the federal level (Ouazad
and Kahn, 2021).
Our findings advance a rapidly growing literature on climate change, sea level rise, and housing markets along multiple margins. First, our paper uniquely incorporates dynamic market
activity alongside home prices rather than examining prices independent of transaction volume.38 Several papers have found evidence that SLR risk is at least partially capitalized
into house prices, with an emphasis on heterogeneity in capitalization between markets with
different beliefs.39 Both Bernstein et al. (2019) and Baldauf et al. (2020) estimate large SLR
price discounts after 2013, and are significantly higher in areas with high climate change
“worry” as measured in the Yale Climate Opinion Survey. Similarly, Giglio et al. (2021b) construct a “Climate Attention Index” from mentions of flood zones and hurricanes in property
listings, and find that high Index values are related to greater SLR discounts. Our results
suggest that focusing on prices alone can miss important dimensions along which housing
markets respond to SLR. The initial divergence between home sale volumes and prices that
we document provides the first empirical evidence that increasing salience of SLR risk can
first result in a decline in market liquidity rather than being immediately capitalized into
home prices.
A second notable difference between our approach and the prior literature is that we measure SLR exposure and outcomes at the census tract rather than property level. Thus,
our identification strategy compares differentially exposed coastal communities rather than
differentially exposed properties in the same community. We adopt this approach for two
38
A related literature studies the capitalization of current flood risk into housing markets. See, for instance,
Bin and Landry (2013), Bin and Polasky (2004), Eichholtz et al. (2019), Kousky (2010), and Muller and
Hopkins (2019).
39
A notable exception is Murfin and Spiegel (2020), who compare elevation price premiums across areas
with different relative rates of SLR due to geological subsidence. They find that no difference in the elevation
premium between areas with higher versus lower expected relative SLR, indicating that SLR risk is not
capitalized into prices.
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primary reasons. First, SLR inundation projections are highly uncertain at the property
level due to measurement error and model uncertainty (Gesch, 2009). Second, propertylevel comparisons may be contaminated by localized spillover effects from SLR impacting
nearby roads or infrastructure and increasing flood risk for even nominally non-inundated
properties (McAlpine and Porter, 2018). Using a continuous community level measure better
reflects the uncertainty and spillover effects of SLR exposure.40
A third central contribution is our analysis of lender behavior in response to increasing
SLR salience. Our results showing sharp declines in both mortgage volumes and cash purchases suggest that buyers’ changing risk perceptions are currently of primary importance
for understanding housing market trends in SLR-exposed coastal Florida. Our results are
potentially consistent with the findings of Ouazad and Kahn (2021) that lenders increase
mortgage securitization in areas struck by large hurricanes that occurred between 2004 and
2012, insofar as they suggest that lenders may have updated their beliefs about climate
risk before 2013. However, the fact that lenders have not meaningfully changed their rate
of refinancing, loan denial, or securitization in the most-SLR-exposed areas suggests that
either their perception of SLR risk has either not changed since 2013, or else they view their
balance sheets as sufficiently insulated from climate risk.
Finally, our empirical approach provides a uniquely broad analysis of housing markets’
response to SLR risk by incorporating many data sources and emphasizing tract-level variation. The primary analysis covers 20 years of housing market activity with data from over
1,380,000 home sales and 2,650,000 loan applications in coastal Florida. We also collect
extensive and novel data on changing policy-level flood insurance premiums and take-up
rates. Data on over 320,000 flood insurance policies are used to calculate census tract-level
measures of premium increases that followed the 2012 Biggert-Waters (B-W) legislation that
reformed the NFIP.41 Merging these records at the tract-level with rich controls and SLR
40
See Section 3.2 for more details on the construction of our SLR exposure measure and Section B.5 on
the decision to use tract-level measures.
41
See also Gibson and Mullins (2020b), who study the effect of the 2012 B-W reforms, flood map changes,
and the impact of Hurricane Sandy on property values in New York.
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projections, we are able to estimate the effects of SLR risk salience on not just house prices,
but also transaction volumes and lender behavior, as well as study the effects of changing
flood insurance premiums. Combining these sources, we are able to conclude that SLRexposed housing markets are experiencing demand-driven declines in transaction volume
and home prices over a period coinciding with increasing climate risk salience, and that
cannot be explained by lender behavior, insurance premiums, or other observable factors
correlated with SLR exposure. These steep transaction volume declines in at-risk tracts
may serve as a leading indicator of further impending price declines.

2.2
2.2.1

Data
Data Sources

Our analysis relies on sea level rise projections, home sales prices and characteristics, mortgage lending data, detailed information on home listings, and various other supplementary
sources aggregated and merged at the 2010 census tract level. In this section, we describe
how these data, along with other complimentary sources, are used to construct the sample
and variables used to conduct our analysis.

2.2.2

Sample Selection

To compare SLR exposure within housing markets located near similar coastal amenities,
we subset to 2010 Florida census tracts where the 2000 census population centroid from
the National Historic GIS database (Manson et al., 2019) is within 1/2 mile of the coast.
As shown in Appendix Figure B.2, inland Florida had distinct home sale volume and price
dynamics, particularly over the housing boom and bust, relative to its coastal areas. There
are 859 tracts that meet this coastal definition. We further exclude tracts with zero Census
population or that we identify as completely non-residential (14 tracts) and tracts with
insufficient data in CoreLogic to reliably estimate home price indices (HPIs) (74 tracts).
These restrictions produce a final estimation sample of 771 tracts over an estimation period
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from 2001-2019.
We collect a number of tract-level controls from the 2010 Census and geographic data,
including population share nonwhite, household poverty rate, age demographics, and the
share of tract area occupied by water.

2.2.3

Sea Level Rise Exposure (NOAA)

Our data on SLR projections come from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Marcy et al., 2011).42 These projections use hydrological models and
elevation data to identify coastal land areas that would be inundated under one foot to ten
feet of SLR.
We construct a continuous measure of SLR exposure for each tract as the share of developed
land that would be inundated at six feet of SLR. Developed land is defined using the 2001
National Land Cover Database and overlaid with the six-foot SLR layer from the NOAA in
ArcGIS (Consortium, 2001). From this continuous measure, we construct a binary indicator
of “more-SLR-exposed” versus “less-SLR-exposed” tracts, defined as tracts with SLR exposure greater than 70% (187 tracts) or less than 10% (217 tracts) respectively. Our rationale
for choosing these specific thresholds comes from our Generalized Propensity Score (GPS)
results, described in Section 2.4.3.
Figure 2.2 maps the geography of SLR exposure across the estimation tract sample. The
top panel shows continuous exposure for all estimation tracts and the bottom panel shows
the subset of more-SLR-exposed (red) or less-SLR-exposed (green) tracts. Both maps show
that SLR exposure tends to be higher on the state’s west coast and along the southern edge
to Miami. However, the inset maps focused on Tampa Bay and Miami show substantial SLR
risk heterogeneity within small geographic areas. Figure 2.3 plots the distribution of SLR
exposure with cutoffs for the more-SLR-exposed and less-SLR-exposed tracts. The density
of SLR exposure is greatest at the upper and lower ends of the exposure distribution.
42

See https://coast.noaa.gov/slrdata/ for NOAA SLR data. Our version was downloaded in August 2018.
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The NOAA’s six-foot measure matches the benchmark for SLR exposure used in other
research on climate risk and housing markets (Bernstein et al., 2019; Goldsmith-Pinkham
et al., 2019). A recent meta-analysis of climate models suggests that six feet of SLR is
towards the upper end of likely SLR outcomes under a high emissions scenario (Garner et al.,
2018). This measure captures variation in SLR tail risk, an important consideration given
that much of the expected costs of climate change occur under such worst-case scenarios
(Weitzman, 2011). By construction, the continuous tract-level measure of SLR exposure at
six feet will be correlated with relative exposure at other SLR depths.

2.2.4

Home Price Index and Market Transaction Volume (Corelogic)

We use home purchase records from CoreLogic to measure total housing transaction volume
from 2001-2019 at the census tract level and separately by cash versus mortgage purchases.
CoreLogic gathers publicly available deeds and tax assessor records on the near-universe of
Florida home sales. The deed records include information on sale date, sale price, whether
the sale was a cash or mortgage purchase, and an indicator for sales of newly built homes.
Our estimation sample includes over 1.4 million home transactions.
We measure residential property transaction volumes as the annual number of condo or
single-family home transactions at the tract level. We assign each transaction to a 2010
census tract using parcel coordinates in CoreLogic. We use the CoreLogic cash purchase
field to separately tally cash purchases. To measure home prices, we construct a tract-byyear home price index (HPI) from the CoreLogic transactions data, as described in Appendix
Section B.4.

2.2.5

Loan Volumes, Denial Rates, and Securitization Rates (HMDA)

Loan applications from the HMDA database allow us to measure credit volume and lender
behavior through rates of loan denials and securitization. The Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act requires lenders to submit detailed characteristics of home mortgage or refinance loan
applications and subsequent denials or approvals, including data on applicant income and
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demographics, property census tract, and loan amount if approved.
We measure annual purchase loan volume as the number of approved home purchase loans
in HMDA, and similarly define a measure of refinance loan volume. We crosswalk loans
reported at the 2000 census geography in the earlier HMDA samples to 2010 census tracts
using the Missouri Census Data Center Geocorr application weighting by housing units (Missouri Census Data Center, 2014).43 To account for lender heterogeneity, we also separately
measure lending volumes by “local” and “non-local” lenders. Following a similar procedure
used in Gallagher and Hartley (2017), if a lender makes at least 10% of their total lending value (as measured in the full, national HMDA data) within a given county, they are
classified as “local” to that county.
We estimate tract-level annual denial and securitization indices controlling for characteristics
in the loan-level HMDA data. The denial and securitization indices are estimated from linear
probability models where the outcome is whether a loan application was approved or denied
and whether an approved loan below the conforming loan limit (CLL) was marked in HMDA
as sold for securitization, respectively. Both estimating equations include flexible controls
for loan value, loan type, distance from the CLL, and the borrower’s reported loan-to-income
ratio. Appendix Section B.4 describes the estimation of these indices in more detail.

2.2.6

Home Listings (MLS)

We distinguish between the behavior of buyers and sellers in the housing market using data
from the Multiple Listings Service (MLS) provided through CoreLogic. MLS are a collection
of databases used by realtors to list homes and search among available homes for sale. The
CoreLogic MLS data contains the record of these listings from a sampling of different MLS
providers who operate in different regions.
The MLS data show when each property was listed for sale, the price it was listed for, and
43

We obtain similar results measuring purchase loan volume with CoreLogic instead of HMDA. The 2010
tract-level loan counts in both datasets have a correlation coefficient greater than 0.9 from 2001-2019.
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when it went off the market. We see whether each listing ended as sold versus expired, and
its closing price if sold. We subset to listings of single-family homes and condos and geocode
each property to its 2010 census tract.
We construct several variables to describe listing activity. First, we measure the total number
of new listings each year. In constructing this variable, we account for a common strategy
employed by realtors to remove and re-list properties that become “stale” after being on the
market for several months. If the same property is listed less than 180 days after expiring, we
treat that as part of a single continuous list attempt. Second, we define the average number
of days on market for listings that end in sales. We also measure the average number of
unsold listings available in each year, calculated as the mean number of unsold listings as
of the first of each month in a year. Finally, similar to the home price index, we construct
a list price index as described in Appendix Section B.4.
The MLS data excludes for sale by owner transactions, which typically account for 9-15%
of sales (NAR, 2013). In addition, the set of MLS providers CoreLogic has data access
from varies over time. Before 2010, there is insufficient listings data to construct a reliable
panel. After 2010, we find much higher and more consistent coverage, although still with
substantial missing data for some of the 771 estimation sample tracts. We subset to tracts
where at least 66% of CoreLogic sales are accounted for in the MLS data. The remaining
MLS estimation sample includes 579 of the original 771 census tracts, covering over 800,000
listings and accounting for 84% of the sales in CoreLogic from 2010 to 2019.

2.2.7

Flood Insurance Premium Changes (NFIP)

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a government entity that provides over
95% of flood insurance policies in the United States, with $1.3 trillion in value insured as of
December 2019 (Kousky et al., 2018). To address the program’s large debts after Hurricane
Katrina, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters (BW) Insurance Reform Act of 2012, which
required the NFIP to increase premiums on subsidized policies and other fees. As a result,
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average premiums increased in our estimation sample from $833 in 2012 to $1,243 in 2018.
To account for these changing premiums, we turn to the OpenFEMA policy and claims
databases. These data describe the universe of NFIP policies issued since 2009 and claims
filed since 1978 (OpenFEMA, 2020a,b).44 The policy data include the insured home’s geography at the 2010 census tract level and detailed policy attributes. The claims data describe
every claim submitted by policyholders, including the exact date of loss and the total claim
paid, also geocoded at the 2010 census tract. We manually code NFIP rating manuals
to construct premiums and fees across 234 distinct policy categories from 2012 – 2019 to
measure premium changes over time. Appendix Section B.4.3 describes the construction of
our premium change instrument used to address endogeneity between policy composition,
take-up, and observed average premiums paid.
The premium changes described above were focused on homes inside the Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), commonly referred to as the floodplain. In addition to different premiums,
new construction inside the floodplain generally faces higher standards for adaptation and
is a source of flood risk information for homeowners and prospective buyers. Although the
2012 BW reforms did not affect floodplain regulations, it is possible that market participants
may have reacted differently to floodplain designations over this period separately from the
effect of premium changes. We measure the share of each tract’s developed land designated
by FEMA as inside a SFHA to include as a control for changing perceptions of current flood
risk as opposed to future SLR risk.45

2.2.8

Climate Opinion Proxies

Given the polarizing nature of climate change in U.S. political discourse, we estimate how
responses to Sea Level Rise (SLR) risk after 2013 vary by climate risk beliefs. We gather
44
FEMA and the Federal Government cannot vouch for the data or analyses derived from these data after
the data have been retrieved from the Agency’s website(s) and or Data.gov.
45
Current data from the National Flood Hazard Layer can be downloaded at https://www.fema.gov/floodmaps/tools-resources/flood-map-products/national-flood-hazard-layer. Our version of the data were downloaded in August 2018, with the shapefile available upon request.
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three proxies for variation in climate opinions by coastal Florida residents and prospective
homebuyers. First, we use data come from the 2014 Yale Climate Opinions Survey. The
Yale Climate Opinions Survey uses polling data combined with statistical models to estimate
climate change beliefs at the county level (Howe et al., 2015) and has been used in many
related studies, including Baldauf et al. (2020), Barrage and Furst (2019), Bernstein et al.
(2019), and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2019).
Second, we gather data on the share of buyers in each coastal Florida county between
2010 and 2012 who came from counties in New York or New Jersey that were affected by
Hurricane Sandy in October 2012. Given the prominence of Hurricane Sandy in driving the
discussion of coastal climate risk after 2013, such buyers might be especially wary of investing
in another SLR-exposed market. To construct this measure, we use IRS county-to-county
migration tables (IRS Statistics of Income Division, 2012) to calculate the share of migration
inflows into Florida counties from New York or New Jersey counties identified as exposed
to Hurricane Sandy. New York coastal counties were identified as exposed if they were
designated to receive individual and public assistance under FEMA’s New York Disaster
Declaration (FEMA, 2012); coastal counties in New Jersey were identified as exposed if the
were marked as featuring significant Sandy surge extent by USGS (USGS, USGS).
Finally, we use Florida tract-level vote shares for the Democratic candidate in the 2008 U.S.
presidential election as a proxy for climate concerns (Tyson, 2021). We obtain Democratic
vote shares from the Florida House of Representatives’ Redistricting Committee website.

2.3
2.3.1

Methodology
Estimating Changes in SLR Capitalization after 2013

A challenge of studying the effects of climate risk on housing markets is that SLR exposure is
correlated with current flood risk, coastal amenities, income, and demographics. As shown
in Table 2.1, more-SLR-exposed tracts are closer to the coast, have higher flood risk and
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higher socioeconomic status relative to less-SLR-exposed tracts.
Rather than make cross-sectional comparisons between more- and less-SLR exposed areas,
we instead compare their market dynamics before and after 2013 as SLR became more
salient. A confluence of events around 2013 focused public attention on climate risk, including Hurricane Sandy striking the East Coast, new SLR projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) AR5 report, and the 2014 National Climate
Assessment which documented SLR exposure in the United States (Stocker et al., 2013;
Georgakakos et al., 2014). In Florida, these reports spurred local news coverage and google
searches for the topic “Sea Level Rise” (see Appendix Figure B.1).46 Pew Research polling
shows an increase and growing partisan gap (Kennedy, 2020).
The purpose of our estimation strategy is to identify the effects of this increasing climate
salience after 2013 on the capitalization of risk in SLR-exposed markets. To achieve this, our
methodology builds on a difference-in-difference style estimator that compares changes in
more-SLR-exposed housing market outcomes from 2013-2019 relative to observationally similar but less-SLR-exposed coastal markets. We measure housing market changes normalizing
outcomes by their 2001-2012 tract-level mean.
Under a parallel trends assumption, our estimates can be interpreted as relative changes
in the capitalization of SLR into more- versus less-exposed housing markets. Specifically,
our assumption is that in the absence of growing SLR salience in coastal Florida, housing
markets with different exposure would have continued on similar paths. We employ a series
of matching estimators to select a subset of less-SLR-exposed tracts that are observationally
similar to the more-SLR-exposed tracts on pre-2013 characteristics and outcome trends.
Different relative trends between more- and less-exposed tracts which persist in matched
samples are more likely a result of increasing climate risk awareness rather than some unrelated shock.

47

We apply two different estimators to establish the robustness of our results

46

For examples of local media coverage, see Frago (2014), Reiser (2014), or Gibson (2014).
Spillover effects are another important concern, as there may be a reallocation of economic activity from
areas affected by SLR into nearby less affected areas. This concern motivates our decision to refer to the
47
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to alternative matching techniques and sets of covariates: synthetic control (SC) and generalized propensity score (GPS) matching. The fact that the results of these two estimators
are consistent with the trends in the raw data increases our confidence in the conditional
parallel trends assumption.

2.3.2

Synthetic Control

For each more-SLR-exposed tract, the synthetic control (SC) estimator constructs a weighted
average of less-SLR-exposed tracts that match as closely as possible on both covariates and
pre-period trends. Assuming that the procedure can achieve a close fit, SC results are
robust to differences in observable and unobservable characteristics with time-varying effects
(Abadie, 2019).
We construct our set of synthetic tracts by matching on the following set of non-outcome
covariates: mean 2001-2012 home price index, 2001-2012 share of transactions by non-owner
occupied buyers, inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of flood insurance claims per capita 19952005, 2010 poverty rate, share of tract area made up of water, and distance-to-coast from
tract population center. We also match on the outcome variable as a set of consecutive
two-year averages over the pre-period (i.e. the outcome means in 2001-2002, 2003-2004,...,
2011-2012).
Unlike the traditional SC setting in Abadie et al. (2010) with one treated group, we have
many treated units (187 more-SLR-exposed tracts). We adopt the implementation in Cavallo
et al. (2013), using the MSCMT package developed by Becker and Klößner (2018), and run
the SC procedure over each more-SLR-exposed tract to estimate an average treatment effect
in each year.
We conduct inference by constructing placebo synthetic controls for each of the less-SLRexposed tracts from the other less-SLR-exposed tracts, following Cavallo et al. (2013). For
comparison group as “less-SLR-exposed” rather than “control” or “unexposed.” Our estimated effects include
the net impact of any such reallocation.
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each year, we construct 1,000 bootstrap samples from the set of placebo estimates equal
to the number of exposed tracts to construct a distribution of average placebo treatment
effects. The two-sided p-value of a treatment effect in year t is the probability that one of
the average placebo effects has a larger magnitude than the estimated average treatment
effect.
In sum, the SC estimator can flexibly control for a large number of observable covariates as
described above. As we show, with 12 years of pre-period data, the SC method succeeds at
constructing a set of synthetic tracts quite similar to the more-SLR-exposed tracts over the
pre-2013 period and across our set of outcomes.

2.3.3

Generalized Propensity Score

The generalized propensity score (GPS) approach extends propensity score matching to
estimate the effects of continuous treatments (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). This flexibility
means that, unlike with SC, we do not need to classify tracts into binary more-versus-less
exposed groups while discarding any tract with intermediate exposure. Instead, we are able
to estimate “dose-response” functions and document the changing effects of SLR on housing
markets across the full distribution of exposure for all tracts in our sample. Appendix
Section B.5 describes GPS estimation in more detail.
Generalized propensity scores are estimated conditional on deciles of distance-to-coast and
share of a tract’s developed area in the floodplain (also referred to as “Special Flood Hazard
Areas,” or SFHAs), county fixed-effects, inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) of flood insurance
claims per-capita 1995-2005, mean share of 2001-2012 home sales by non-owner occupied
buyers, 2010 population share under 18 and share 18 to 64, and quadratic terms of 2010
population shares nonwhite and in poverty, and tract area made up of water. We estimate
potential outcomes at 10% intervals of SLR exposure from 0% to 100%, and combine data
over 2010-2012, 2013-2015, 2016-2018, and 2019-2020 to present our estimates compactly.48
48

We obtain similar GPS results from year-by-year estimates.
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The ability to include county fixed-effects in propensity score estimation is another desirable
property of the GPS approach. These fixed-effects control for differential trends driven by
county-level unobservable factors and show that our results can be robustly identified from
within-county variation in SLR exposure.

2.4
2.4.1

Results: SLR Exposure and Housing Market Dynamics
Descriptive Statistics

Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample of coastal Florida census tracts.
Among these tracts, we examine both continuous and discrete measures of exposure. Using
all tracts, we employ a continuous measure of the share of the parcels in the tract exposed
to six feet of sea level rise. The average tract in our sample has 40% of its parcels exposed
to six feet of SLR, and, as seen in Figure 2.3, the density of SLR exposure is greatest at the
upper and lower ends of the exposure distribution.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.1, we present summary statistics for tracts assigned by our
discrete measure to “more-SLR-exposed” and “less-SLR-exposed” coastal tracts (as defined
above). These two groups of tracts differ substantially across a range of geographic and
demographic attributes. High exposure tracts are more likely to be located in a FEMA
floodplain, have a larger water area in the tract boundary, and have higher average house
transaction prices. These differences motivate our approaches to account for observable
differences between the two areas while exploring the effect of sea level rise on housing and
mortgage markets in these tracts.

2.4.2

Housing Transaction Volumes and Prices

Raw Data Trends and Long-Difference Results
Figure C.3 presents the time series of aggregate housing transactions (top panel) and mean
house price index (bottom panel) for our sample of less-SLR-exposed and more-SLR-exposed
tracts. As discussed in Section 3.1, there is a lead-lag relationship between transaction
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volumes and prices in both the more- and less-exposed tracts over the housing boom and
bust. However, while the less exposed tracts see a steady increase in volumes and prices
after the 2008 recession, the recovery in more-exposed tracts is interrupted in 2013 with a
sudden decline in transaction volumes. In these at-risk tracts, the lead-lag relationship of
the boom and bust repeats: While home prices continue to rise until 2016, they begin to
level off and see a large relative decline by 2019.49
Figure 2.4 shows that these relationships between SLR, housing transactions, and house
prices hold across the continuous distribution of SLR exposure.50 Comparing changes in
2016 relative to the pre-2013 mean, panel (a) shows a declining relationship between home
sales volumes and SLR. On the other hand, there is little relationship between SLR and
relative changes in 2016 home sale prices as shown in panel (b). By 2019, however, there
is a significant negative relationship between SLR and both home sales and relative prices
emerges in panels (c) and (d).
As a simple test of the raw trends’ robustness to differences in observable characteristics,
we estimate linear regressions of the following form:

Yit = α0 + λt Xi + βt SLRi + ϵit

(2.1)

Yit denotes home sales volume or prices of tract i in year t ∈ {2016, 2019} normalized by its
tract-level 2001-2012 mean.51 Xi are tract-level controls for population centroid distanceto-coast and share of 2010 households in poverty. SLRi is an indicator variable for tract i’s
exposure, taking distinct values for less-SLR-exposed tracts, more-SLR-exposed tracts, and
tracts with medium SLR exposure as defined in Section 2.2.3.
49

Figure B.3 plots volumes and prices side-by-side in the more- and less-exposed samples to emphasize
their lead-lag dynamics.
50
Figure B.4 presents a map of the change in home sales volume (panel (a)) and HPI (panel (b)) between
2011-2012 and 2017-2018.
51
Results are similar when we calculate the long-difference as the change in the log outcome variable from
2012.
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The results of these regressions are shown in Table 2.2 for home sales volume (panel a) and
prices (panel b) in 2016 (columns 1 and 2) and 2019 (columns 3 and 4). The results with
no controls suggest a relative decline of 20% in home sales volume relative to 2001-2012
in more-SLR-exposed tracts by 2016, but a small increase in relative prices. By 2019, the
volume decline reaches 23% and home prices are 7% lower in more-SLR-exposed areas. The
magnitude and lead-lag relationship between the volume and price declines in more-SLRexposed tracts persist as we introduce controls for distance-to-coast and poverty share in
columns (2) and (4). Across specifications, the declines are larger in more-SLR-exposed
relative to medium-SLR-exposed markets.

Synthetic Control Results
In this section, we examine whether the divergence between sales volumes and prices in markets with high SLR exposure in the raw data is robust to flexibly controlling for differential
trends between more and less SLR exposed areas during the housing market recovery using
the synthetic control (SC) estimator.
Figure 2.5 shows the time series of home sales and HPI for the more-SLR-exposed tracts (in
blue) and the synthetically constructed control sample (in black). The home sales volume
series (panel (a)) follow each other closely prior to 2012, the period over which we balance
pre-event covariates. After 2012, however, the two series begin to diverge, with fewer home
sales in high exposure areas. By 2019, annual home sales are 9% below the “pre-period”
2001-2012 mean in more-SLR-exposed tracts, whereas in the synthetic control sample sales
are 10% above their mean, yielding a total sales gap of 19%.52
In contrast, the house price series (shown in panel (c)) follows a different pattern, with high
exposure tracts’ relative prices rising until 2016, peaking at roughly 3% higher prices in 2014,
and then falling 6% below that of the synthetic control sample’s prices by 2019. Note that
52

We also confirm that our results are not sensitive to the matching endpoint. Appendix Figure B.9 shows
that the results remain similar for home sales volumes and prices when we end the matching pre-period in
2010 instead of 2012.
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prices followed similar paths prior to 2013, highlighting the ability of the synthetic control
method to balance pre-trends for house prices despite the differences in many observable
attributes of these coastal tracts.
Thus, even when the set of less-SLR-exposed tracts are chosen to match the more-SLRexposed tracts on relevant covariates and outcomes prior to 2013, we see the same divergence
between house prices and sale volume emerge in high exposure tracts as shown in the raw
data from Figure C.3. Summing the differences between the exposed and synthetic series and
multiplying by the most-SLR-exposed tracts’ 2001-2012 mean home sale volume, we estimate
that there were approximately 22,000 fewer home transactions in more-SLR-exposed tracts
relative to the synthetic control sample between 2013 and 2019.
Panels (b) and (d) of Figure 2.5 present the estimated treatment effects (the difference
between the two series in panels (a) and (b), respectively) along with the two-sided 95%
interval of placebo treatment effects indicated by the shaded gray region. Treatment effects
falling outside of the shaded gray region are statistically significant at α = 0.05.53 Relative
to the statistically significant volume declines from 2013 to 2016, there was not a statistically
significant relative price decline until 2017.54

2.4.3

Dynamics Across the Distribution of SLR Exposure

While our synthetic control results highlight divergent housing market trends between moreSLR-exposed and less-SLR-exposed tracts, they are constrained to measure SLR exposure
as a binary variable. In reality, we observe a continuous distribution of SLR exposure across
our sample in coastal Florida. To study how intermediate levels of SLR risk affect housing
markets, we turn to a generalized propensity score (GPS) estimator.
53

The first column of Table 2.3 presents the 2019 coefficients from the SC estimator across housing market
outcomes with p-values in parentheses.
54
We further show in Appendix Table B.1 and Appendix Figure B.8 that are our results are robust to
removing tracts with poor synthetic fit, following (Abadie, 2019). In Appendix Figure B.13 we establish
that these results are not driven solely by Miami, despite its prominence in the national discussion around
SLR.
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Figure 2.9 presents results for home sales and the home price index across the sea level rise
distribution, with the x-axis representing sea level rise exposure. “0” indicates no exposure,
while “1” means the entire tract (100% of developed area) would be inundated at six feet of
sea level rise. Panels (a) and (c) show the differential change in home sales by 2013-2016 and
2017-2019 from the 2001-2012 period relative to tracts with no SLR exposure. In the 20132016 period, tracts with at least 80% exposure experience a statistically significant decline
in transaction volume. By the 2017-2019 period, there is a clear downward trend in home
sales for tracts with greater than 40% exposure. For tracts that would be fully inundated
at six feet of sea level rise, we estimate a relative decline of roughly 25% of the pre-2013
mean in home sales, similar to the estimated effect for the more-SLR-exposed group using
synthetic control methods.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.9 shows the relative change in home prices in 2013-2016 from the 20012012 period. Similar to the trends in the raw data, we estimate a statistically significant
relative increase in prices of around 5% for tracts with high SLR exposure over this period.
In panel (d), we see that this relative increase has completely disappeared by the 2016-2019
period, with more-SLR-exposed tracts instead facing a relative price decline of 5% compared
to their pre-2013 mean prices.
In sum, examining changing housing market dynamics across the sea level rise distribution,
we observe statistically significant declining home sales by 2017-2019 only in tracts with at
least 40% sea level rise exposure. The largest declines are concentrated in the same tracts
as the more-SLR-exposed treatment group used in the synthetic control method, supporting
the use of our “high vs. low” binary exposure measure for capturing the relevant treatment
effect.55
55

Similar to the synthetic control results, we also we find in Appendix Figure B.14 that our GPS results
hold when excluding all tracts in Miami-Dade county.
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2.5

Separating Buyers’ and Sellers’ Responses to SLR Risk

Our evidence so far documents a housing market slowdown in more-SLR-exposed areas
relative to less-SLR-exposed ones that began with declining transaction volumes in 2013
and then continued with falling sales prices in 2016. These results, however, leave us with
no explanation for why transaction volumes declined in response to news about SLR risk or
why prices would decline with a lag.
In this section, we compare the dynamics of home sale listings in more- and less-SLR-exposed
markets between 2010 and 2019 using the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data described in
Section 3.2. If changing seller perceptions of climate risk caused these market declines, we
would expect to see a sharp increase in listings as sellers attempted to exit risky properties.
In contrast, if buyers are updating their understanding of risk in this market, we would
expect listed properties to take longer to sell and ultimately at lower prices.
We find multiple pieces of evidence that while potential buyers adjusted their behavior in
2013, sellers had a delayed reaction to the climate news. First, panel (a) of Figure 2.16 shows
almost no difference in the trends in the number of new listings in more- and less-exposed
markets across the entire sample period. This similarity in listings stands in sharp contrast
to the divergence in home sale volume documented in the top panel of Figure C.3.
As a result of the continuing growth in listings but stagnating sales volumes after 2013,
we show that the inventory of unsold homes increased in more-SLR-exposed areas even as
it continued to decline among less-SLR-exposed properties (Figure 2.16 panel b). Further,
consistent with these trends, panel (c) shows that the days-on-market from listing for homes
sold in more-SLR-exposed markets increased from 2013 to 2016 relative to less-SLR-exposed
markets.
The listing price trends shown in Figure 2.16 panel (d) document similar growth from 20102016 across the two markets. After 2016, however, more-SLR-exposed list prices decline
relative to less-SLR-exposed ones. The timing of this relative decline in list prices aligns
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with the relative decline in transacted prices documented in the bottom panel of Figure C.3.
As the growth in more-SLR-exposed prices began to slow, days-on-market declined between
2016 and 2019, although the inventory of unsold homes remained elevated.
Looking across the distribution of SLR exposure, we apply the Generalized Propensity Score
(GPS) methodology described in Section 2.3.3 to the outcomes in Figure 2.16.56 The results, shown in Figures 2.17 and 2.18 and summarized in Table 2.4, are consistent with the
trends from the raw data. We find that sellers continued to list properties in the face of
reduced demand, leading to rising inventories and time on market, and a delayed re-pricing
of their assets. The results from the listings data uniquely clarify the dynamics of supply and
demand in the housing market, and suggest that sharp changes in volume and delayed capitalization into prices are initially demand-driven. In the next section, we examine potential
mechanisms for these patterns.

2.6
2.6.1

Exploring Mechanisms Driving Market Dynamics
Sea Level Rise and Mortgage Lending

Does the decline in transaction volume reflect a change in credit supply on the part of
lenders, who may recognize the growing risk of a long-term 30-year obligation in SLR exposed
markets? Or do these patterns instead represent a negative shift in credit demand due to
declining housing demand in exposed areas? If the patterns we document were a consequence
of lenders tightening their credit standards, then we would expect a larger decline in home
purchase lending volumes than cash purchase volumes.
In Figure 2.6, we explore the dynamics of home purchase lending volumes alongside cash
purchase volumes. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.6 show a sharp divergence of both cash and
mortgage transactions between more-SLR-exposed tracts and matched control tracts after
2012 that are consistent with the overall volume results presented above in Figure 2.5. The
56
As described in Section 3.2, the MLS data is only consistently available starting in 2010. Because of
this shortened time series, we cannot apply the synthetic control estimator.
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decline is actually larger for cash than mortgage purchases, with relative declines of 28%
and 17% by 2019, respectively. Thus, the explanation for the decline in transaction volume
cannot be solely based on lender behavior. While previous research has focused on lender
decision-making, by examining cash purchase transactions where lenders are not involved
and nonetheless observing a pronounced contraction in home buying activity, we provide
new direct evidence that the decline in sales volume reflects primarily a housing demand
rather than credit supply response.
In Figure 2.7, we further examine additional indicators of lender behavior. If lenders were
differentially tightening their standards in these tracts, we would expect to see a decline in
refinancing volume and an increase in loan denials. In panel (a), we observe essentially no
change in refinancing activity. That said, panel (b) of Figure 2.7 shows that modestly more
loan applications are being denied in more-SLR-exposed tracts, with coefficients showing
approximately 5% more loan denials (off a base of 25% in the pre-2013 period) in most
years. Thus, we conclude that while lenders may be making some small adjustments on the
margin, changing loan denials cannot explain a nearly 20% decline in purchase loan volume
in more-SLR-exposed tracts.
Although lenders have not meaningfully tightened credit in areas at risk of sea level rise,
it is possible they have increased securitization to transfer their climate risk to the housing
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). However, Figure 2.8 shows only modest support
for this hypothesis. The securitization rates of more-SLR-exposed tracts are elevated by
about 5% of the 2001-2012 mean relative to the synthetic control for most of the 2013-2019
period, with the 2018 and 2019 differences close to zero.
While the above patterns suggest a muted lender reaction to SLR risk, it is possible that
local lenders with concentrated portfolios may be more exposed and thus more responsive
(Keenan and Bradt, 2020). To test if behavior differs across local and non-local lenders we
define a lender within a county for a given year as “local” if it originates at least 10% of its
total annual lending in that county.
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Figure 2.14 shows the synthetic control results for local (top row) and non-local purchase
loan volumes. Although the relative decline by 2019 of 25% for local loans is larger than
the corresponding 15% decline of non-local loans in more-SLR-exposed areas, both declines
are of comparable magnitude especially given the poor pre-2013 fit of the local lending time
series with its synthetic control counterpart.57 In Figure 2.15, we see no evidence of a
substantial decline in refinance lending for local or non-local lenders. Our results suggest
that both local and non-local lenders responded similarly to changing SLR risk perceptions
around 2013 – that is to say, not much at all.
In sum, our results suggest that changing SLR risk salience has not dramatically affected
credit supply in coastal Florida. One plausible mechanism behind these results is that lenders
were already incorporating climate risk into their practices prior to 2013, as suggested by
Ouazad and Kahn (2021) who find that lenders increased mortgage securitization in high-risk
areas following large hurricanes from 2004-2012.
Furthermore, federal housing policies, by insulating mortgage balance sheets from disaster
risk, could also make lenders less responsive to climate risk. The National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) offers flood insurance at premiums generally below actuarial rates for the
highest risk properties (Kousky et al., 2017). For instance, after Hurricane Katrina, the
most flooded parts of New Orleans saw no significant change in loan delinquency, consistent
with flood insurance payments protecting lenders from mortgage default (Gallagher and
Hartley, 2017). Lenders can also securitize loans with the housing GSEs, Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac, at prices that are independent of current or future flood risk (Hurst et al.,
2016). Although the NFIP and mortgage securitization leave taxpayers exposed to climate
risk, these programs insulate lenders’ balance sheets.
57
Achieving a clean fit with the synthetic control method is difficult given the sparsity of non-local loans,
which only make up only 11% of purchase loans from 2001-2012 in the estimation sample.
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2.6.2

Higher Insurance Premiums

One possible explanation for our findings is that higher flood insurance premiums drove the
decline in SLR-exposed housing markets over this periods. 2012 and 2014 saw the passage of
reforms of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) that began to increase premiums
on previously subsidized homes inside floodplains.
These rising premiums are unlikely to explain our findings. First, there is no reason that
higher premiums should lead to a decline in transaction volume or its lead-lag relationship
with lower transaction prices. Second, our GPS method includes controls for the share of
homes inside the FEMA floodplain - the group most affected by premium increases over this
period. Notably the floodplain is not perfectly correlated with our measure of sea level rise
due to differences in current versus future flood risk and floodmap accuracy
To directly test the role of higher premiums in driving volume and price outcomes, we control
for log per-capita premium changes from 2012-2019 in our long-difference OLS specification,
with results described in Appendix Table B.2. The magnitude and lead-lag relationship
between the declines remain consistent when we add the premium change variable in columns
(1) and (3). The results also remain quantitatively similar when we instrument for premium
changes in columns (2) and (4) with the counterfactual premium change if each tract’s 2012
policy cohort were held fixed, as described in Appendix Section B.4.58

2.6.3

Heterogeneity by Climate Opinions

Our results thus point to a demand-side explanation for the drop in home sales volume in
more-SLR-exposed markets. In this section, we examine whether beliefs regarding climate
change are associated with the changes in sales volumes and prices documented above.
58
We additionally show that our results are not driven by contemporaneous disasters by re-estimating
our home prices and sales volumes results excluding tracts in the top quartile of 2001-2018 flood insurance
claims per capita. Appendix Figure B.10 shows that this sample restriction excludes essentially all tracts
with significant flood insurance claims over the sample period. Appendix Figures B.11 and B.12 present
similar synthetic control and GPS estimates for transaction volumes and home prices, respectively, excluding
census tracts with high claims as in the full sample.
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Panel (a) of Figure 2.11 presents the relationship between the 2019 synthetic control treatment effect for changes in home purchase volume and the share of the more-SLR-exposed
tract’s county that says they are worried about climate change in 2014. The x-axis is defined
as the estimated percent of adults in the county who would respond “somewhat worried” or
“very worried” to the question, “How worried are you about global warming?” There is a
strong and statistically significant negative relationship: More-SLR-exposed tracts in counties with a larger share of residents worried about climate change have experienced much
weaker growth in home sales through 2019. The differences are dramatic, with an additional
ten percent of the county worried about climate change associated with an approximately
27 percentage point greater relative decrease in home sales volume.
Panel (b) shows the relationship between the 2019 change in house prices and the share that
are worried about climate change. Here we observe a negative albeit statistically insignificant
relationship between the relative home price changes in more-SLR-exposed markets and
worry about climate change.
Our other climate opinion proxies show a similar negative relationship between climate
pessimism and housing market declines in SLR-exposed markets. SLR-exposed markets
where a greater share of 2010-2012 home purchases were by buyers in parts of New York
and New Jersey affected by Hurricane Sandy saw greater home transaction volume declines
by 2019 (Figure 2.12), while a higher 2008 Democratic vote is associated with smaller volume
declines (Figure 2.13). Greater Sandy-affected migration, or lower Republican vote share, are
associated with larger 2019 home price declines, although the relationships are statistically
insignificant.
In sum, the places with the largest transaction volume and price declines since 2013 for SLRexposed markets are in counties where climate risk is most salient to residents and prospective homebuyers. Together with the evidence on changing SLR risk salience in Florida since
2013, this pattern suggests that climate change belief heterogeneity may be affecting how
and when SLR risk is capitalized into housing markets. Contrary to prior studies which
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have focused on the heterogeneity of capitalization of SLR into home prices, we find that
the heterogeneity of SLR’s effects on transaction volumes is more elastic with respect to
climate risk beliefs.
The larger volume declines in markets with more climate pessimists is a puzzle for the
usual explanation that segmented markets and resorting by beliefs drives heterogeneous
SLR capitalization (Bakkensen and Barrage, 2017; Bernstein et al., 2019). Such a model
would predict higher housing market turnover as pessimists sell to optimists. We return to
possible explanations for this pattern in Section 3.4.4.

Heterogeneity by Socioeconomic Status
Not all coastal communities in Florida are wealthy; in fact, poverty rates in our sample
of census tracts range from near zero to over 50%. We next explore whether there is any
evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects in lower socioeconomic status census tracts.
Given that lower-income households may find it more difficult to adjust to climate risks,
this is an especially important margin of heterogeneity (Keenan et al., 2018).
To assess such heterogeneity, we plot the 2019 synthetic control sales volumes and prices
treatment effects by share of households in poverty in Appendix Figure B.5. The figure
shows little evidence of differential volume declines (top panel) by poverty, although higher
poverty tracts experienced larger price declines (bottom panel), although the relationship
is statistically insignificant. In Appendix Figure B.6, we find negative, but also statistically
insignificant, negative relationship between the share of each SLR-exposed tract’s population
that is nonwhite and its price and volume declines.
Taken together, these results suggest relatively little heterogeneity in the housing market
dynamics or capitalization surrounding SLR risk by socioeconomic status.
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2.6.4

New and Old Construction

Next, we compare the changes in SLR-exposed transaction volumes between sales of new
and existing homes. While most of the existing coastal housing stock was built well before
sea level rise (SLR) was a concern for most housing market participants, changes in newly
built home sales reflect housing supply responses to growing SLR awareness after 2013.
One might rationalize the decline in volume we observe as driven by a decrease in housing
construction in SLR-exposed areas driven by rising flood insurance premia or regulations.
Figure 2.10 shows the synthetic control estimates for the sales volumes of new homes (top
row) and existing homes (bottom row). Noting the difference in the y-axis scales between
the top and bottom rows, new home sales were much more elastic over the housing market
boom and bust than existing home sales. After 2013, whereas new home sales continued to
decline through 2019 in more-SLR-exposed markets, they recovered in the matched synthetic
control sample of less-SLR-exposed tracts, reaching their 2001-2012 mean by 2019 (panel a).
As a result, new home sales were 90% of the 2001-2012 mean lower in more-SLR-exposed
markets relative to their synthetic controls by 2019 (panel b). The bottom row of the figure
shows that existing home sales also declined substantially in more-SLR-exposed tracts after
2013 (panel c), falling over 20% of the 2001-2012 baseline by 2019 relative to their synthetic
controls (panel d). Generalized propensity score estimates of changes in new and existing
home sales across the SLR distribution are consistent with the synthetic control results
(Appendix Figure B.7).
Despite the significant decline in new home sales, the magnitude of the decline in existing
sales is statistically indistinguishable from the decline estimated for total sales of SLRexposed homes, unsurprising given that existing home sales comprised nearly 90% of 20012012 sales in the estimation sample. Although the decline in new home sales volume is
consistent with a strong negative supply response in more-SLR-exposed areas, it cannot
explain the drop in overall transaction volumes.
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2.7

Discussion

Our paper is the first to establish a lead-lag relationship of declining transaction volumes
preceding lower prices in SLR-exposed housing markets. The relationship between SLR
exposure and these market dynamics persist under a variety of estimators and cannot be
easily explained by differences in observable characteristics, pre-trends, behavior by lenders,
changes to flood insurance policy, recent flood damage, or changes in new housing supply. We
now briefly discuss how existing frameworks of the capitalization of SLR risk into housing
markets, or the capitalization of new information into asset prices more broadly, fit the
trends we document.

Market Segmentation and Belief Heterogeneity
One approach to market segmentation, proposed by Bakkensen and Barrage (2017), allows
for dynamic SLR capitalization when homeowners are climate “optimists” or “pessimists,”
with optimists sorting over time into the risky coast. As negative climate news arrives,
optimists update their beliefs, leading to re-sorting and volatile price changes. As in our
results above, a number of papers have found supporting evidence that homes exposed to
SLR risk sell at a greater discount in markets where more participants are worried about
future climate change (Giglio et al., 2021b; Barrage and Furst, 2019; Bernstein et al., 2019).
The Bakkensen and Barrage (2017) framework can potentially explain the price heterogeneity among more-SLR-exposed we observe in the bottom panels of Figures 2.11-2.13,
where higher climate concern proxies are associated with larger home price declines since
2013. However, sorting and heterogeneous beliefs alone cannot explain the volume decline
in more-SLR-exposed markets, or the fact that declines in volume were largest where buyers
and sellers were most pessimistic. Instead, the model would predict higher home turnover
as optimists buy from pessimists on the negative climate news.
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Sea Level Rise as a Neglected Risk
Gennaioli et al. (2015) describe how “neglected risks” – potential negative shocks treated by
market participants as having a probability of zero – can bring about financial crises when
they suddenly become salient with the arrival of bad news. Gennaioli et al. (2012) consider
the role of neglected risk in driving financial innovation to produce assets that appear safe
only because their underlying risk is neglected.
We argue that sea level rise qualifies as a plausibly neglected risk for many coastal residents,
or at least one that became much more salient after the many climate-related events and
reports in 2013 (Figure B.1). Under this interpretation, the framework in Gennaioli et al.
(2012) can explain the steep decline of new home sales in SLR-exposed markets after 2013
shown in the top panel of Figure 2.10. Coastal housing appeared relatively safe while SLR
risk was neglected during the housing boom, leading to overproduction of SLR-exposed
homes. After SLR risk became more salient in 2013, the production of SLR-exposed homes
collapsed.
However, the neglected risk framework is inconsistent with the decline in existing home
sales shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2.10. This is especially true given the belief
heterogeneity noted above, as one would still expect optimists to buy from pessimists in
SLR-exposed areas after the arrival of bad climate news.

Extrapolative Beliefs
One of the most striking features of the lead-lag relationship between volume and price
declines in SLR-exposed communities is its similarity to the experience of housing markets
over the boom-and-bust of the 2003–2007. As shown in Figure B.3, home sales volumes in
Florida declined dramatically from 2005 to 2006 even as prices continued to rise.
Building on Glaeser and Nathanson (2017), DeFusco et al. (2017) describe a model that
matches these volume and price dynamics. In the model, housing market participants incorrectly believe that current home prices solely reflect demand and neglect buyers’ price
85

expectations. Under this “cap rate error,” sellers overestimate demand during periods of
rapid price growth because they misattribute buyers’ expectations of capital gains to higher
demand for housing services. In the data, this tendency appears as extrapolative beliefs
where market participants over-infer future price changes from past price changes. Over
the boom, prices exceed their fundamentals until the boom turns into a “quiet phase,” with
falling volumes as prices continue to rise, and eventually a bust with falling prices.
Such a model can help to explain the lead-lag relationship we observe between volume
and price declines in the context of climate risks. The bad climate news in 2013 represented a looming negative amenity shock in SLR-exposed areas, decreasing housing demand.
Nonetheless, sellers continued to post high list prices, believing under the cap rate error that
the continuing high flow utility of coastal housing services today justify high prices. Fewer
buyers, who anticipate increasing climate risks over their housing tenure, are willing to buy,
causing falling sales volumes even as prices remain high among those still willing to transact. In response to declining transaction volumes, sellers gradually reduce their estimate of
housing demand and thus their asking prices.
We uniquely observe another key feature of the housing boom-and-bust - the rise in unsold
home inventories and time on the market before sale - in more-SLR-exposed areas (Figures
2.16 - 2.18). These patterns are consistent with SLR-exposed sellers overestimating demand
as they try to sell their homes.
Finally, this extrapolative belief framework can parsimoniously explain the climate concern
heterogeneity we observe. Even in SLR-exposed markets where both buyers and sellers are
pessimists, the cap rate error causes list prices to exceed housing demand, accentuating the
decline in home sales. Where buyers and sellers are climate optimists, sales volumes and
prices will remain high even in the face of negative climate news. In sum, the patterns that
we document in the housing and mortgage markets around the arrival of climate news are
consistent with heterogeneous beliefs, previously neglected risks, and expectations formed
by extrapolation from recent market performance.
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2.8

Conclusion

In this paper, we provide new evidence that the “most liquid” parts of Florida (in that they
are most likely to be underwater by 2100) have increasingly illiquid housing markets. Since
2013, we show that annual home transaction volumes have fallen in relative terms by 20%
in the most-SLR-exposed coastal census tracts. This stark time-series pattern of divergence
in sales volumes between more and less-exposed areas is robust to a wide variety of controls,
methods, and samples. Notably, this pattern holds for both home mortgage volumes and
cash purchases, suggesting that demand for at-risk coastal properties has fallen sharply since
2013, above and beyond any adjustments currently being made by lenders, insurers, or the
GSEs.
In contrast, home prices in both more and less-exposed markets rose from 2013-2015, and
only in recent years have prices begun to (relatively) fall. This pattern of declining sales
volumes but relatively unresponsive prices points to a phenomenon most recently observed
during the housing boom and bust of the 2000s when a strong lead-lag pattern was observed
in many markets: Falling sales volumes preceded sharp declines in prices.
The most natural explanation for this pattern is the shrinking and eventual departure of
“market optimists” from the market. For supply to equal demand, “optimistic” sellers and
“pessimistic” buyers would need to agree on how the threat of sea level rise affects the
present value of at-risk homes (Bakkensen and Barrage, 2017). But, belief heterogeneity
across buyers alone cannot explain the accumulation of unsold inventory or continuing high
list prices of for-sale SLR-exposed homes. These facts suggest that it was primarily buyers
and not sellers who started responding to SLR risk.
Why might some housing market actors have been slower than others to respond to increasingly severe SLR projections? One possibility is that partisan division on climate change has
led to durable belief heterogeneity, a premise supported by polling data (Kennedy, 2020).
Another explanation is that the behavioral forces of myopia and optimism (among other
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potential biases) may be causing homeowners in SLR-exposed areas to underestimate their
risk (Meyer and Kunreuther, 2017). In addition, nominal loss aversion relative to their
purchase price could make homeowners slow to accept lower market prices (Genesove and
Mayer, 2001). Finally, those living in the places most exposed to SLR might already be
the most optimistic about present (and future) flood risk due to housing market sorting
(Bakkensen and Barrage, 2017).
We suggest, however, that our unique pattern of empirical findings is most consistent with
the role of extrapolative beliefs and neglected risk (Glaeser and Nathanson, 2017; DeFusco
et al., 2017; Gennaioli et al., 2012, 2015). These frameworks would explain the lead-lag
relationship between price and volume declines, the direction of our heterogeneity results,
and the unsold housing inventory and high list prices in at-risk markets. Further documenting the mechanisms and connections between SLR belief heterogeneity and housing market
behavior remains a promising direction for research.
While our empirical approach is not predictive of the future, sharp declines in transaction
volume could anticipate further declines in price. The ultimate consequences of perceptions
of sea level rise on coastal property values, and the associated mortgages attached to those
properties, depends crucially on whether there are buyers willing to hold these properties and
at what price. At some later date, in the absence of substantial mitigation and infrastructure
efforts, many Florida properties will be underwater. Until then, homeowners and lenders
face greater risk of extreme weather events, storm surges, and nuisance flooding. Our results
suggest that fewer buyers are willing to bear these risks at current market prices, leading to
a sharp fall in transaction volumes.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that these housing market responses to climate risk are not due
to the pricing of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) premiums or federal mortgage
programs; Instead, these responses are in spite of federal policies that actively mis-price
predictable climate risk. This mis-pricing tends to subsidize coastal property markets at
the expense of non-coastal communities, distorting investment into more at-risk regions.
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Whether these programs will continue to differentially support coastal housing investment
in the face of rising costs, and how housing and mortgage markets will respond to changes
in these programs that incorporate the current and future costs of climate change, remain
crucial topics for future research.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics

2001-2012 Annual Sale Volume
2001-2012 Median Sale Price
2010 Population
2010 Share Nonwhite
2010 Poverty Share
2001-2012 Share Owner-Occupied Buyers
Meters-to-Coast
Share in Floodplain
Observations

All
120
(70)
259778
(201914)
3436
(1481)
0.132
(0.146)
0.129
(0.087)
0.626
(0.168)
664
(458)
.473
(.368)
771

More-SLR-Exposed
134
(83)
334526
(187615)
2921
(1273)
0.076
(0.065)
0.107
(0.063)
0.557
(0.167)
427
(405)
.913
(.192)
187

Less-SLR-Exposed
104
(61)
172982
(101215)
3838
(1545)
0.191
(0.167)
0.155
(0.098)
0.679
(0.156)
964
(412)
.111
(.137)
217

Tract-level summary statistics of variable means with standard deviation in parentheses.
Sample divided into all coastal tracts, more-SLR-exposed tracts (share SLR-exposed > 0.7),
and less-SLR-exposed tracts (share SLR-exposed < 0.1).
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Table 2.2: Long Difference Results

More-SLR-Exposed
Medium-SLR-Exposed
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Panel (a)
2016 Home Sales Volume
(1)
(2)

2019 Home Sales Volume
(3)
(4)

-0.196***
(0.027)
-0.076***
(0.022)
1.156***
(0.017)

-0.197***
(0.030)
-0.076***
(0.023)
1.190***
(0.032)

-0.231***
(0.031)
-0.087***
(0.026)
1.220***
(0.021)

-0.215***
(0.034)
-0.076***
(0.028)
1.219***
(0.038)

771
0.067

771
0.090

771
0.069

771
0.084

Panel (b)
2016 Home Prices
(1)
(2)
More-SLR-Exposed
Medium-SLR-Exposed
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Controls

2019 Home Prices
(3)
(4)

0.036***
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.008)
1.154***
(0.007)

0.039***
(0.011)
0.002
(0.008)
1.151***
(0.012)

-0.069***
(0.010)
-0.028***
(0.009)
1.311***
(0.007)

-0.039***
(0.011)
-0.009
(0.009)
1.242***
(0.012)

771
0.026

771
0.027

771
0.061

771
0.127

No
Yes
No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Yes

Results from long-difference OLS regressions showing the relative change in home sales
volumes (top panel) and prices (bottom panel) in 2016 (columns 1-2) and 2019 (columns
3-4) in more-SLR-exposed and medium-SLR-exposed markets relative to less-SLR-exposed
markets. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for tract population centroid distance-to-coast
and 2010 share of households in poverty.

91

Table 2.3: Main Results
Outcome

Home Sale Volume
Home Prices
Home Purchase Loan Volume
Home Cash Sale Volume
Refinance Volume
Denial Index
Securitization Index

Synthetic Control
(P-value)

GPS
(SE)

OLS
(SE)

-.186***
(.000)
-.053***
(.000)
-.170***
(.000)
-.279***
(.000)
-.025
(.281)
-.006
(.679)
-.023
(.102)

-.255***
(.035)
-0.056**
(0.020)
-.273***
(.070)
-.147
(.102)
-.082**
(.025)
.085**
(.038)
-.030
(.033)

-.227***
(.041)
-0.038***
(0.011)
-.240***
(.038)
-.243***
(.054)
-.098***
(.017)
.046**
(.021)
.033
(.020)

Coefficients for the relative change by 2019 in SLR-exposed tracts over less-SLR-exposed
tracts across the primary outcomes for synthetic control, generalized propensity score (GPS),
and OLS methodologies. Standard errors are in parentheses for the OLS and GPS columns,
and p-values in parenthesis for the synthetic control column. The GPS column estimates are
from the pooled 2017-2019 period. Outcome variables are standardized by their tract-level
2001-2012 mean.
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Table 2.4: MLS Estimates
Outcome

2019 New Listings
2019 Listings Inventory
2019 Days on Market
2016 List Price
2019 List Price

GPS
(SE)

OLS
(SE)

0.083
(.077)
.635***
(.133)
.220***
(.045)
-.120
(.073)
-.731***
(.118)

0.102**
(.046)
0.433***
(.059)
0.115***
(.020)
-0.163***
(0.044)
-0.388***
(0.067)

Coefficients for relative changes of home listings outcomes in SLR-exposed tracts over lessSLR-exposed tracts with generalized propensity score (GPS) and OLS methodologies. Standard errors are in parentheses for the OLS and GPS columns. The GPS column estimates are
from the pooled 2013-2016 and 2017-2019 period for 2016 and 2019 outcomes, respectively.
Outcome variables are standardized by their tract-level 2001-2012 mean.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Home Sales Volumes and Prices

Housing transaction volume (top panel) and home price (bottom panel) trends in coastal
Florida census tracts with high versus low SLR exposure. Housing volume and home price
index are normalized by their 2001-2012 mean. Sources: Zillow Home Value Index, CoreLogic, Authors’ calculations
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Figure 2.2: Sea Level Rise Exposure Map

Maps show SLR exposure for the sample of 771 coastal Florida census tracts. The top
panel shows the share of each tract’s developed land in 2000 that would be chronically
inundated at six feet of SLR. The bottom panel shows the subsample of tracts categorized
as either “more-SLR-exposed” (> 70% exposure, 187 tracts) or “less-SLR-exposed” (< 10%
exposure, 217 tracts).
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Figure 2.3: SLR Exposure Histogram

Histogram of tract SLR exposure. The first and second dashed lines indicate the cutoffs for
the less-SLR-exposed and more-SLR-exposed tracts, respectively.

96

Figure 2.4: Price and Volume Trends Across SLR Distribution

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Relationship between tract-level SLR exposure and 2016 home sale volumes (a), 2016 home
prices (b), 2019 home volume (c), and 2019 home prices relative to their 2001-2012 mean.
The plot divides tracts into twenty quantiles of SLR exposure and fits a quadratic curve to
the resulting scatterplot.
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Figure 2.5: Volume and Price Synthetic Control Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for home sale volume and home price index. Left column shows
outcome for SLR-exposed tracts alongside synthetic counterparts, right column shows
treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure 2.6: Loan and Cash Purchase Volume Synthetic Control Results

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for housing purchase loan and cash sale volumes. Left column
shows outcome for SLR-exposed tracts alongside synthetic counterparts, right column
shows treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure 2.7: Refinance Volume and Loan Denial Synthetic Control Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for refinancing volume and loan denial index. Left column shows
outcome for SLR-exposed tracts alongside synthetic counterparts, right column shows
treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure 2.8: Securitization Synthetic Control Estimates

Synthetic control results for securitization index. Top row shows outcome for SLR-exposed
tracts alongside synthetic counterparts, bottom shows treatment effects with two-sided 95%
interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure 2.9: Volume and Price Generalized Propensity Score Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Generalized propensity score results for housing transaction volume and home prices. Results show the relative change in the outcome variable normalized by the tract-level
2001-2012 mean by 2013-2016 (top row) and 2017-2019 (bottom row).
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Figure 2.10: Existing and New Sales Volume Synthetic Control Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for transaction volume of new (top row) and existing (bottom
row) homes. Left column shows outcomes for SLR-exposed tracts alongside synthetic
counterparts, right column shows treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo
effect estimates in gray.

103

Figure 2.11: SLR Effect Heterogeneity by Climate Opinion

Summarizes treatment effect heterogeneity from synthetic control estimator by climate
change concern for 2019 home sale volume (top) and 2019 home prices (bottom). Each
point is a county with the average treatment effect of its more-SLR-exposed census tracts
on the y-axis and the estimated share of adults in the county worried about climate change
from the 2014 Yale Climate Opinion Survey on the x-axis. The dashed red line indicates
the best-fit linear line through the points, with the coefficient and robust standard error
from the tract-level regression of the worry measure over the estimated treatment effects
indicated in the upper-right corner. Outcomes are normalized by the tract-level 2001-2012
mean.

104

Figure 2.12: SLR Effect Heterogeneity by Hurricane Sandy Exposure

Summarizes treatment effect heterogeneity from synthetic control estimator by share of 20102012 home sales made by New Jersey or New York residents affected by hurricane Sandy
for 2019 home sale volumes (top) and 2019 home prices (bottom). Each point is a county
with the average treatment effect of its more-SLR-exposed census tracts on the y-axis and
the share of migration inflows from New Jersey or New York residents affected by hurricane
Sandy on the x-axis. The dashed red line indicates the best-fit linear line through the points,
with the coefficient and robust standard error from the tract-level regression of the share of
migration inflows over the estimated treatment effects indicated in the upper-right corner.
Outcomes are normalized by the tract-level 2001-2012 mean.
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Figure 2.13: SLR Effect Heterogeneity by 2008 Democratic Vote Share

Summarizes treatment effect heterogeneity from synthetic control estimator by 2008 Democratic presidential vote share for 2019 home sale volumes (top) and 2019 home prices (bottom). The binscatter plot shows the average treatment effect of more-SLR-exposed census
tracts on the y-axis and the share of voters who voted for the Democratic Presidential candidate in 2008 on the x-axis. The dashed red line indicates the best-fit linear line through
the points, with the coefficient and robust standard error from the tract-level regression of
the share voting Democratic in 2008 over the estimated treatment effects indicated in the
upper-right corner. Outcomes are normalized by the tract-level 2001-2012 mean.
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Figure 2.14: Local and Non-Local Lender Purchase Loan Volume Synthetic Control Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for local and non-local lender purchase loan volume. Left column
shows outcome for SLR-exposed tracts alongside synthetic counterparts, right column
shows treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure 2.15: Local and Non-Local Lender Refinance Volume Synthetic Control Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for local and non-local refinancing volume. Left column shows
outcome for SLR-exposed tracts alongside synthetic counterparts, right column shows
treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure 2.16: Home Listings, Inventory, Time on Market, and List Prices

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

MLS home listings data comparing trends in more-SLR-exposed (blue) and less-SLR-exposed
(gray) markets. Shows raw data trends for total number of listings (a), unsold inventory
(b), days on the market before sale (c), and list price index (d) normalized by the tract-level
2001-2012 mean.
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Figure 2.17: Home Listings and Inventory Generalized Propensity Score Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Generalized propensity score results for listing volume (top) and unsold inventory (bottom).
Results show the relative change in the outcome variable normalized by the tract-level
2001-2012 mean by 2013-2016 (left) and 2017-2019 (right).
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Figure 2.18: Days on Market and List Price Generalized Propensity Score Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Generalized propensity score results for days on market before sale (top) and list price
index (bottom). Results show the relative change in the outcome variable normalized by
the tract-level 2001-2012 mean by 2013-2016 (left) and 2017-2019 (right).
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CHAPTER 3
What’s at Stake? Understanding the Role of Home Equity in
Flood Insurance Demand

3.1

Introduction

Since 1980, the United States has seen more than $1.7 trillion in damages from major natural disasters, with environmental risk expected to grow over time with climate change (Dahl
et al., 2018).59 Large disasters cause severe financial distress for many households and lead
to mortgage delinquency and default.60 An analysis from CoreLogic finds that the sequence
of devastating hurricanes and wildfires in 2017–2018 tripled mortgage delinquency rates in
affected areas (Betten et al., 2019).61 Ouazad and Kahn (2019) find that major hurricanes
caused a 1.6 percentage point increase in the probability of home foreclosure. However,
millions of flood-prone properties in the country remain uninsured for flood damage, contributing to the mortgage system’s exposure to disaster risk. Identifying the causes of this
flood insurance demand gap is critical for understanding how climate change will affect
households and financial markets.
This paper provides the first evidence of a causal relationship between home equity and flood
insurance demand. We find that flood insurance take-up followed the rise and fall of home
prices over the U.S. housing boom and bust of the 2000s. The relationship between home
prices and flood insurance demand cannot be easily explained by changes in the number
or value of homes at risk, demographic changes, flood insurance regulations, or wealth and
liquidity effects. Rather, our results are broadly consistent with a debt overhang channel,
where leveraged households have less incentive to invest in flood insurance because mortgage
59

See https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/.
The Federal Reserve estimated that about 40 percent of American adults are not able to cover an
unexpected $400 expense by cash or savings (Canilang et al., 2020). However, the typical cost of repair and
rebuilding after a disaster is orders of magnitude larger. For example, the average flood insurance claim in
2019 was $52,000 (https://www.fema.gov/data-visualization/historical-flood-risk-and-costs).
61
Other studies documenting the housing finance impacts of disasters include Anderson and Weinrobe
(1986), Morse (2011), Billings et al. (2019), Issler et al. (2019), and Kousky et al. (2020).
60
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default acts as a form of implicit insurance.
We estimate the effect of home equity on the demand for flood insurance from the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The main challenge to establish such a causal relationship
comes from the correlation between equity and other determinants of insurance demand,
such as income and disaster risk. To overcome this issue, we use the sudden variation in
home prices from the housing boom and bust in the 2000s, which drove similar changes in
home equity. This housing market cycle created price variation within and across housing
markets driven primarily by changing land values and independent of gradual changes in
flood risk, economic fundamentals, and demographics. Therefore, this setting is ideal for
isolating the effect of home equity on flood insurance demand from that of the value of the
physical structure at risk and other confounding factors.
We find a large, positive relationship between home prices and flood insurance take-up during
this period. For a measure of the housing boom, we use estimated structural breaks in each
MSA’s home price trend from Charles et al. (2018), most of which occurred during 2003 to
2005. Figure 3.1 provides a reduced-form depiction of our results in the raw data. The left
panel shows that MSAs with larger housing booms saw greater increases in flood insurance
take-up between 2002 and 2007, which roughly correspond to the beginning and the peak
of the boom. The right panel, in contrast, shows that as housing booms turned into busts
from 2007 to 2012, the MSAs with the largest initial booms had the lowest growth in flood
insurance policies.
Our difference-in-differences specification exploits variation in the timing and magnitude of
housing booms across MSAs and tracks the dynamics of home prices and flood insurance
take-up over the boom-bust cycle. The results shows that flood insurance take-up closely
follows the dynamics of home prices, has no pretrends, and is robust to controlling for annual
income, housing turnover, population, employment, and recent floods. Using data from a
new state-of-the-art flood risk model, we also include flexible controls for risk-dependent
trends in flood insurance take-up. Using housing boom size and timing as instruments in an
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instrumental variable (IV) framework, we estimate a home price elasticity of flood insurance
take-up around 0.3. We also run a series of robustness checks to verify that the effect
reflects voluntary purchases and to address concerns about the exclusion restriction for our
instrument.
Our results are broadly consistent with a “debt overhang” effect suppressing flood insurance
demand. For highly leveraged households, the option of mortgage default or bankruptcy
after a disaster can act as a high-deductible substitute for formal insurance. Consistent
with this mechanism, we find that the home price elasticity of flood insurance take-up is
significantly higher in states with borrower-friendly judicial foreclosure laws that reduce the
credit consequences of mortgage default. In addition, the home price elasticity is stronger
where homes are more exposed to large “tail-risk” flood events that could trigger negative
equity for leveraged homeowners. Finally, take-up during the housing bust declines the most
for homes built at the peak of the boom — a group that was highly leveraged with little
home equity at the market’s nadir.
On the other hand, we find little support for wealth effects or changes in liquidity as the
main mechanism. The home price elasticity we estimate is an order of magnitude larger than
existing estimates of wealth effects on insurance demand. Inconsistent with a wealth shock
channel, we estimate a large effect of home equity on extensive margin flood insurance
take-up but null effects on intensive margin demand through supplemental coverage and
deductible choices. We also find little evidence that homeowners used their increased access
to liquidity over the boom to avoid policy lapsation.
These findings suggest that leveraged households do not fully internalize their environmental risk and that part of their risk is transferred to lenders instead. Lenders, in turn,
rely on mortgage securitization and credit rationing to reduce their disaster risk exposure
(Laux et al., 2017; Ouazad and Kahn, 2019; Keenan and Bradt, 2020; Sastry, 2021). The
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that underwrite residential mortgage securitization do not price disaster risk or enforce mandatory flood insurance purchase outside of
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floodplains.62 As a result, the remaining risk is ultimately borne by taxpayers along with
obligations from a host of post-disaster public transfers (Deryugina, 2017; Billings et al.,
2019). As long as neither homeowners nor lenders bear the full cost of disasters, homes
in risky areas will receive an implicit subsidy, a distortion that will grow with increasing
climate risk.
This paper provides novel insights into the determinants of flood insurance demand. We
are the first to estimate the causal effect of home prices on disaster insurance take-up,
revealing an economically important relationship.63 We also test various mechanisms of
how low home equity may limit flood insurance demand, offering new explanations for the
insurance gap to complement studies on the role of adverse selection and information frictions
(Gallagher, 2014; Mulder, 2019; Wagner, 2021b; Mulder, 2021), affordability issues (Netusil
et al., 2021b), and disaster aid (Billings et al., 2019; Kousky et al., 2018). Our findings
suggest that default can insure households against climate shocks, albeit at the social cost
of reducing incentives to formally insure or invest in adaptation.
Our results also extend the broader insurance literature studying the sources and effects of
implicit insurance. Mahoney (2015) finds that bankruptcy acts as implicit health insurance
and a higher cost of bankruptcy induces greater insurance demand, while Gallagher et al.
(2020) shows that relying on bankruptcy for implicit health insurance crowds out precautionary saving. Similarly, Finkelstein et al. (2019) find that the availability of uncompensated
care to uninsured patients can explain their low willingness to pay for formal health insurance. However, it was less clear whether these incentives documented in health insurance
would hold in the real estate context where studies have found mixed evidence of strategic
default (Foote et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 2013; Scharlemann and Shore, 2016; Bhutta et al.,
2017; Fuster and Willen, 2017; Gerardi et al., 2018). Our findings are consistent with default
62

Even within floodplains, evidence is inconsistent on whether mandatory purchase requirements are well
enforced (Hecker, 2002; National Research Council, 2015).
63
Several studies have examined how insurance take-up in the NFIP is correlated with various factors
(Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Kousky, 2011; Atreya et al., 2015). Typically, the analysis involves regressions
that include home values as one of the covariates but not a formal treatment of unobserved confounding
variables.
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acting as implicit insurance even in the real estate setting. We note that natural disasters
often make homes and neighborhoods uninhabitable for some time, removing one of the key
barriers to strategic default. Second, a natural disaster is a classic example of the sort of
“double trigger” events - simultaneous income and equity shocks - that have been shown to
more reliably predict default (Ganong and Noel, 2020).
Finally, this paper also relates to a larger literature on how home prices and equity affect
household decisions. An extensive set of studies have shown that high mortgage leverage and
negative equity reduce incentives to invest in home improvements and labor search (Melzer,
2017; Donaldson et al., 2019; Bernstein, 2021). We show that these same forces can reduce
investment in climate risk management. Given a growing literature suggesting that climate
change may already be influencing home prices, our estimates will be relevant to ongoing
policy discussions around how climate change will affect financial and insurance markets.64
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes our data and key features of
the National Flood Insurance Program and the housing boom and bust. Section 3.3 explains
our empirical design, Section 3.4 describes the results, and Section 3.5 concludes.

3.2

Data and Background

We construct an MSA-level dataset that contains measures of flood insurance take-up, home
prices, and various MSA characteristics, such as flood risk, foreclosure laws, and demographics. Our final estimation sample consists of quarterly observations across 271 MSAs from
2001 to 2015 (see Table 3.1 for summary statistics). In this section, we introduce our data
sources and describe background information about the National Flood Insurance Program
and the housing boom and bust.
64

See the related literature studying how climate and disaster risk are capitalized into home prices (Bernstein et al., 2019; Baldauf et al., 2020; Keys and Mulder, 2020; Murfin and Spiegel, 2020; Ortega and
Taspınar, 2018) and how disasters affect housing markets (Gibson and Mullins, 2020a; Kousky, 2010; Zivin
et al., 2020).
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3.2.1

The National Flood Insurance Program

Our flood insurance data come from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The
NFIP is a publicly run insurer under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
that writes over 95 percent of flood insurance policies in the United States (Kousky et al.,
2018). Established in 1968, it currently covers 22,000 communities with more than five
million policies in force nationwide. In each community, FEMA defines the Special Flood
Hazard Area (SFHA, or so-called “100-year floodplain") where the annual flood risk is at
least 1 percent. The NFIP sets premiums using a national standard that depends on the
property’s flood zone designation and structural characteristics (Kousky et al., 2017). As the
flood maps are infrequently updated and NFIP has no means-tested subsidy, the home price
changes we study did not induce any response in insurance pricing (see Appendix Figure
C.4).
The NFIP, through various federal agencies and GSEs that purchase and insure mortgages,
makes flood insurance purchase mandatory on any home purchased inside the SFHA with a
federally-backed mortgage (henceforth the “mandatory purchase requirement”).65 However,
this mandate was not always well enforced (Hecker, 2002). Outside the SFHA, homeowners
have no federal requirement to purchase flood insurance. The overall take-up rate in the
NFIP has been low despite premiums often being lower than actuarially fair rates (MichelKerjan, 2010).
We obtain policy-level data from the NFIP public database released on OpenFEMA (OpenFEMA, 2020b). This dataset covers the universe of NFIP policies written since 2009 with
variables including property zip code, policy effective date, construction year, and a suite
of policy characteristics, such as deductible and coverage limits. We extend our policy data
back to 2000 using a similar database of policies shared with the Wharton Risk Center by
the NFIP for research purposes. The two datasets contain a similar set of variables, allowing
us to construct a consistent and comprehensive record of all NFIP policies written from 2000
65

For more details on the mandatory purchase requirement, see https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/The-Mandatory-Purchase-Requirement-September-2019.pdf.
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to 2015. Next, we aggregate the number of one-to-four family residential policies active at
the end of each quarter in each zip code and aggregate them to the MSA level. Thus, we
end up with a quarterly MSA-level panel of flood insurance take-up for 2001–15. As shown
in Table 3.1, MSAs on average have about 10,500 active policies in our sample, of which
around 40 percent are located outside the SFHA.
The richness of our flood insurance data allows us to construct separate take-up measures
for different subsets of policies. For example, we can calculate take-up for only those policies
covering properties outside SFHAs, a feature that allows us to test the effects of home price
changes on take-up independent of the mandatory purchase requirement enforced inside
SFHAs. We also test other demand-related outcomes, such as the amount of coverage,
deductible, and renewal rates. We use these outcomes to implement robustness checks and
mechanism tests.

3.2.2

Housing Boom and Bust

The variation we use to estimate the home price elasticity of flood insurance demand comes
from the US housing boom and bust over the mid-2000s. During this period, average national
home prices increased dramatically, peaking around 2007, before beginning a sharp decline
that reached its trough in 2012.
These housing dynamics have inspired an extensive literature on their causes and consequences. Although active debate remains on the original cause of the cycle,66 a few consistent
empirical observations have emerged. The housing price changes were highly heterogeneous
across markets, with some seeing sudden price acceleration, whereas others experienced
smooth changes throughout. More importantly, the sudden variations cannot be explained
by any similarly large break in market fundamentals, such as productivity or demographics,
that affect house prices (Sinai, 2012). Instead, surveys of home buyers at this time suggest
they held strong investment motives and unrealistic beliefs about the long-term growth of
66

See Mayer (2011) for a useful survey of this literature.
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property values (Case and Shiller, 2003). Together, these observations led to the widespread
view that these dramatic price changes represent growing buyer optimism about future price
growth (Kaplan et al., 2020).
This feature of the housing boom and bust—the sudden break in home prices relative to
otherwise smoothly changing fundamentals—has been used in a related literature to study
the relationship between home prices and other economic outcomes. To illustrate this variation, Figure 3.2 plots 2001–2005 housing price trends in four markets. In Athens (top
left) and Galveston (bottom left), the housing price index increases linearly without any
noticeable breaks, whereas a clear break in trend occurs in 2004 for both Tucson (top right)
and Naples (bottom right). The latter pattern motivates a procedure, pioneered by Ferreira
and Gyourko (2017), to identify a single trend break in each MSA’s home price time series
during 2001–2005. The structural break instrument is then calculated as the change in the
slope of the time trend. For markets without a clear break, the procedure also identifies a
“break” but the estimated size is minimal. This procedure is used in Charles et al. (2018)
to construct the structural break instrument for a broader set of MSAs and eventually to
investigate the relationship between educational attainment and labor market opportunities
provided by the boom. The authors find that the instrument is economically relevant to
changing house prices and highly correlated with the size of each MSA’s subsequent housing
bust.
Our analysis directly adopts this measure of structural break. Figure C.1 plots the size
and timing of these breaks across our sample of MSAs. Although the method identifies the
most likely break for every MSA, all the pre-2003 breaks are close to zero. Such MSAs are
effectively a control group that saw smooth price changes over the period. The majority of
large and positive breaks occurred between 2003 and 2005. Figure C.2 maps the geographic
variation in break size. Although coastal housing markets tend to have larger breaks than
inland ones, different coastal markets vary substantially, which will allow us to identify the
effect of the boom independent of the underlying flood risk level.
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As the instrument captures the change between the pre- and postbreak house price trends,
our key identification assumption is that unobserved factors in flood insurance demand continued to evolve smoothly in parallel trends between MSAs with different price trend breaks
over the boom and bust. Charles et al. (2018) present a series of empirical tests suggesting
that underlying economic conditions and amenities in housing markets run smoothly even
across the structural break in the housing market. In particular, the breaks are uncorrelated with pre-boom trends and levels in home prices, post-secondary education enrollment,
employment, and wages.
For identification between MSAs with different break timing or magnitudes, the key assumption is that their flood insurance demand would have continued on parallel trends, as
in other difference-in-difference settings. We discuss these assumptions in more detail in
Section 3.3.

3.2.3

Other Data

Our analysis also uses the following data sources for mechanism tests and regression controls.
Home prices. To measure home prices at the MSA level, we obtain the quarterly House
Price Index (HPI) from the Federal Housing Finance Administration. The HPI measures
changes in single-family home values using a weighted, repeat-sales methodology on millions
of homes sales, covering 363 metropolitan areas.
Flood risk. We also obtain a new national flood risk measure from the First Street Foundation (2020). The First Street Foundation Flood Model (FSF-FM) combines hydrological
models, fine-resolution land cover and elevation data, and inventories of flood adaptation
infrastructure to accurately estimate expected flood depths across the entire continental
United States. This property-level measure allows us to construct multiple MSA-level measures that capture different aspects of flood risk in the given MSA. See Appendix C.3.1 for
more details on these measures.
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Foreclosure law. One of our mechanism tests rely on variation in foreclosure laws across
states. We follow Demiroglu et al. (2014) to classify states as following judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.67 See Appendix C.3.2 for more details on the background
of judicial foreclosure laws.
Additional covariates. For controls in our models, we include MSA-level log annual income,
population growth, and employment rate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and residential housing transaction volume and share of foreclosure sales calculated using data from
CoreLogic.

3.3

Methodology

In this section, we formally describe our empirical specifications. The first specification
uses the housing boom structural breaks as a continuous difference-in-difference treatment
to estimate the reduced-form relationship between the housing boom and flood insurance
take-up. The second adapts these structural breaks as instrumental variables to estimate
the home price elasticity of flood insurance demand. We conclude the section by describing
empirical tests to examine the underlying mechanism.

3.3.1

Housing Boom Event Study

We start with a difference-in-differences event study framework to compare flood insurance
take-up across MSAs with different boom intensity and timing. The estimating equation is

lnN F IPmt =

24
X

ατ (P ostτmt × ∆Pm ) + δ ′ Xmt + λm + λt + εmt .

(3.1)

τ =−9

The main dependent variable lnN F IPmt is the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation
of the number of NFIP policies in MSA m at quarter t. Our main regressors are a set of
interaction terms, together capturing an event time frame starting from nine quarters before
67

See footnote 2 of Table 3.1 for a complete list of judicial-review states.
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the structural break in home prices and extending to 24 quarters after. The variable P ostτmt
is an indicator of the τ -th quarter after the housing boom starts in MSA m.68 Each indicator
is interacted with ∆Pm , the structural break intensity in each MSA, as described in Section
3.2.2. The model includes a vector of controls, Xmt , which contains annual per capita income,
home transaction volume, and total NFIP claims in the preceding four quarters, all of which
are IHS transformed, population growth and employment rate, and the average FSF-FM
risk score interacted with year indicators to control for differential time trends based on risk
levels. The model also includes an MSA fixed effect λm to control for time-invariant features
of the MSA, such as its baseline flood risk and amenities, and a quarter-year fixed effect λt
to control for national trends in flood insurance take-up.
The ατ s are our coefficients of interest. Together, they capture the dynamics of the outcome
variable over the boom-bust cycle, normalized by the initial boom size. The key identifying
assumption in Equation (3.1) is parallel trends: MSAs with different housing boom intensities would have experienced similar changes in flood insurance take-up in the absence of
the home price fluctuations around the housing boom and bust. We can partially test this
hypothesis by examining whether the pre-boom βτ coefficients are zero.
We also assess observable differences between housing markets with different cycles to inspect
for factors that may be correlated with differential trends around the boom. Table 3.2
displays measures of flood risk from the Flood Factor model and flood insurance demand
in the first quarter of 2001 across terciles of the housing boom structural break. The table
shows that housing markets with larger housing booms tend to have greater flood risk and
more flood insurance policies before the boom. Despite these level differences, there is no
evidence of positive pre-trends in flood insurance take-up in MSAs that experienced larger
boom sizes (see Appendix Figure C.3 for 2001–2003 take-up trends in the raw data across
terciles of the structural break). Nevertheless, one might still be concerned if areas with
higher flood risk also saw an increase in flood insurance demand around the housing boom,
The first indicator P ost−9
mt also includes observations earlier than the start of the event time frame. The
last indicator P ost24
mt also includes those later than the end of the event time frame.
68
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which motivates our decision to include flood risk controls interacted with year in all of our
baseline specifications, making our estimates robust to differential trends by flood risk.
We also estimate Equation (3.1) with the IHS-transformed home prices as the outcome
variable. Because each βτ is estimated flexibly, we can assess whether the dynamic effects
of the housing boom and bust were similar across both flood insurance take-up and home
prices. This provides an additional measure of plausibility to the parallel trends assumption
given that any violation would need to match these boom and bust dynamics.
Under the parallel trends assumption, Equation (3.1) estimates the reduced-form effect of
the housing boom and bust on flood insurance demand.

3.3.2

Instrumental Variables

The housing market structural breaks can be used as instruments to directly estimate the
relationship between take-up and home price changes. In this framework, Equation (3.1) can
be reinterpreted as the reduced-form relationship between the outcome and the instrument.
We implement a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation where the first-stage regression is

lnHP Imt =

24
X

ρτ (P ostτmt × ∆Pm ) + µ′ Xmt + γm + γt + ωmt .

(3.2)

τ =0

The house price index (lnHP Imt ) is our endogenous variable. We instrument the IHStransformed house price index by the set of interaction terms between the event-time indicators and the structural break intensity (P ostτmt × ∆Pm ), exploiting essentially the same
variation in Equation (3.1). The only difference is that this equation excludes pre-boom
interactions, as they do not capture meaningful variation from the boom-bust cycle. The
second-stage equation is

\I mt + δ ′ Xmt + λm + λt + εmt .
lnN F IPmt = β · lnHP
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(3.3)

\I mt are the instrumented values of the house price index from Equation (3.2). The
lnHP
equation includes the same set of controls as before.
Equation (3.3) estimates a single β coefficient that we interpret as the home price elasticity
of flood insurance demand.

Exclusion Restriction
For our home price elasticity coefficients to be consistent in the IV framework, the exclusion
restriction must hold. Given that the outcome of interest is flood insurance take-up, our
first necessary assumption is that the house price trend breaks were uncorrelated with any
changes in flood insurance demand outside of the home price channel. This assumption
is supported by a body of research that suggests that most other economic fundamentals
were smoothly changing in the markets that saw these sudden price changes (Ferreira and
Gyourko, 2017; Sinai, 2012).
Nonetheless, several plausible violations of the exclusion restriction are specific to our setting.
We use a variety of approaches to address these concerns, detailed below:
1. Increased home sales: If new homeowners—especially those subject to the insurance
mandate for SFHA properties—have a higher propensity to buy flood insurance, this
can mechanically create an increase in take-up. We address this in two ways. First, we
control for home transaction volume in all regressions. Second, we examine the takeup of non-SFHA policies separately, which are not required by the insurance mandate.
A similar or larger trajectory would suggest the mandate is not a major driver of the
take-up response.
2. New construction in risky areas: To explore this possibility, we subset to policies on
structures that are built before 2003. Similar to earlier, if the take-up response is
robust among this set of policies, new construction is not likely the main pathway.
3. Home renovations: Renovated homes might have a higher physical replacement cost,

124

prompting homeowners to purchase insurance. To investigate this channel, we examine
the amount of building coverage purchased by policyholders as a dependent variable.
This is usually commensurate with the insured structure’s replacement value, so we
would expect to see more coverage being purchased on the intensive margin if home
renovations were driving the extensive margin increase in take-up.
4. Labor market conditions: If the housing booms improved labor market opportunities,
residents might have become better able to afford flood insurance (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2017; Charles et al., 2019). To account for this possibility, we control for annual
MSA income and employment rate in all regressions.
5. In-migration: As the housing booms might also be associated with greater net inmigration, we also control for population growth rate.

3.3.3

Heterogeneity Tests

The last part of our analysis focuses on evaluating the debt overhang mechanism as a
potential driver of the relationship between flood insurance take-up and home prices with a
series of heterogeneity tests. The theoretical motivation behind these heterogeneity tests is
described in Appendix C.2.2.
Our first test stems from the insight that flood insurance demand in MSAs with lower
default costs should be more responsive to changes in home equity. We exploit differences in
state foreclosure laws that drive variation in default costs. As discussed in Appendix C.3.2,
judicial foreclosure laws raise lenders’ costs of pursuing a foreclosure, reducing the credit
risk of default for households after disasters.
A second prediction is that flood insurance demand in MSAs with a larger fraction exposed
to tail risk flood events that cause negative equity should also be more responsive to changes
in home equity. Our measure of tail risk, constructed with the property-level First Street
Foundation Flood Model, is described in Appendix C.3.1.
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To formally test these predictions, we extend the 2SLS procedure to estimate heterogeneous
effects based on foreclosure laws and flood risk, by adding an interaction term between home
prices and an indicator variable for MSAs with judicial foreclosure laws (or above-median
flood risk) to the second-stage equation and instrumenting for it using a corresponding
interaction between the structural break instrument and the indicator. For details on this
extended framework, see Appendix C.5.
As a third test of the debt overhang channel, we compare the flood insurance demand
response to the housing bust between homes built at the peak of the housing boom (20032005) against those built before 2003. Homes built during the boom were more likely
to be leveraged given the expansion of credit supply over this period and to face low or
negative equity over the housing bust. Thus, this segment of the housing market should be
more responsive to declining home equity over the bust than existing homes. To test this
prediction, we employed a first-difference specification to separately estimate effects during
the boom and the bust. For details on this specification, see Appendix C.6.

3.4
3.4.1

Results
Dynamics of Insurance Choices Over the Boom-Bust Cycle

We start with the difference-in-differences framework to investigate the dynamics of our
main outcomes over the boom-bust cycle. We first estimate Equation (3.1) over the housing
price index. The result is shown in the top panel of Figure 3.3. Each coefficient corresponds
to a quarter relative to the start of a housing boom and estimates the relationship between
the size of each MSA’s house price trend break and its home price dynamics. As expected,
these coefficients trace out a boom-bust cycle with an initial increase, a peak at the end
of the third year after the start of the boom, and a subsequent decline. This shows that
MSAs with larger structural breaks also experience larger fluctuations in home prices as
the housing bubble unfolds. A one-standard-deviation increase in the initial boom size is
associated with roughly 15 percent higher home prices at the peak. Little evidence supports

126

a meaningful pre-trend, suggesting that these instruments effectively capture the timing of
the sudden breaks in housing price trends.
The bottom panel of Figure 3.3 shows the results of Equation (3.1) with flood insurance takeup as the dependent variable. Consistent with the raw correlation in Figure 3.1, MSAs with
larger home price structural breaks saw a larger increase in flood insurance policies. More
importantly, the dynamic pattern of take-up closely follows that of house prices, peaking
around the same time (three years after the start of the boom) before declining. A onestandard-deviation increase in the initial boom size is associated with a 5 percent higher
flood insurance take-up at the peak. No evidence indicates a pre-trend, supporting the
validity of the parallel trends assumption.
Figure 3.3 suggests that the housing boom-bust cycle had similar dynamic effects on both
home prices and flood insurance take-up. These closely aligned trajectories suggest a direct
relationship between the two, but alternative channels remain, described in Section 3.3.2,
that may explain these changes in take-up. Below, we rule out these other factors as driving
our results.
We first show that the increase in take-up was not caused by the mandatory insurance
purchase requirement for homeowners with federally-backed mortgages or by new construction in the SFHA. If more properties are transacted and constructed in the SFHA during
the boom, this might drive take-up mechanically through the mandate. To test this, we
re-estimate Equation (3.1) over two subsamples of NFIP policies. The first subsample includes only policies written on structures built before 200369 and outside SFHAs that have
no insurance mandate. For comparison, the second subsample includes only policies written inside SFHAs. These results are shown in Figure 3.4. The contrast between the two
panels is striking: the estimated effect for pre-2003 non-SFHA policies is very similar to the
full-sample estimates and much larger than the SFHA subsample estimates. This suggests
that our findings are not driven by the insurance mandate or new construction. The small
69

Figure C.1 shows that the vast majority of notable booms occurred in or after 2003.
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estimated effect inside the SFHA is also consistent with the insurance mandate lowering
the elasticity of demand, as a relatively smaller number of households are on the margin of
voluntarily purchasing insurance inside the SFHA.
Next, we also show that the increase in demand was not driven by more home renovations,
which could increase the property value at risk of flood damage, leading to higher insurance
demand. If this is the case, we would expect homeowners to purchase more building coverage,
since most policyholders purchase coverage equal to the replacement value of their home
(Collier and Ragin, 2020).70 To test this, we estimate Equation (3.1) on the IHS-transformed
average amount of building coverage. These results are shown in Appendix Figure C.5. We
see little evidence of an increase in the intensive margin of coverage purchased on nonSFHA policies, suggesting that homeowners were not insuring more valuable structures. In
contrast, the amount of coverage purchased on SFHA policies did increase over the boom, but
did not decline over the bust. This is consistent with SFHA policyholders complying with
minimum coverage requirements under the mandatory purchase requirement as mortgage
balances increased over the housing boom.71
Using the same estimation framework, we examine other margins of the insurance decision
to test whether risk preferences or perceptions changed over the boom-bust cycle. Figure
C.6 shows the estimates on the share of newly enrolled SFHA policies with supplemental
contents coverage.72 A slight increase occurs following the start of the housing boom, but
the magnitude is statistically insignificant and very small: a one-standard-deviation increase
in boom size is associated with a 0.7 percentage point increase in the share of policies with
contents coverage. Figure C.7 shows the dynamics of the share of newly enrolled SFHA
70

The NFIP currently allows for a maximum building coverage of $250,000 for each r family residential
structure. In the sample, the average coverage is $133,051 for SFHA policies and $164,286 for non-SFHA
ones.
71
The minimum required coverage is the lesser of (1) the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage; (2)
the maximum available coverage ($250,000); or (3) 100 percent of the replacement value of the structure.
72
Contents coverage protects the value of personal belongings that might be damaged by flooding. It is
separate from the building coverage and not subject to the mandatory purchase requirement. Contents and
structure coverage are bundled for non-SFHA policies.
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policies with the standard deductible73 , which is largely unresponsive to the boom. These
results suggest that risk preferences and perceptions are quite stable across the boom-bust
cycle.

3.4.2

Home Price Elasticity of Flood Insurance Demand

In this section, we go from studying the dynamic reduced-form effect of the housing boom
and bust on flood insurance demand to directly estimating the home price elasticity of flood
insurance demand. Building on our findings, which suggest home prices were the primary
channel affecting flood insurance demand, we use our instrumental variable framework to
estimate the effect of a given change in home prices on take-up.
We estimate the home price elasticity of flood insurance demand using the 2SLS estimator
described in Equations (3.2) and (3.3). The results are reported in Table 3.3. The first
column displays the estimate based on all policies. The coefficient on the instrumented
housing price index is positive and statistically significant at around 0.31. This implies that,
on average, a 1 percent increase in home prices is associated with an approximately 0.3
percent increase in flood insurance take-up. In columns (2) and (3), we separately estimate
this coefficient for SFHA and non-SFHA policies. Consistent with the patterns in Figure
3.4, the estimated elasticity of SFHA take-up, around 0.21, is much smaller than that of
non-SFHA take-up (0.48). When we further subset to non-SFHA policies on homes built
before 2003, we obtain an estimate of 0.33, again showing that the main effects are not due
to new construction. All four columns have first-stage F-statistics74 of over 30, confirming
the strength of the instruments, and include controls for MSA income, home sale volume,
and time-varying effects of flood risk.
These estimates reflect the magnitude of the effect of home prices on flood insurance takeup. To put them into context, several studies have estimated an own-price elasticity of flood
73

All non-SFHA policies have a standard deductible of $500. SFHA policyholders can choose either the
standard deductible or a larger deductible at a different premium.
74
We follow Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) in calculating the F-statistic to account for multiple endogenous variables.
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insurance demand between −0.3 and −0.1 (Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Atreya et al., 2015;
Wagner, 2021b; Mulder, 2021). In comparison, our estimates suggest a 1 percent increase
in home prices has roughly the same effect as a 2 percent decrease in premiums on overall
take-up, or a 3 percent decrease in premiums on non-SFHA take-up. Kousky (2017) finds
that hurricanes are estimated to lead to only 1.5 percent increase in voluntary purchases
of flood insurance, which is equivalent to a 4.7 percent increase in home prices. Given the
large variability of housing prices in both the short and long run, our results suggest that
home prices play a substantial role in flood insurance demand.

3.4.3

Robustness Checks

We perform several additional analyses to test the robustness of our specifications and
measurement of the outcome variable and boom instrument. First, we check that our main
difference-in-difference result on total policy count is stable under different sets of controls
(see Figure C.8). The corresponding 2SLS estimates are also similar across the board, among
which our main specification is the most conservative (see Table C.1).
Second, we obtain similar difference-in-difference estimates examining the count of newly
enrolled policies in a given quarter instead of all active policies. As NFIP policies are effective
for one year, the number of active policies will respond with a lag when existing policyholders
want to drop their insurance. In contrast, the number of newly enrolled policies, which
include newly written policies and renewals each quarter, might better capture the behavior
of homeowners who are actively making insurance decisions. The estimated results on newly
enrolled policies are consistent with our results on total policies, albeit with some additional
noise due to seasonality (see Figure C.9).75 Table C.4 reports the 2SLS estimates based on
the number of newly enrolled policies, which are also similar to the main results.
In Table C.2, we examine two potential issues in our specification of the boom-bust trajec75

Due to strong seasonal patterns in enrollment, we control for MSA-by-quarter-of-year fixed effects in
these specifications in place of MSA fixed effects to better account for idiosyncrasies in these patterns across
MSAs. The results are noisier but very similar to MSA fixed effects.
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tory. First, our main specification allows for heterogeneity in the start time and magnitude
of each housing boom but imposes homogeneity on the boom-bust dynamics across MSAs.76
To allow for heterogeneous boom-bust dynamics, we interact the original instruments with
MSA cohort indicators defined by boom start dates. The regressions based on quarterly and
annual cohorts are reported in columns (1) and (2), respectively. These estimates are in
general similar to our main estimate but slightly smaller, which could be due to the addition
of many weak instruments.
A second potential issue is addressed in columns (3) and (4), which investigate potential
misspecification issues related to MSAs with small or negative estimated structural breaks.
Such estimates likely represent noise in the structural break estimation procedure rather
than actual variation across MSAs. In column (3), we replace all negative values in the
boom instrument with zero, which assumes that negative-boom MSAs actually experience
no boom or bust. In column (4) we expand this set of no-boom MSAs to include those
MSAs in the lowest quartile of positive booms. Both estimates are slightly larger than the
main result, which is consistent with a reduction in measurement errors.
To assess whether our results are contaminated by using the two-way fixed effects (TWFE)
estimator with staggered treatment timing, we re-estimate our results with the stacked
event-by-event estimator following Cengiz et al. (2019).77 Unlike TWFE with variation
in treatment timing, the stacked estimator avoids spurious violation of the parallel trends
assumption that can occur with dynamic and heterogeneous treatment effects (Baker et al.,
2021).78 Figure C.11 shows that our estimate of the effect of the housing boom on flood
76

Of particular concern is the timing of when each boom turned into a bust. As described in Ferreira
and Gyourko (2012), although the beginning of the housing boom was highly heterogeneous across MSAs,
the timing of peaks was concentrated between the end of 2005 through 2007. In Equation (3.2), imposing
equality on the ρτ coefficients across housing boom cohorts might lead to a misspecified first-stage estimation.
This could also cause a violation of the monotonicity assumption under the IV framework if some MSAs
experienced home price declines during their busts relative to the pre-boom period. However, the coefficients
plotted in the top panel of Figure 3.3 show that relative home prices in MSAs with larger booms remain
well above their pre-boom levels even by the end of the bust, suggesting that the monotonicity assumption
generally holds.
77
See Appendix C.4 for more details on our implementation and results.
78
See also Sun and Abraham (2020), Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020), and Goodman-Bacon (2021) discussing this issue.
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insurance take-up is little changed with the stacked estimator. In Table C.3, we re-estimate
the home price elasticity of take-up, applying the stacked estimator to the 2SLS framework.
These estimates are also similar to our main results, again showing little bias from the
staggered treatment timing.

3.4.4

Testing for the Debt Overhang Mechanism

Our results so far have established a robust and plausibly causal connection between home
prices and flood insurance take-up. In this section, we empirically test whether a “debt
overhang” channel might drive our results. When facing major disaster damage, highly
leveraged households can default on their mortgage to limit losses. When home equity
increased over the housing boom,79 defaulting became more costly for households, increasing
their willingness to pay for disaster insurance. Below, we test three predictions of this
mechanism, motivated by the model in Appendix C.2.2.
First, we test whether there is a stronger relationship between house prices and flood insurance take-up in MSAs with lower default costs relative to MSAs with higher default costs.
This test exploits differences in the baseline cost of default across states with and without
laws that require judicial review of foreclosure proceedings that reduce the credit risk of
default for borrowers. In states without judicial review protections, defaults are more costly
for borrowers and thus less viable as a form of implicit insurance. Thus, the debt overhang
mechanism is weaker in such states, and flood insurance demand should be less responsive
to changing home prices.
Figure 3.6 plots the coefficients from estimating Equation (3.1) separately in states with and
without judicial review over home prices (left panel) and non-SFHA flood insurance take-up
(right panel). Despite similar home price trends conditional on the initial break size, flood
insurance demand in judicial review states is much more responsive, which is consistent with
the debt overhang mechanism.
79

Despite a concurrent increase in mortgage debt over the boom, Figure C.10 shows that home equity
closely corresponds to changes in house prices over the housing cycle.
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Next, we test whether MSAs with greater exposure to tail risks see greater increases (decreases) in take-up in response to increases (decreases) in house prices relative to MSAs
with lower tail risk. The effect of home equity on insurance demand is increasing in the
probability that flood damage will be large enough to induce default. Using flood risk estimates from FSF-FM, we calculate a measure of tail risk exposure for non-SFHA homes (see
Appendix C.3.1 for details). We examine how the effect of home equity varies across MSAs
with above-median versus below-median tail risk exposure.80 Note that all regressions control for the time-varying effect of the average risk level. Therefore, any heterogeneity can
be attributed to the default-inducing part of the risk—that is, the tail risk in the MSA.
Figure 3.7 plots the coefficients from estimating Equation (3.1) separately for these two
groups of MSAs on home prices (left panel) and non-SFHA flood insurance take-up (right
panel). Although we see a slight divergence in price trends across the two groups, the hightail-risk group has a much larger flood insurance take-up response,81 so this finding is also
consistent with the debt overhang mechanism.
For the two tests above, we formally test the statistical significance of their findings by
applying the 2SLS estimator with an additional interaction term between home prices and
an indicator of judicial review law or above-median tail risk.82 These results are shown in
Table 3.5. These estimates confirm the results from our difference-in-differences exercises:
MSAs in judicial review states and those with high tail risk both have higher home price
elasticities of flood insurance demand. Moreover, the differences are statistically significant
and economically large. States with judicial review have a home price elasticity of flood
insurance demand of 0.67 versus only 0.3 in states without such laws. MSAs with abovemedian tail risk have a home price elasticity of flood insurance demand of 0.78 versus 0.45
in states with below-median tail risk. In columns (3) and (4), we also report the estimates
80

One concern with this variable might be that MSAs with higher tail risk also have higher premiums.
Fortunately for our analysis, almost all non-SFHA properties face uniform rates that have changed little
over this period, as the NFIP has not developed detailed risk assessments outside of floodplains.
81
The divergence in the first stage is captured in our 2SLS estimator, described in the next paragraph, by
interacting the price trend structural breaks with the above-median tail risk indicators.
82
The precise estimation equations are presented in Appendix C.5.
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on SFHA policies. In sharp contrast to the non-SFHA results, neither margin shows notable differential effects. As discussed, given the mandatory purchase requirement, SFHA
homeowners likely face different incentives and have less room for take-up adjustments.
Finally, we compare the flood insurance take-up response over the housing busts for owners
of homes built between 2003-2005 versus those in homes built before 2003. The 2003-2005
homeowners are likely to be leveraged and likely to have low equity because they purchased
their homes near the peak of the boom. Thus, this group’s flood insurance demand should
be more responsive to home price changes under the debt overhang channel because of their
higher likelihood of defaulting after a flood.
To estimate the effect during the housing bust and boom separately, we use a first-difference
approach where we estimate 2SLS regressions with all variables differenced over two periods
(Charles et al., 2018).83 We take 2002 Q1 to 2007 Q1 to be the boom period and 2007 Q1 to
2012 Q1 to be the bust. To control for the effect of increased foreclosures on flood insurance
take-up, we include the share of sales through foreclosure in the housing bust specifications.
Table 3.4 reports these results. To provide some basis of comparison, we first estimate the
home price elasticity of overall take-up during the boom and the bust. The elasticity during
the boom is 0.33 for all policies and 0.35 for non-SFHA policies (Panel A, columns (1)–(2)),
which is comparable to the main results above. These elasticities are larger during the bust
(Panel A, columns (3)–(4)), especially for non-SFHA policies, whose elasticity is twice as
large. When we focus on homes constructed between 2003-05 and estimate their take-up
elasticity over the bust, both estimates increase sharply to around 1.4. These patterns are
consistent with the prediction above.
In sum, across all three predictions, we find strong evidence consistent with the debt overhang channel playing an important role in the relationship between home equity and flood
insurance take-up.
83

See Appendix C.6 for the regression equations.
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3.4.5

Testing for Wealth and Liquidity Mechanisms

This section considers whether the effect of home prices on flood insurance demand is driven
by changes in wealth or liquidity over the housing boom and bust.

Liquidity Effect
The housing boom saw a substantial expansion in households’ access to liquidity through
home equity loans and looser credit conditions (Mian and Sufi, 2011; Bhutta and Keys, 2016).
If low flood insurance take-up were driven by households being forced to intermittently forgo
flood insurance to manage liquidity shocks, favorable borrowing conditions might increase
take-up.
If greater equity eased liquidity constraints, we would expect more policyholders to renew
their flood insurance coverage. Over 20 percent of flood insurance policies lapse in their
second year (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2012), and policy lapsation has been shown to be driven
by liquidity constraints across insurance settings (Hambel et al., 2017; Gottlieb and Smetters,
2021).
To test the liquidity channel, we estimate Equation (3.1) with one-year renewal rates as the
dependent variable. Figure 3.5 shows these results for SFHA (left panel) and non-SFHA
(right panel) policies. We see little evidence that the housing boom increased the one-year
renewal rate for either group of policies, suggesting that liquidity was not likely the main
factor driving the relationship between home equity and insurance demand.84
This liquidity channel is also inconsistent with existing evidence on how home equity extraction was used over the housing boom. Both Mian and Sufi (2011) and Bhutta and Keys
(2016) find that home equity loans were used to increase spending on consumption and
durable goods rather than pay down high interest debt or fund precautionary savings. Furthermore, home equity borrowers had much higher default risk over the housing bust. Given
84

We focus on the one-year renewal rate to capture more policy lapsations due to liquidity conditions
rather than household learning about the local flood risk. We find similar results using three- and five-year
renewal rates as our dependent variable. These results are available upon request.
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this evidence that households were not using home equity loans to hedge other sources of
financial risk, it is unlikely they were using these loans to maintain disaster insurance coverage.

Wealth Effect
Our findings might also be consistent with the “wealth effect puzzle” in recent studies, where
insurance coverage is found to increase with wealth (Armantier et al., 2018; Gropper and
Kuhnen, 2021). This effect contradicts the standard theoretical prediction that insurance
demand decreases with wealth and the literature has yet to come up with an explanation
for it. To assess the possibility that the same mechanism drives our results, we compare
the magnitude of effect from these studies with our estimates, noting the main caveat that
their estimates are based on other insurance types. In Armantier et al. (2018), the implied
elasticity of auto insurance spending with regard to home values is 0.07.85 The home price
elasticity of life insurance take-up is 0.08 in Gropper and Kuhnen (2021).86 Given that our
non-SFHA take-up elasticity of 0.48 is much larger than both of these estimates, we conclude
that the wealth effect is unlikely to be the main driver of our results.87
Other aspects of our finding are fundamentally different from existing evidence on the wealth
effect on insurance demand. We found little evidence of a positive relationship between home
prices and intensive margin flood insurance demand, as in the amount of structure coverage
purchased, purchase of supplemental contents coverage, or deductible choice (Figures C.5C.7). A general increase in insurance demand via a wealth effect would predict increases
along these intensive margins as well as extensive margin take-up. The debt overhang
85

Calculation based on Armantier et al. (2018): Table A8 reports a $100k increase in home wealth is associated with an increase of 0.31 in the “insurance index”. Following the authors’ method of calculation on p.21,
this implies a 0.31/1.1*(909-812) = $27.34 increase in cost. Using an average home value of $268.52k (Table
3) and average premium of $994.34 (Table 4), we calculate the elasticity to be (268.52/100)*(27.34/994.34)
≈ 0.07.
86
Calculation based on Gropper and Kuhnen (2021): Table 3 shows that a $100,000 increase in housing wealth is associated with a 0.93 p.p. increase in the probability of having life insurance. Using an average home value of $301,387 and an average take-up of 36% (Table 1), the elasticity is
(301,387/100,000)*(0.0093/0.36) ≈ 0.08.
87
Note that the home price elasticity of flood insurance spending is trivially equal to our take-up elasticity
because all non-SFHA policies face approximately the same premiums.
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mechanism, on the other hand, predicts that take-up and not the intensive margin decisions
should be sensitive to home equity. Finally, note that the wealth effect would not predict
the heterogeneous home price elasticities between the housing boom versus housing bust or
the 2003-2005 versus pre-2003 homeowners in Table 3.4.

3.5

Conclusion

We find a significant and positive relationship between home prices and flood insurance
take-up over the housing boom and bust of the early 2000s. These price changes reflect a
large increase in home equity for existing homeowners but little difference in their actual
structural value at risk. After ruling out alternative explanations, such as new construction
or mandatory purchase requirements imposed by the NFIP, our findings suggest that home
equity plays a causal role in flood insurance demand. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect
is comparable to other primary factors, such as premiums and flood events, in shifting flood
insurance demand.
Findings from multiple mechanism tests are consistent with the debt overhang channel,
where leveraged homeowners have less incentive to purchase formal flood insurance because
mortgage default provides a form of implicit insurance. We find higher home price elasticities
of flood insurance demand in states with judicial review laws, where default is less costly, and
in states with higher tail risk, where implicit insurance would be more valuable. In addition,
we find a much stronger response to the subsequent bust during 2007-12 among homes built
between 2003-05, whose owners are likely to be highly leveraged and face negative equity
after a flood. On the other hand, while we consider alternative channels through liquidity
and wealth, they ultimately fall short in explaining the patterns and magnitudes of our
findings.
These results have important implications for understanding the likely impact of climate
change on housing markets. As disaster risk increases over time, more homeowners will
face the choice between purchasing insurance or risking default after a flood. The signifi137

cant elasticity between changes in home prices and flood insurance take-up, combined with
continuing low take-up rates in the NFIP, suggests that many leveraged households will
choose not to insure. This means that some of their losses will ultimately be borne by the
broader housing finance system or the GSEs that securitize mortgages and the taxpayers
that support them. Home price declines driven by a bursting “climate bubble” along the
coast (Bakkensen and Barrage, 2017; Bernstein et al., 2019; Keys and Mulder, 2020) could
exacerbate these dynamics by reducing insurance demand.
However, our findings do point to two promising policy interventions. First, expanding the
mortgage purchase requirement to high-risk non-SFHAs may lead homeowners and lenders
to better internalize their flood risk. The SFHA mortgage mandate exists in part for this
reason, and our findings suggest that underinsurance due to misaligned incentives in leveraged markets is prominent outside the SFHA. Second, GSEs themselves could start pricing
the risk of disaster-induced default into securitization. This would improve lenders’ incentive
to require borrowers to maintain flood insurance.
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3.6

Figures
Figure 3.1: Reduced-Form Relationship Between Boom Size and Take-Up
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Notes: Each circle represents an MSA. The x-axis displays the size of the housing boom, and the
y-axis displays the change in log NFIP policy count between 2002 and 2007 in the left panel and
2007 and 2012 in the right panel. The boom size measure comes from the structural break estimates
in Charles et al. (2019).
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Figure 3.2: Examples of Housing Booms
Low Risk, High Break - Tucson, AZ
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Notes: This figure shows the quarterly series of the housing price index for four MSAs. The four
MSAs each represent a group of MSAs classified based on low/high risk and low/high break. In each
panel, the blue solid line presents the house price series, the black dashed line presents the predicted
value from the structural break model, and the red vertical line presents the timing of the break.
The note below each panel displays the average risk score in the MSA and the estimated break size.
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Figure 3.3: Dynamics of the House Price Index and Insurance Take-Up
Log housing price index
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals from
Equation (3.1) for HPI (top panel) and total flood insurance policy count (bottom panel). Both
dependent variables are IHS transformed. The policy count includes all one-to-four family policies.
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Figure 3.4: Dynamics of Insurance Take-Up in Two Subsamples
Log count of non-SFHA policies on pre-2003 structures
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals from
Equation (3.1) for the count of flood insurance policies written on structures outside the SFHA and
constructed before 2003 (top panel) and those inside the SFHA (bottom panel). Both dependent
variables are IHS transformed.
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Figure 3.5: One-Year Renewal Rate
SFHA 1-year renewal rate
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Notes: This figure plots the estimate coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals from
Equation (3.1) for one-year renewal rates of policies inside the SFHA (left panel) and outside the
SFHA (right panel).

143

Figure 3.6: Heterogeneity by Judicial Review Law
Log housing price index

Log non-SFHA policy count
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients from Equation (3.1) for home prices (left panel)
and non-SFHA flood insurance take-up (right panel) separately for MSAs in states with judicial
review foreclosure laws (green line) or without such laws (blue line). Both dependent variables are
IHS transformed.

Figure 3.7: Heterogeneity by Non-SFHA Risk
Log housing price index
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients from Equation (3.1) for home prices (left panel)
and non-SFHA flood insurance take-up (right panel) separately for MSAs in states with abovemedian (green line) and below-median (blue line) non-SFHA risk as measured by Flood Factor from
the First Street Foundation. Both dependent variables are IHS transformed.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Statistic
All Policies
SFHA Policies
Non-SFHA Policies
Non-SFHA Pre-03 Policies
Avg. Premium1
Non-SFHA Avg. Premium
SFHA Avg. Coverage
Non-SFHA Avg. Coverage
% Contents Coverage
% Standard Deductible
SFHA 1-yr Renewal Rate
Non-SFHA 1-yr Renewal Rate
Total Claims ($1,000s)2
Break Size
FHFA Housing Price Index
Per Capita Income ($1,000s)
Population
Population Growth
Employment Rate3
Home Transaction Volume
Judicial Review Law
Non-SFHA Tail Risk

Mean

St. Dev.

10th Pctile

Median

90th Pctile

10, 510.05
6, 155.51
4, 354.53
3, 793.74
0.51
0.25
129, 031.20
160, 121.40
0.33
0.73
0.77
0.75
8, 693
0.04
169.89
36.73
834, 636
0.01
0.58
12, 542.98
0.52
0.64

31, 664.71
21, 388.61
16, 081.73
14, 015.92
0.19
0.09
42, 999.41
37, 050.27
0.21
0.12
0.20
0.19
221, 178
0.07
36.73
8.64
1, 338, 575
0.01
0.08
21, 463.26
0.50
0.14

282
136
112
103
0.28
0.17
75, 774.87
107, 363.60
0.11
0.57
0.56
0.56
0
−0.03
132.93
27.38
138, 330
−0.002
0.48
684
0
0.49

1, 774
986
646
585
0.49
0.24
122, 894.70
163, 272.20
0.27
0.74
0.77
0.75
131
0.03
162.34
35.54
372, 086
0.01
0.59
5, 000
1
0.65

23, 097
10, 753
9, 796
8, 376
0.76
0.37
191, 852.10
206, 263.50
0.69
0.88
0.94
0.94
4, 045
0.14
217.67
46.77
1, 920, 919
0.02
0.68
32, 536
1
0.79

Notes: This dataset consists of quarterly observations across 271 MSAs during 2001–2015.
Premium is measured as cost per $100 coverage.
2
Total claims in the preceding four quarters.
3
Employment rate is calculated as employed persons divided by total population.
1
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Table 3.2: MSA Characteristics by Structural Break Size (2001 Q1)
Group

Lowest Boom
(N = 88)

Middle Boom
(N = 91)

Highest Boom
(N = 88)

Structural Break Size
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

-0.024 (0.015)
-0.021 [-0.102, -0.007]

0.032 (0.018)
0.034 [-0.007, 0.065]

0.13 (0.047)
0.117 [0.065, 0.271]

SFHA Policy Count
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

1,870 (4,490)
528 [32.0, 35,500]

2,390 (5,200)
791 [5.94, 42,300]

13,500 (34,400)
2,220 [27.2, 22,5000]

Non-SFHA Policy Count
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

2,210 (11,300)
220 [18.8, 103,000]

1,260 (2,110)
430 [32.7, 12,100]

5,140 (10,800)
1240 [76.8, 79,000]

82.4 (24.6)
76.1 [41.4, 158]

108 (29.5)
108 [48.3, 173]

Average Non-SFHA Building Coverage (in $1,000s)
Mean (SD)
101 (26.4)
110 (26.3)
Median [Min, Max]
97.9 [36.4, 171]
107 [62.3, 185]

130 (28.7)
130 [67.0, 195]

Average Risk Score, All Properties
Mean (SD)
1.65 (0.532)
Median [Min, Max]
1.50 [1.23, 5.50]

1.76 (0.584)
1.63 [1.21, 5.79]

2.16 (0.874)
1.86 [1.25, 6.74]

Average Risk Score, SFHA Properties
Mean (SD)
4.61 (1.15)
Median [Min, Max]
4.59 [2.42, 8.33]

4.81 (1.17)
4.68 [2.39, 7.63]

4.70 (1.56)
4.65 [1.52, 8.82]

Average Risk Score, Non-SFHA Properties
Mean (SD)
1.51 (0.370)
Median [Min, Max]
1.38 [1.20, 3.79]

1.61 (0.549)
1.46 [1.16, 5.95]

1.89 (0.651)
1.68 [1.22, 5.08]

Population (in 1,000s)
Mean (SD)
Median [Min, Max]

734 (1,410)
348 [104, 9,380]

855 (1,290)
386 [125, 9,630]

Average SFHA Building Coverage (in $1,000s)
Mean (SD)
74.3 (20.8)
Median [Min, Max]
70.6 [28.5, 145]

743 (1,100)
289 [101, 6,120]
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Table 3.3: Home Price Elasticity of Insurance Take-Up
Dependent variable: log(NFIP Policy Count)
Policy Sample

All

SFHA

Non-SFHA

Non-SFHA +
Pre-2003

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

\
log(HPI)

0.305∗∗∗
(0.077)

0.211∗∗∗
(0.060)

0.483∗∗∗
(0.154)

0.322∗∗
(0.141)

log(Income)

0.244
(0.276)

0.128
(0.258)

0.026
(0.404)

−0.072
(0.373)

log(Sales)

0.002
(0.006)

0.006
(0.005)

0.017∗
(0.009)

0.016∗
(0.009)

log(Claims)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.0002
(0.001)

0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)

Pop. Growth

−0.226
(0.545)

−0.160
(0.551)

−0.568
(0.740)

−0.045
(0.673)

Emp. Rate

−0.517
(0.587)

−0.423
(0.551)

0.041
(0.832)

0.761
(0.775)

Risk × Year indicators
MSA FE
Quarter FE
First-stage F-stat
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
40.20
15,180
0.991

Yes
Yes
Yes
53.68
15,180
0.992

Yes
Yes
Yes
37.28
15,180
0.979

Yes
Yes
Yes
37.28
15,180
0.981

Notes: This table presents 2SLS coefficients from Equation (3.3). Each column indicates a
different policy sample over which take-up is measured. Respectively, they are all one-to-four
family residential policies, policies inside the SFHA, policies outside the SFHA, and policies
on structures built prior to 2003 outside the SFHA. The first-stage regression follows Equation
(3.2), and the corresponding F-statistic is reported in the bottom panel. “Risk × Year indicators”
refers to a set of interaction terms between the average risk score in the MSA and indicators for
each year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p <
0.01
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Table 3.4: Boom vs. Bust: First-Difference Estimates
Dependent variable: ∆log(NFIP Policy Count)
Boom (2002–2007)

Bust (2007–2012)

All

Non-SFHA

All

Non-SFHA

All
2003–2005

Non-SFHA
2003–2005

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

A. 2SLS Estimates
\
∆log(HPI)

First-stage F-stat
Observations
Adjusted R2

0.326∗∗∗
(0.110)

0.353∗∗
(0.178)

0.377∗∗∗
(0.120)

0.714∗∗∗
(0.239)

1.368∗∗∗
(0.299)

1.447∗∗∗
(0.412)

33.73
251
0.023

33.35
251
0.034

10.18
252
0.168

9.83
252
0.125

10.18
252
0.147

9.83
252
0.118

0.669∗∗∗

0.721∗

(0.228)
0.067

B. Reduced-Form Estimates
Break Size

Adjusted R2

(0.370)

−0.629∗∗∗
(0.210)

−1.181∗∗∗
(0.396)

−2.282∗∗∗
(0.476)

−2.395∗∗∗
(0.662)

0.059

0.120

0.116

0.197

0.150

Notes: This table presents coefficients from first-difference specifications. Panel A reports 2SLS coefficients and
Panel B reports the corresponding reduced-form coefficients. Columns (1)–(2) present boom-period estimates
based on the difference between 2002 Q1 and 2007 Q1, while columns (3)–(6) present bust-period estimates
based on the difference between 2007 Q1 and 2012 Q1. The outcome is the count of all policies in (1) and
(3), of non-SFHA policies in columns (2) and (4), of all policies on buildings constructed during 2003–2005
and of non-SFHA policies on those buildings. All regressions control for first-differenced log income, log sales,
population growth and employment rate, as well as the average risk score. Columns (3)-(6) also control for the
first-differenced share of foreclosures among home sales. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneity by Foreclosure Law and Non-SFHA Risk
Dependent variable: log(NFIP Policy Count)
Policy Sample

Non-SFHA

SFHA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

\
log(HPI)

0.298∗
(0.168)

0.453∗∗
(0.179)

0.194∗∗∗
(0.074)

0.240∗∗∗
(0.072)

\
log(HPI)
× Judicial

0.373∗∗∗
(0.119)

−0.053
(0.066)
0.326∗∗
(0.152)

log(HPI)\
× High Risk

0.092
(0.076)

log(Income)

0.039
(0.419)

−0.050
(0.436)

0.162
(0.261)

0.073
(0.263)

log(Sales)

0.014
(0.009)

0.018∗∗
(0.009)

0.006
(0.005)

0.006
(0.006)

log(Claims)

0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.0003
(0.001)

0.0002
(0.001)

Pop. Growth

−0.606
(0.739)

−0.777
(0.760)

−0.089
(0.544)

−0.130
(0.549)

Emp. Rate

−0.163
(0.813)

−0.007
(0.807)

−0.380
(0.548)

−0.489
(0.544)

Yes
Yes
Yes
(25.89, 80.95)
15,180
0.979

Yes
Yes
Yes
(23.74, 71.36)
15,180
0.979

Yes
Yes
Yes
(29.11, 81.52)
15,180
0.992

Yes
Yes
Yes
(28.05, 70.35)
15,180
0.992

Risk × Year indicators
MSA FE
Quarter FE
First-stage F-stat
Observations
Adjusted R2

Notes: This table presents 2SLS coefficients testing for heterogeneous home price elasticities by
states with judicial review foreclosure laws in columns (1) and (3), and above median non-SFHA
flood risk in column (2). The dependent variable is the IHS-transformed count of non-SFHA
policies in columns (1) and (2), and its counterpart for SFHA policies in columns (3) and (4).
Corresponding first-stage F-statistics are reported in the lower panel. “Risk × Year indicators”
refers to a set of interaction terms between the average risk score in the MSA and indicators for
each year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p <
0.01
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APPENDIX A
Mismeasuring Risk Appendix

A.1

Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Survey Summary Statistics

Variable Means
Income
Has College Degree
Age
Risk Preferences
10-Year Risk of Flooding
Believe Flood Risk Higher in 30 Years
Has Flood Insurance
Insurance Required by Lender
Voluntarily Buy Flood Insurance
Reported Flood Insurance Premium
Observations

Outside Floodplain
90672
.66
56
4.71
17.5
0.43
.30
.06
.29
665
543

Inside Floodplain
99433
.57
57
4.58
27.75
0.57
.66
.39
.55
1762
159

Summary statistics for estimation sample from survey of flood insurance demand and risk
perceptions. Risk Preferences are self-reported willingness to take risks from one to 10,
where one is the most risk averse.
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Table A.2: Risk Rating and Incentivizied Flood Insurance Willingness-to-Pay
Incentivized Flood Insurance Willingness-to-Pay
Inside Floodplain

0.785***
(0.124)

Had Past Flood
Flood Depth
I[Flood Depth = 0]
Observations
R-squared
Demographics
ORIV

702
0.112
Y
N

0.492***
(0.122)
0.855***
(0.131)
0.071
(0.045)
-0.212*
(0.113)
702
0.137
Y
N

0.418**
(0.161)
0.845***
(0.154)
0.123
(0.083)
-0.163
(0.127)
702
0.133
Y
Y

Results from estimating incentivized flood risk perceptions from the survey of coastal homeowners. The dependent variable is inverse hyperbolic sine transformed willingness-to-pay
for flood insurance from the incentivized elicitation described in Section 1.4.2. The primary
independent variable of interest is an indicator for being inside the floodplain. Column (2)
adds the average 100-year flood depth from the two models, and column (3) applies the
Obviously Related Instrumental Variable method to the estimation of the 100-year flood
depth coefficient. All models include controls for respondent demographics. Standard errors
are clustered by county and bootstrapped in column (3).
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A.2

Appendix Figures
Figure A.1: Flood Model 100-year Flood Depths

Distribution of average 100-year flood depths from the First Street Foundation and Kat Risk
flood models in the flood insurance survey estimation sample.
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Figure A.2: Elevated Properties over Time

Mean property elevation of floodplain-built structures in the loss events estimation sample
by year built. Property elevation is defined as the difference between a home’s first floor
elevation and its FEMA 100-year flood elevation.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of Flood Insurance Claims

Histograms of the distribution of flood insurance claims across the loss events estimation
sample. The top panel shows the claims distribution for all claims, while the bottom panel
shows the distribution for claims greater than 0. Source: OpenFEMA claims data
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Figure A.4: Claims by Elevation Relative to Remapped Floodplain Properties

Results from hurdle model predicting flood insurance claims. The top panel shows results for
having a claim as the dependent variable, and the bottom panel shows results for log claims
conditional on having a claim as the dependent variable. The figures plot the coefficients
of each half-foot elevation indicator with newly mapped properties as the omitted category.
Both models include census tract by loss event interacted fixed effects and controls for
property year built, deductible, and amount of coverage purchased. Standard errors are
clustered by loss event.
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Figure A.5: Flood Model Average Annual Losses in 2020 and 2050 Projections

Average annual flood damages for high-risk and low-risk properties in 2020 and 2050 according to the First Street Foundation Flood Model (FSF-FM). High-risk properties are single
family homes built on ground with at least a 1% annual chance of flooding.
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A.3

Adjusted Price Elasticity of Voluntary Flood Insurance
Demand

In this section, I adjust the price elasticity of flood insurance demand estimate from Table
1.1 for the share of floodplain flood insurance buyers subject to the mandatory purchase
requirement according to the survey data. This adjusted elasticity represents the estimated
percent of voluntary flood insurance purchasers who drop their policies in response to a 1%
premium increase.
In the survey data, 36% of high-risk buyers outside the floodplain have flood insurance.
Applying the newly mapped take-up estimates from Figure 1.3, this implies that their takeup rate would increase to 72% absent any premium increases one year after being remapped
into the floodplain. Given that 39% of homeowners inside the floodplain reported being
subject to a mandatory purchase requirement, this implies that

72−39
72

= 46% of purchasers

are not subject to this mandate.
I assume that the estimated price elasticity in the newly mapped results comes entirely from
purchasers not subject to the mandatory purchase requirement not renewing their policies.
This implies that the 0.17% of all purchasers not renewing their policies in response to a 1%
premium increase represents an elasticity of

0.17
0.46
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= 0.37 among voluntary purchasers.

APPENDIX B
Neglected No More Appendix

B.1

Appendix Tables
Table B.1: Synthetic Control Root Mean Squared Error Distribution

Percentile
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th

Transaction Volume
0.0319
0.0455
0.0670
0.1090
0.1759

Home Price Index
0.0104
0.0140
0.0192
0.0284
0.0429

Distribution of root-mean-square error (RMSE) for transaction volume (second column) and
home price index (third column) outcome variables between more-SLR-exposed tracts and
their constructed synthetic counterparts from 2001-2012.
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Table B.2: Long Difference with Premium Controls

More-SLR-Exposed
Medium-SLR-Exposed
Log Premium Change
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Panel (a)
2016 Home Sales Volume
(1)
(2)

2019 Home Sales Volume
(3)
(4)

-0.201***
(0.030)
-0.078***
(0.023)
0.004
(0.003)
1.177***
(0.034)

-0.262***
(0.037)
-0.107***
(0.029)
0.059***
(0.011)
0.976***
(0.056)

-0.227***
(0.035)
-0.082***
(0.028)
0.010***
(0.004)
1.181***
(0.040)

-0.288***
(0.041)
-0.111***
(0.033)
0.065***
(0.012)
0.980***
(0.062)

771
0.091

771
-0.248

771
0.093

771
-0.155

Panel (b)
2016 Home Prices
(1)
(2)
More-SLR-Exposed
Medium-SLR-Exposed
Log Premium Change
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Premium Instrument

2019 Home Prices
(3)
(4)

0.039***
(0.011)
0.002
(0.008)
-0.000
(0.001)
1.152***
(0.013)

0.056***
(0.012)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.016***
(0.004)
1.209***
(0.019)

-0.038***
(0.011)
-0.009
(0.009)
-0.001
(0.001)
1.246***
(0.014)

-0.030**
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.010)
-0.008**
(0.003)
1.273***
(0.018)

771
0.027

771
-0.197

771
0.128

771
0.082

No
Yes
No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Yes

Results from long-difference OLS regressions showing the relative change in home sales volumes (top panel) and prices (bottom panel) in 2016 (columns 1-2) and 2019 (columns 3-4)
in more-SLR-exposed and medium-SLR-exposed markets relative to less-SLR-exposed markets. All specifications include controls for tract population centroid distance-to-coast, 2010
share of households in poverty, and log per-capita flood insurance premium changes between
2012 and 2019. Columns 2 and 4 instrument for premium changes with the counterfactual
change if the number and composition of flood insurance policies were held fixed at their
2012 base. Outcomes are normalized by their 2001-2012 tract-level mean.
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B.2

Appendix Figures
Figure B.1: Sea Level Rise Google Trends

Quarterly Google Trends search intensity for topic “Sea Level Rise” in Florida from 2006 to
2020. Dashed line is at the first quarter of 2013.
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Figure B.2: Florida Home Transaction Volumes and Prices

Housing transaction volume (top panel) and home price (bottom panel) trends across all
of Florida (solid lines) and coastal Florida census tracts with high versus low SLR exposure (dashed and dotted lines, respectively). Housing volume and home price index are
normalized by their 2001-2012 mean.
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Figure B.3: Coastal Price and Volume Dynamics

Annual aggregate housing transactions (left axis) and mean house price index (right axis)
for coastal Florida census tracts with either less-SLR-exposure (top panel) or more-SLRexposure (bottom panel). See Data and Methodology sections for data sources and definitions of coastal and SLR exposure.
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Figure B.4: Price and Volume Change Maps

Maps show change in log home transactions (top panel) and home price index (bottom
panel) by coastal tract between 2011-2012 and 2017-2018. Tracts are colored by relative
change, with red indicating larger relative to declines and green larger relative increases.
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Figure B.5: SLR Effect Heterogeneity by Poverty

Summarizes treatment effect heterogeneity from synthetic control estimator by tract-level
poverty for 2019 home sale volume (top) and 2019 home prices (bottom). Points indicate
the average treatment effect (y-axis) within twenty quantiles of more-SLR-exposed tracts
grouped by 2010 census estimate of the share of residents in poverty (x-axis). The dashed
red line indicates the best-fit linear line through the points, with the coefficient and standard
error from the tract-level regression of poverty over the estimated treatment effects indicated
in the upper-right corner. Outcomes are normalized by the tract-level 2001-2012 mean.
covariates.
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Figure B.6: SLR Effect Heterogeneity by Nonwhite Population Share

Summarizes treatment effect heterogeneity from synthetic control estimator by tract-level
nonwhite population share for 2019 home sale volume (top), 2019 home prices (bottom).
Points indicate the average treatment effect (y-axis) within twenty quantiles of more-SLRexposed tracts grouped by 2010 census estimate of the share of residents who are nonwhite
(x-axis). The dashed red line indicates the best-fit linear line through the points, with the
coefficient and standard error from the tract-level regression of nonwhite population share
over the estimated treatment effects indicated in the upper-right corner. Outcomes are
normalized by the tract-level 2001-2012 mean.
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Figure B.7: Existing and New Home Sales Volume Generalized Propensity Score Estimates

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Generalized propensity score results for transaction volumes of new and existing homes.
Results show the relative change in the outcome variable normalized by the tract-level 20012012 mean by 2013-2016 (top row) and 2017-2019 (bottom row).
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Figure B.8: Synthetic Control - Excluding Poor 2001-2012 Fit

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for housing transaction volume and home prices, excluding moreSLR-exposed tracts with root mean square error (RMSE) above the 90th percentile by
outcome. Placebo tracts with RMSE greater than double the more-SLR-exposed trimmed
RMSE are also removed for inference.
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Figure B.9: Synthetic Control - 2010 Match Endpoint

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for housing transaction volume and home prices only matching from
2001-2010 instead of 2001-2012 as the pre-period. Top row shows outcome for more-SLRexposed tracts in blue alongside synthetic counterparts in gray, bottom shows treatment
effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure B.10: Flood Insurance Claims

Annual flood insurance claims per-capita of more-SLR-exposed (blue squares) and less-SLRexposed (black circles) census tracts. The top panel is calculated from the full estimation
sample while the bottom panel excludes census tracts in the top quartile over total 20012018 claims per-capita. Claims per-capita calculated from the NFIP claims database and
decennial census housing unit estimates.
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Figure B.11: Synthetic Control - Excluding High Claims

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for housing transaction volume and home prices, excluding all tracts
in the top quartile of 2001-2018 flood insurance claims per-capita. Top row shows outcome
for more-SLR-exposed tracts in blue alongside synthetic counterparts in gray, bottom shows
treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect estimates in gray.
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Figure B.12: Generalized Propensity Score - Excluding High Claims

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Generalized propensity score results for housing transaction volume and home prices excluding all tracts in the top quartile of 2001-2018 flood insurance claims per-capita. Results
show the relative change in the outcome variable normalized by the tract-level 2001-2012
mean by 2013-2015 (top row) and 2016-2019 (bottom row).
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Figure B.13: Synthetic Control - Excluding Miami

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Synthetic control results for housing transaction volume and home prices, excluding all tracts
in Miami-Dade County. Top row shows outcome for SLR-exposed tracts alongside synthetic
counterparts, bottom shows treatment effects with two-sided 95% interval of placebo effect
estimates in gray.
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Figure B.14: Generalized Propensity Score - Excluding Miami

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Generalized propensity score results for housing transaction volume and home prices excluding all observations in Miami-Dade county. Results show the relative change in the
outcome variable normalized by the tract-level 2001-2012 mean by 2013-2015 (top row) and
2016-2019 (bottom row).
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B.3

Long-Difference Results

This section describes long-difference OLS results estimating the dynamic housing market
capitalization of sea level rise (SLR) risk in 2016 and 2019 relative to the 2001-2012 base
period. The results show that the magnitude and timing of the housing market declines in
SLR-exposed areas evident in the raw data (Figure C.3) and with Synthetic Control and
Generalized Propensity Score matching methods (Figures 2.5, 2.9) persist using regression
adjustment for covariates.
The baseline estimating equation for the long-difference regressions is:

Yit = α0 + λt Xi + β t SLRi + ϵit

(B.1)

Yit denotes home sales volume or prices of tract i in year t ∈ {2016, 2019} normalized
by its tract-level 2001-2012 mean.88 Xi is a set of tract-level controls: population center
distance-to-coast, share of 2010 population in poverty, and the change in log per-capita
flood insurance premiums between 2012 and 2019. SLRi is an indicator variable for tract
i’s exposure, taking distinct values for less-SLR-exposed tracts, more-SLR-exposed tracts,
and tracts with medium SLR exposure as defined in Section 2.2.3.

B.4
B.4.1

Data Appendix
Home Price and List Price Indices Estimation

This section describes the estimation of the tract-by-year home price index (HPI). To construct the HPI, we run the following regression,

Yhjt = α0jt + α1 Xht + ϵhjt
88

(B.2)

Results are similar when we calculate the long-difference as the change in the log outcome variable from
2012 to 2016 and 2019.
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where Yhjt is the log transaction price, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by year, of
property h in census tract j transacted in year t. Xht are the following fixed effects: square
footage decile, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, building age since construction,
effective building age, and month sold.89
α0jt are a set of tract-by-year fixed effects that give the HPI. We normalize each tract’s HPI
to equal 1 in 2001.
We also estimate a list price index for the MLS data using a similar approach as in Equation
(B.2). We observe the same Xht controls in the MLS data, with the exception of the effective
building age.

B.4.2

Denials and Securitization Index Estimation

This section describes the estimation of our tract-by-year indices for loan denial and securitization using loan-level data in HMDA. To define the securitization index, we subset to
approved purchase or refinance loans below the conforming loan limit (CLL) in the estimation sample of tracts. To construct a tract-level securitization index, using all approved
loans i of type l ∈ {Ref i, P urchase} for a property in tract j in year t, we estimate a linear
probability model:

siljt = α

l

+ βtj Y

eart + β0l

2
X

V

ALU Ein + LT Iin + β1l

n=1

3
X

(CLLjt − V ALU Ei )m + β2l Xij + ϵiljt

m=1

(B.3)
where siljt is an indicator variable for whether loan application j was marked in HMDA
data as sold to one of the housing GSEs (Fannie/Ginnie Mae or Freddie/Farmer Mac) or
to a private securitization entity. V aluei is defined as the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS)
of loan value and LT Ii is the loan-to-income ratio derived from reported borrower income
89

The effective building age is constructed using CoreLogic’s “effective year built” variable which accounts
for renovations and maintenance.
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and loan value. Both of these variables enter as second-order polynomials in the estimating
equation. (CLLjt − V ALU Ei ) is the IHS of the difference between the CLL and loan value
and enters as a third-order polynomial. Finally, Xij contains binary indicators for whether
the borrower is reported as nonwhite, whether the property is owner-occupied, and whether
the lender is local. The constant term α, as well as each of the β slope coefficients, vary by
whether the loan is a refinance or purchase loan, as indicated by the l superscripts.
Equation (B.3) is estimated from 1,575,345 observations. The tract-by-year securitization
index is constructed by adding each of the βtj terms to the overall mean securitization rate
in the estimation data such that the index values fall between zero and one. The final index
values are winsorized by year at the 99th and 1st percentiles.
The denials index is estimated similarly over the sample of applications for purchase or
refinance loans. Because the denials index includes both conforming and non-conforming
loans, l now indexes four categories of loans by whether they are purchase or refinance
and conforming or non-conforming. In addition, the term |CLLjt − V aluei | is the IHS of
the absolute difference between the loan value and conforming loan limit. The estimating
equation is written:

diljt = αl +λjt Y eart +λl0

2
X

V ALU Ein +LT Iin +(|CLLjt −V ALU Ei |)n +λl1 Xij +ϵiljt (B.4)

n=1

where diljt is an indicator for whether loan application i was denied. Equation (B.4) is
estimated from 2,650,018 observations.
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B.4.3

Calculation of Flood Insurance Premium Controls

This section describes how we construct tract-level controls for changes in National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) premiums from 2013-2018.90 To motivate our approach, consider
the tract-level regression described below:

Yj,2019 − Yj,2012 = α + β(Pj,2019 − Pj,2012 ) + ϵj

(B.5)

where Yj,t is some tract-level outcome (say Home Price Index) in tract j in year t, and Pj,t
is some measure of the cost of flood insurance.
One way to define P is by taking a simple mean of the premiums we observe for the policies in
each tract in the corresponding years. The problem with this approach is that the observed
premiums are a function of the rates and fees that households face. When premiums increase
between 2012 and 2019, some households may choose to insure less or not buy flood insurance
altogether, attenuating our measure of premium changes. Thus, estimation of β in Equation
B.5 would be biased. This is a similar source of endogeneity as in other literatures where
prices are a function of consumption (see e.g. Gruber and Saez (2002) or Ito (2014)).
To address this issue, we adopt a standard approach by instrumenting for the observed
premium change from 2012 to 2019 with the counterfactual change in premiums if insurance
uptake were exactly the same in 2019 as it was in 2012. To define these measures precisely,
define pijr,2012 as the premium paid by policy i in tract j that is part of rate class r in 2012,
and let pnjr,2019 index the corresponding set of policies in 2019.91 Let Njt be the number
of homes in tract j in year t, and Ijt the number of flood insurance policies.92 We calculate
the observed change in flood insurance premiums as:93
90
The NFIP historical rating manuals can be accessed via https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance/
work-with-nfip/manuals/archive.
91
Rate class refers to the set of attributes (e.g. property elevation relative to the floodplain, number of
floors in the home) that determines a policy’s flood insurance rates and fees.
92
We subset to 1-4 family homes and NFIP policies, excluding mobile homes and condos. This sample
forms the large majority of policies and price variation over the period.
93
We scale premiums by the take-up rate to match the tract-level definition of our outcome variables.
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Pj,2019 − Pj,2012 =

Ij,2019 X
Ij,2012 X
pnjr,2019 −
pijr,2012
Nj,2019
Nj,2012

(B.6)

As described above, this measure may be biased because the composition of observed policies
and

Ijt
Njt ,

the take-up rate, may change in response to the premium changes. We construct

our instrument by measuring 2019 premiums under the 2012 policy cohort. This means
using the 2012 instead of 2019 take-up rate, and calculating the 2018 premiums as if the
same exact policies written in 2012 formed the set of insured in 2019. This measure is
defined:

X
Ij,2012
∗(
pijr,2019 − pijr,2012 )
Nj,2012

(B.7)

Using this instrument, we can estimate Equation (B.5) via two-stage least squares in our
long-difference specifications.
We use the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) premium change and its instrument in equations
B.6 and B.7. The IHS is defined as IHS(y) = ln(y+(1+y 2 )1/2 ). Like the log transformation,
the IHS transformation allows coefficients to be interpreted as approximate elasticities, but
with the added benefit of being defined at y ≤ 0 for the 115 census tracts in our estimation
sample where observed average flood insurance premiums decline between 2012 and 2019
(Bellemare and Wichman, 2020).94

B.5
B.5.1

Methodology Appendix
Census Tract Versus Property Level Estimation

A notable difference between our approach and the papers described above is that we measure SLR exposure and outcomes at the census tract rather than property level. In this
94
Holding policy characteristics fixed, the pricing reforms between 2012 and 2019 would have caused
premiums to increase in all census tracts. We treat the premium change instrument as zero in the five
census tracts with no active flood insurance policies in 2012.
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section, we describe in further detail our rationale for this decision. As described in Section
3.2, our SLR measure is constructed from the share of a tract’s developed land95 that would
be inundated under six feet of SLR whereas other studies relate property level exposure to
property level sales prices.
We opt for the tract-level approach for several reasons. First, the NOAA SLR model’s inundation projections are highly uncertain on a property-by-property basis (Gesch, 2009).
In addition to fundamental uncertainty in climate models, there is additional noise from
measurement error in local geography, changes from construction or erosion over time, and
the climate itself. We view our continuous and community-level measure as better reflecting
this uncertainty. Second, there will likely be many local spillover effects from SLR that negatively impact even nominally non-inundated properties, such as roadway flooding, which has
been shown to erode property value (McAlpine and Porter, 2018), or flooding of other critical infrastructure. Properties at a lower elevation due to rising seas will also be exposed to
increased flood risk due to their lower elevation. Estimating SLR capitalization by comparing neighborhoods with different exposure, rather than properties with nominally different
exposure in the same neighborhood, avoids contamination from these localized spillovers.

B.5.2

Generalized Propensity Score Estimation

This section describes the technical details behind the estimation of our generalized propensity score (GPS) model. Let tract j have continuous SLR exposure Rj between 0 and 1.
The first stage of the GPS models Rj as a function of tract covariates. We use a tobit model
censored at 0 and 1 with the following underlying linear model:

Rj =α + β0 Distj + β1 SF HAj + β2 Claimsj + β3 P op18 + β4 P op64
18
+ β5

2
X

(B.8)
N onwhitenj

+

F oreignnj

+

W aterjn

+ ϵj

n=1
95

In particular, developed land includes roads and non-residential buildings
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Where the covariates are, in order, deciles of distance-to-coast and share of a tract’s developed area in a FEMA Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), IHS of flood insurance claims
per-capita 1995-2005, 2010 population share under 18 and share 18 to 64, and quadratic
terms of 2010 population shares nonwhite and foreign born, and tract area made up of
water.
In the second stage, we estimate each tract’s generalized propensity score, pbj , as the probability density of observing the tract’s actual SLR exposure from a normal distribution with
cj and variance from Equation (B.8). Next, we fit the outcomes Yj as a flexible model
mean R
of the generalized propensity score and actual SLR exposure using a quadratic model:

2
E[Yj |Rj , pc
bj + α4 pb2j + α5 Tj ∗ pbj
R j ] = α0 + α1 Rj + α2 Rj + α3 p

(B.9)

Finally, we estimate the average potential outcome at any level of SLR exposure, r. Let
\
p(r,
Xj ) be the generalized propensity score for tract j at counterfactual exposure r. p() is
the same function used to calculate the generalized propensity score pbj from the results of
equation (B.8), but calculated from the counterfactual exposure r rather than the tract’s
actual exposure Rj . Then, the average potential outcome at exposure r is:

E[Y[
(r)] =

J
2
1X
\
\
\
α0 + α1 rj + α2 rj2 + α3 p(r,
Xj ) + α4 p(r,
Xj ) + α5 Tj ∗ p(r,
Xj )
J

(B.10)

j=1

By calculating Equation (B.10) across the full distribution of SLR exposure, we can estimate
the effects of SLR risk over time as a series of dose-response functions relative to tracts with
no SLR exposure. We estimate potential outcomes at 10% intervals of SLR exposure from
0% to 100%, and calculate standard errors from 2,000 panel bootstrap samples.
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APPENDIX C
Home Equity Appendix

C.1

Additional Tables and Figures
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Table C.1: Home Price Elasticity of Take-Up in Different Specifications
Dependent variable: log(NFIP policy count)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.390∗∗∗
(0.059)

0.352∗∗∗
(0.070)

0.308∗∗∗
(0.072)

0.305∗∗∗
(0.077)

log(Income)

0.228
(0.277)

0.250
(0.275)

0.244
(0.276)

log(Sales)

0.003
(0.006)

0.002
(0.006)

0.002
(0.006)

log(Claims)

0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

Pop. Growth

−0.364
(0.522)

−0.248
(0.531)

−0.226
(0.545)

Emp. Rate

−0.789
(0.597)

−0.514
(0.581)

−0.517
(0.587)

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
49.28
15,240
0.990

Yes
Yes
44.31
15,180
0.991

\
log(HPI)

Other covariates
Risk × Quad. time trend
Risk × Year indicators
MSA FE
Quarter FE
First-stage F-stat
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
99.78
15,420
0.990

Yes
Yes
Yes
40.20
15,180
0.991

Notes: This table presents 2SLS coefficients from Equation (3.3). The dependent
variable is IHS-transformed total policy count. The first-stage regression follows
Equation (3.2), and the corresponding F-statistic is reported in the bottom panel.
Each column represents a different set of controls as indicated by the bottom panel.
“Other covariates” include IHS-transformed income, home sales volume, and total
NFIP claim amount, as well as population growth and employment rate. “Risk ×
Quadratic trend” is the interaction between the average risk score for all properties in
the MSA and a quadratic time trend. “Risk × Year indicators” are a set of interaction
terms between the average risk score and indicators for each year. Column (4) is the
preferred specification used in all main results. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered by MSA. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.2: Robustness Checks on the Home Price Elasticity of Take-Up
Dependent variable: log(NFIP Policy Count)
Checks

Cohort-Based IV

Boom Measurement

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

\
log(HPI)

0.258∗∗∗
(0.067)

0.278∗∗∗
(0.070)

0.341∗∗∗
(0.069)

0.360∗∗∗
(0.068)

log(Income)

0.287
(0.268)

0.269
(0.272)

0.212
(0.271)

0.195
(0.269)

log(Sales)

0.002
(0.006)

0.002
(0.006)

0.003
(0.006)

0.003
(0.006)

log(Claims)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

Pop. Growth

−0.206
(0.539)

−0.215
(0.539)

−0.242
(0.541)

−0.250
(0.539)

Emp. Rate

−0.456
(0.579)

−0.482
(0.580)

−0.562
(0.586)

−0.586
(0.586)

Risk × Year indicators
MSA FE
Quarter FE
First-stage F-stat
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
1531.24
15,180
0.991

Yes
Yes
Yes
120.93
15,180
0.991

Yes
Yes
Yes
39.41
15,180
0.991

Yes
Yes
Yes
42.14
15,180
0.991

Notes: This table presents 2SLS coefficients from Equation (3.3). The dependent variable
is IHS-transformed total policy count. The first-stage regressions follow Equation (3.2),
and the corresponding F-statistics are reported in the bottom panel. Columns (1) and (2)
use instruments based on start-of-boom cohorts. In column (1), the first-stage regression
uses, as instruments, the interaction between the original instruments with indicators for
the start-of-boom quarter. Column (2) switches to the start-of-boom year. Columns (3)
and (4) examine potential mismeasurement of boom size and timing for those MSAs with
no clear boom. Column (3) sets the structural break of all MSAs with negative boom sizes
to zero. Column (4) expands sets the lowest quartile of MSA structural breaks to zero.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.3: Instrumented Regressions—Stacked Design
Dependent variable: log(NFIP Policy Count)
All

SFHA

Non-SFHA

(1)

(2)

(3)

\
log(HPI)

0.294∗∗∗
(0.078)

0.188∗∗∗
(0.060)

0.484∗∗∗
(0.152)

log(Income)

0.307
(0.269)

0.206
(0.266)

0.055
(0.391)

log(Sales)

0.002
(0.006)

0.006
(0.006)

0.017∗∗
(0.008)

log(Claims)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.0002
(0.001)

0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)

Pop. Growth

−0.002
(0.539)

0.005
(0.572)

−0.270
(0.723)

Emp. Rate

−0.581
(0.583)

−0.444
(0.577)

−0.086
(0.814)

Risk × Year indicators
MSA-cohort FE
Quarter-cohort FE
First-stage F-stat
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
39.19
15,180
0.988

Yes
Yes
Yes
54.53
15,180
0.989

Yes
Yes
Yes
35.74
15,180
0.973

Notes: This table presents 2SLS coefficients from the stacked design as described in
Appendix C.4. The dependent variables are IHS-transformed policy counts in categories indicated in the top panel. The corresponding F-statistic in the first-stage
regression is reported in the bottom panel. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Instrumented Regressions—Newly Enrolled Policy Count
Dependent variable: log(NFIP Policy Count)
All

SFHA

Non-SFHA

(1)

(2)

(3)

\
log(HPI)

0.297∗∗∗
(0.078)

0.190∗∗∗
(0.060)

0.486∗∗∗
(0.152)

log(Income)

0.303
(0.271)

0.203
(0.268)

0.045
(0.393)

log(Sales)

0.002
(0.006)

0.006
(0.006)

0.018∗∗
(0.008)

log(Claims)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.0002
(0.001)

0.008∗∗∗
(0.001)

Pop. Growth

−0.009
(0.551)

0.001
(0.584)

−0.290
(0.738)

Emp. Rate

−0.577
(0.586)

−0.445
(0.580)

−0.069
(0.816)

Risk × Year indicators
MSA × Quarter-of-year FE
Quarter FE
First-stage F-stat
Observations
Adjusted R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
37.67
15,112
0.988

Yes
Yes
Yes
51.33
15,112
0.989

Yes
Yes
Yes
34.86
15,112
0.973

Notes: This table presents 2SLS coefficients from Equation (3.3). The dependent variables
are the IHS-transformed counts of newly enrolled policies in categories indicated in the top
panel. The first-stage regressions follow Equation (3.2), and the corresponding F-statistics
are reported in the bottom panel. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by MSA.
∗
p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure C.1: Size and Timing of the Structural Breaks

Break Size
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Notes: Each circle represents an MSA. The x-axis displays the quarter of the
structural break, and the y-axis displays the size of the break. The size of the
circle reflects population size in 2000. The structural break estimates are from
Charles et al. (2019).

Figure C.2: Housing Boom Size Across MSAs
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Figure C.3: Pre-Boom Trends in NFIP Take-Up by Structural Break Tercile
A. Log total policy count
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B. Log SFHA policy count
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Notes: This figure shows the quarterly time series of NFIP policy in force during
2001–2003 in the raw data. Each color represents one group of MSAs in each
structural break tercile. Panel A plots the IHS-transformed total policy count,
and Panels B and C plot the IHS-transformed count of SFHA and non-SFHA
policies, respectively.
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Figure C.4: Dynamics of NFIP Premium
Log premium - non-SFHA policies
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals from
Equation (3.1) for premium, measured as cost per $100 coverage, of all policies (left panel) and
non-SFHA policies (right panel). Both dependent variables are IHS transformed.

Figure C.5: Dynamics of Building Coverage
Log coverage of newly enrolled SFHA policies
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals from
Equation (3.1) for coverage purchased on flood insurance policies inside SFHAs (left panel) and
outside SFHAs (right panel). Both dependent variables are IHS transformed.
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Figure C.6: Dynamics of Contents Coverage
Share of newly enrolled SFHA policies with contents coverage
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients and their 95 percent confidence
intervals from Equation (3.1) for the share of newly enrolled SFHA policies that
include contents coverage.

Figure C.7: Dynamics of Deductible Choice
Share of newly enrolled SFHA policies with standard deductible
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients and their 95 percent confidence
intervals from Equation (3.1) for the share of newly enrolled SFHA policies with
the standard deductible.
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Figure C.8: Dynamics of Take-Up Under Different Specifications
Log total policy count
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Notes: This figure plots the point estimates for overall take-up from Equation
(3.1) with different sets of controls. Specification 1 includes only MSA and
quarter-year fixed effects. Specification 2 adds controls for income and home
sales volume. Specification 3 further adds the average risk score interacted with
a quadratic time trend. This risk control is replaced with a set of interaction
terms between the average risk score and indicators for each year in specification
4, which is also the preferred specification used in all main results.

Figure C.9: Dynamics of Newly Enrolled Policies
Log newly-enrolled SFHA policies
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals from
Equation (3.1) for the number of newly enrolled policies inside SFHAs (left panel) and outside
SFHAs (right panel).
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Figure C.10: Home Prices and Homeowner Equity

Notes: This figure plots the household equity (home value minus mortgage debt) and home
prices over the sample period. Sources: Board of Governors Quarterly Financial Accounts
and S&P Case-Shiller US National House Price Index (Board of Governors, S&P Dow
Jones Indices).
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C.2

Framework

We present a theoretical framework to illustrate the role of home equity in disaster insurance
demand. We start by describing a baseline model with no relationship between home equity
and insurance willingness to pay. In this simplified model, because disasters damage a building’s structure, the other components of home equity—land value and mortgage debt—have
no direct effect on demand.
We extend the model to allow homeowners to default on their mortgage debt rather than
pay the repair costs from a disaster. Mortgage default provides implicit insurance to leveraged homeowners and creates a positive relationship between their home equity and flood
insurance demand.

C.2.1

Baseline Model

Consider a single-period model with an agent endowed with a property H. The equity value
of H is given by EH ≡ LH + RH − MH , where LH is the land value, RH the structure value,
and MH the outstanding mortgage debt. We assume the agent starts with positive home
equity, or LH + RH ≥ MH .
The model proceeds in three phases: “pre-disaster,” “disaster,” and “post-disaster,” respectively. Pre-disaster, the agent receives income W and chooses whether to insure their structure against disaster risk. We consider a single insurance contract covering the full value of
RH with no deductible or copay. Denote the purchase decision by I = 0, 1 and the price of
the insurance PI .
In the disaster phase, a disaster occurs with probability p and causes damages to the structure. The potential repair cost L is distributed as follows:


 L = r ∼ f (r), r ∈ (0, RH ] with probability p,
with probability 1 − p


 L=0
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If uninsured, the agent must pay the full cost of L. If insured, L is paid by the insurer.
In the post-disaster period, the agent derives linear utility from wealth and home equity96 :

EH + W − I · PI − (1 − I) · L,

The agent maximizes their expected utility. Assuming PI ≤ W , the agent will purchase
the insurance if and only if expected utility without insurance is lower than utility with
insurance:


E EH + W − L ≤ EH + W − PI .

(C.1)

Clearly, the agent’s willingness to pay for insurance, denoted Pb, equals their expected repair
costs:
Pb = E(L).

(C.2)

The agent’s valuation of disaster insurance is not affected by their home equity because the
agent fully internalizes the risk to their structure, which is independent of land value and
mortgage debt.

C.2.2

Insurance willingness to pay with Mortgage Default

We extend the baseline model to allow the agent to default on their mortgage debt after a
disaster. When an uninsured agent defaults, they do not pay repair costs L but forfeit their
c.
equity EH and pay a default cost M
c + EH . Thus, expected utility without insurance is
Uninsured agents default when L ≥ M
h
i
c + EH ) .
E EH + W − min(L, M
96
We follow much of the insurance literature in defining a utility function over wealth to motivate insurance
demand, as in Einav et al. (2010). We abstract away from non-housing assets or risk aversion over home
equity because the central point of the model—the directional relationship between home equity and demand
for disaster insurance—holds for any weakly concave utility function over wealth.
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Setting this expression equal to the agent’s utility with insurance, which is unaffected by
the default option, we derive the agent’s willingness to pay for insurance with default:
implicit insurance effect

z Z
c + EH ) = E(L) − p ·
Pb = E min(L, M
h

i

RH

}|



{

c + EH ) · f (r)dr
r − (M

(C.3)

c+EH
M

The key difference in Equation (C.3) from Equation (C.2) is the “implicit insurance effect”
of default that is subtracted from expected repair costs. The willingness to pay specified in
(C.3) is strictly less than that in (C.2) when the probability of disaster-induced default is
nonzero.
Further, we can derive how Pb changes with respect to EH :


dPb
c + EH ) > 0.
= p · 1 − F (M
dEH

(C.4)

where F (·) is the cdf of the disaster damages function. This expression shows that the
marginal effect of equity on the agent’s value of insurance is given by the likelihood of
getting a damage level that is high enough for the homeowner to default. Intuitively, the
default option provides the agent with a form of informal insurance with a deductible equal
to the agent’s equity plus default costs. As home equity increases, the loss from defaulting
grows, and the value of this implicit insurance becomes less attractive compared to formal
insurance.
Equation (C.4) identifies two factors that should influence the strength of the relationship
between home equity and flood insurance demand. Expression (C.4) is larger when (i)
c is lower and (ii) default-inducing damage levels are more likely. These
the default cost M
observations motivate two empirical tests to assess whether the implicit insurance from
default plausibly explains the relationship between home prices and flood insurance take-up
in the data:
Debt Overhang Prediction (1). MSAs with higher default costs should have an attenuated
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relationship between the house prices and flood insurance take-up relative to MSAs with lower
default costs.
Debt Overhang Prediction (2). MSAs with greater exposure to tail risk should see greater
increases (decreases) in take-up in response to increases (decreases) in house prices relative
to MSAs with lower tail risk.
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C.3
C.3.1

Additional Variables
Flood Risk

The First Street Foundation Flood Model (FSF-FM) combines hydrological models, fineresolution land cover and elevation data, and inventories of flood adaptation infrastructure
to accurately estimate expected flood depths across the entire continental United States
(First Street Foundation, 2020). Covering 142 million properties, it provides the most comprehensive national account of flood risk to date.
The flood risk measure from FSF-FM has two main differences from FEMA’s flood map.
First, the majority of FEMA’s maps are outdated and do not reflect recent changes in risk
levels; 75 percent of them are older than five years, despite the National Flood Insurance
Reform Act of 1994 requirement to update the maps every five years. Second, FSF-FM
accounts for potential pluvial or surface water flooding more fully than FEMA’s estimate.
As a result, FSF-FM finds a higher flood risk than FEMA for most locations: FSF-FM shows
that 14.6 million homes are currently subject to 1 percent annual flood risk, but FEMA’s
maps indicate this level of risk for only 8.7 million properties.97
The First Street Foundation also provides a “Flood Factor” risk score measure (1–10, representing minimal to extreme levels of risk) based on each property’s flood probability and
depth profile.98 For each MSA, we calculate the average risk score of all properties, SFHA
properties, and non-SFHA properties. In the regressions, we use the floodplain-specific risk
measure99 interacted with quarter indicators to control for time-varying effects of the average
risk level.
We construct an additional measure to characterize non-SFHA tail risk to test the debt
overhang channel. One hypothesis under this mechanism is that MSAs with more properties
97
See https://firststreet.org/flood-lab/published-research/2020-national-flood-risk-assessment-highlights/
for more details.
98
See https://floodfactor.com/methodology for the methodology on Flood Factor.
99
For example, we use the average risk score for non-SFHA properties when the outcome variable is
non-SFHA take-up.
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exposed to tail risk will have a larger response to the increase in home equity. As we focus
on non-SFHA take-up, we define the following measure of non-SFHA tail risk exposure:

Non-SFHA tail risk =

Number of non-SFHA properties at 1 percent annual flood risk
.
Number of non-SFHA properties at any risk

The denominator and numerator capture the extent of the flood insurance market outside
the SFHA and the subset of these properties facing severe enough risk that a flood could
induce enough damage to cause a mortgage default, respectively.100 This ratio ranges from
1 to 89 percent across MSAs, with the median at 65 percent.

C.3.2

Foreclosure law

The states with judicial review laws are CT, DE, FL, HI, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD,
NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, PA, RI, SC, VT, and WI. These states require court approval
for foreclosure sales after mortgage defaults, as opposed to states where lenders may initiate
foreclosure outside of the court based on the contract terms of the mortgage.
The main cost of mortgage default to the owner of a heavily damaged or destroyed home with
negative equity will be the risk of a foreclosure that negatively effects their long-term credit.
Judicial review laws make the process of obtaining a foreclosure sale more costly for lenders as
they are required to obtain permission through court proceedings. Mian et al. (2015) found
that delinquent homeowners were more than twice as likely to enter foreclosure in states
with judicial foreclosure laws as in those that allow nonjudicial foreclosures, and Demiroglu
et al. (2014) found that borrowers with negative equity are more likely to enter default in
judicial foreclosure states. This evidence suggests that flooded homeowners entering default
are more likely to reach a settlement with their lender that preserves their credit with the
protection of judicial foreclosure.
Another commonly cited borrower protection are state-level non-recourse laws, which pre100

We use the 1 percent annual risk cutoff to proxy for tail risk because properties with at least 1 percent
annual risk of shallow flood depth also have a substantial chance of suffering from overwhelming levels of
damage.
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vent lenders from pursuing deficiency judgements in court to recover unpaid mortgage balances after default. We argue that non-recourse laws are unlikely to decrease default costs
for disaster-affected homeowners. First, deficiency judgements are notoriously difficult to
pursue and can be discharged in bankruptcy (Brueggeman and Fisher, 2011; Guiso et al.,
2013). Second, the main effect of recourse laws documented by Ghent and Kudlyak (2011)
- increasing the use of deeds in lieu of foreclosure - is unlikely to be perceived as a cost by
mortgagors in our setting. Lenders prefer deeds in lieu of foreclosure because they transfer
ownership of the distressed property without going through foreclosure. Although borrowers
normally rely on the lengthy foreclosure process to remain in their homes longer, this would
not be a concern if the home were uninhabitable due to flood damage. Furthermore, the
deed in lieu of foreclosure has less negative credit impact, likely making it the preferred
mechanism of both parties in our setting.

C.4

Stacked Event-by-Event Estimation

Our implementation of the stacked estimator is adapted from Cengiz et al. (2019). The
goal of the estimator is to avoid the biases that can be introduced by two-way fixed effects
(TWFE) estimation in settings with heterogeneous treatment effects and variation in treatment timing across units.101 Because different MSAs experienced their housing booms at
different times, our estimation results from Equations (3.1) and (3.3) could be affected by
these biases.
The stacked estimator addresses the TWFE estimator’s issues by estimating a separate
difference-in-differences regression for each group of MSAs with large housing booms in a
specific year. For each group, the only comparison group is the set of MSAs with small or
negative estimated structural breaks—those with no housing boom. Thus, each regression
used to estimate the pooled treatment effect avoids using treated MSAs with different timing
as comparison groups.
101

See the main text for further citations on this literature.
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We first define “never-treated” MSAs as those with a negative boom or a boom size in
the lowest quartile of positive booms. As discussed in Section 3.4.2, these values likely
represent noise in the estimation rather than actual booms. Our results are similar under
other reasonable cutoffs.
Next, we create year-by-year datasets as follows: for each year between 2001 to 2005, we
select all MSAs with home price structural breaks in that year and put them together with
the no-boom MSAs, which we consider to be a “cohort”. The five cohort datasets are then
stacked together to form the dataset for regression. We estimate the following equation:

lnN F IPmtg =

24
X

βτ (P ostτmt × ∆Pm ) + δ ′ Xmt + λmg + λtg + εmtg ,

(C.5)

τ =−9

where g denotes the cohort and other notations are the same as before. The only difference
between this specification and Equation (3.1) is that the MSA and time fixed effects are
now cohort specific. The stacking design and within-cohort comparison prevent using earlytreated MSAs as controls and thus avoid the TWFE problems in the staggered design.
In Figure C.11, we plot our main estimates and the estimates from the stacked design
together. The two trajectories are almost indistinguishable, especially in the one year before
and three years after the boom starts. We also incorporate this approach in the 2SLS
framework, where we run the regression using the stacked sample and incorporate cohortspecific fixed effects in both stages. These results are reported in Table C.3.
In addition, we find that these patterns and estimates are robust (1) using other reasonable
“no-boom” cutoffs and (2) using a “boom” indicator instead of intensity measure. These
results are available upon request. In general, we consistently find the results under this
approach are similar to our main estimation. Therefore, we conclude that our main results
are not subject to substantive bias due to the negative weighting problem.
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Figure C.11: Comparison of main and stacked estimates
Log total policy count
0.75

Estimate

0.50

0.25

0.00

-0.25

-8

-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

Quarter since start of boom
Specification

Main

Stacked

Notes: This figure plots our main estimates for overall take-up in green and
those from the stacked estimator in blue. They follow Equations (3.1) and
(C.5), respectively.
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C.5
C.5.1

Additional Notes on Heterogeneity Analysis
Estimation Equations

In Section 3.4.4, we estimate heterogeneous effects based on (1) judicial review law status
and (2) non-SFHA tail risk. In this section, we specify and discuss the two-stage least square
(2SLS) estimation equations used in those two tests.
In both tests, we estimate the heterogeneous effect based on an indicator variable, Char.
In the first test, it indicates that the MSA is subject to the judicial review law. In the
second, it indicates the MSA has above-median non-SFHA risk. Formally, our second-stage
equation is a version of Equation (3.3) with an additional interaction term:
′
\I mt + β2 · lnHP I\
lnN F IPmt = β1 · lnHP
mt × Charm + δ Xmt + λm + λt + εmt .

(C.6)

Note that we do not need to include Charm in the equation because it is absorbed by the
MSA fixed effect. β1 measures the home price elasticity of take-up by the baseline group
(MSAs with no judicial review law/below-median risk), and β2 measures the additional effect
for the indicated group. Since lnHP I is an endogenous variable, so is the interaction term.
Therefore, we need to instrument for both in the first stage:

lnHP Imt =

24
X

ρ1τ (P ostτmt × ∆Pm ) +

τ =0

24
X

σ1τ (P ostτmt × ∆Pm × Charm )

τ =0

+ µ′1 Xmt + γ1m + γ1t + ω1mt
lnHP Imt ×Charm =

24
X

ρ2τ (P ostτmt

× ∆Pm ) +

τ =0

24
X

(C.7)
σ2τ (P ostτmt

× ∆Pm × Charm )

τ =0

+ µ′2 Xmt + γ2m + γ2t + ω2mt .
In addition to the original set of instruments, we interact each of them with Charm to create
new instruments in these regressions.
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Table C.5: MSA Characteristics by Judicial Review Law and
Non-SFHA Extreme Risk (2001 Q1)
A. Judicial Review Law
Group
Structural Break IV
Total SFHA Policies
Total Non-SFHA Policies
Average Risk Score (SFHA)
Average Risk Score (Non-SFHA)
1-Yr Renewal Rate (SFHA)
1-Yr Renewal Rate (Non-SFHA)
Population
Income
Employment Rate
Home Sales

No
(N=127)

Yes
(N=138)

p-value

0.05 (0.07)
2,618 (6,304)
1,539 (4,063)
4.64 (1.27)
1.66 (0.39)
0.76 (0.15)
0.81 (0.19)
832 (1,412)
29.0 (5.76)
0.58 (0.08)
13,494 (22,755)

0.03 (0.06)
8,908 (27,960)
4,091 (12,029)
4.78 (1.33)
1.67 (0.68)
0.77 (0.18)
0.83 (0.20)
728 (1,141)
29.5 (5.44)
0.59 (0.08)
10,742 (20,194)

0.016∗∗
0.011∗∗
0.020∗∗
0.372
0.829
0.825
0.400
0.514
0.464
0.335
0.308

B. Non-SFHA Tail Risk
Group

Below Median
(N=133)

Above Median
(N=132)

Structural Break IV
Total SFHA Policies
Total Non-SFHA Policies
Average Risk Score (SFHA)
Average Risk Score (Non-SFHA)
1-Yr Renewal Rate (SFHA)
1-Yr Renewal Rate (Non-SFHA)
Population
Income
Employment Rate
Home Sales

0.05 (0.08)
9,944 (28,574)
4,806 (12,550)
4.35 (1.23)
1.72 (0.56)
0.79 (0.15)
0.82 (0.18)
1,016 (1,632)
29.4 (6.23)
0.58 (0.09)
14916 (24688)

0.03 (0.05)
1,814 (4,431)
915 (2,029)
5.08 (1.27)
1.61 (0.56)
0.74 (0.19)
0.83 (0.21)
540 (704)
29.1 (4.89)
0.60 (0.08)
8986 (17064)

p-value
0.016∗∗
0.001∗∗∗
0.001
<0.001∗∗∗
0.106
0.013∗∗
0.738
0.002∗∗∗
0.593
0.114
0.025∗∗

Notes: This table reports the mean of major characteristics for each group. The last
column reports the p-value of the difference in group means. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p
< 0.01

C.5.2

Interpretation

The main challenge in interpreting β2 is that the characteristic of interest Charm might
not be exogenous. Thus, although β2 represents the differential effect of home prices for
MSAs with this characteristic relative to those without, we cannot causally attribute the
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entire effect to the characteristic. We can, however, consider the most likely confounders
and assess how they might affect the interpretation of β2 .
For the analysis on the judicial review laws, one might be concerned that the statute itself
is established in response to the housing market conditions in the state. This is, however,
unlikely because most state foreclosure laws were established in the 1930s and few have
changed since (Demiroglu et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the judicial review status might still be
correlated with other drivers of the relationship between housing prices and insurance takeup. To explore the differences between the MSAs with judicial review laws and those without,
we examine the difference in major characteristics for each group in the first quarter of 2001
(see Panel A of Table C.5). The two groups have notable differences: MSAs with judicial
review laws experienced smaller housing booms and have a greater number of NFIP policies
in force. However, the groups are quite comparable in other dimensions. In particular,
no systematic difference in factors appears that could amplify or weaken the relationship
between housing prices and insurance take-up, such as the overall risk level, income, and
household liquidity (as proxied by the one-year renewal rate). Therefore, this gives us more
confidence that the comparison between the two groups can provide meaningful evidence on
the effect of foreclosure costs.
For the analysis on non-SFHA tail risk, we compare MSAs with above-median non-SFHA
tail risk to those below the median. It should be noted that our risk measure is intended to
capture the extremity of risk instead of the average level. For the latter, its time-varying effect has already been controlled for in the estimation. There are more qualitative differences
in baseline characteristics between the two groups of MSAs (see Panel B of Table C.5). The
MSAs with above-median tail risk experienced smaller housing booms, have a significantly
smaller number of policies in force, and have a smaller population. The SFHAs in these
MSAs also have high average risk levels and one-year renewal rates. Nevertheless, these
variables are not systematically different for non-SFHA policies, which is more reassuring
because our main outcome of interest is non-SFHA take-up. Similarly, the two sets of MSAs
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have no difference in income levels.

C.6

First-Difference Estimation

To examine changes in flood insurance take-up over the housing bust, we use a first-difference
approach following Charles et al. (2018). They show that the structural breaks not only
predict the housing boom during 2000–2006 but also the size of the bust during 2007–2012.
Therefore, we can instrument housing price change from 2007 to 2012 using the structural
breaks.
The regression takes the following form:
\
∆bust lnN F IPm = β0 + βF D ∆bust
lnHP I + δ ′ ∆bust Xm + εm .

(C.8)

Here, ∆bust represents the change in the variable between 2007 Q1 and 2012 Q1, which we
apply to all variables in the original regression. We also control for the risk score directly.
Our key regressor is the change in log housing price index (∆lnHP I), which we instrument
with the break size instrument. The coefficient βF D is the first-difference estimate of how
housing price changes during the bust affect flood insurance take-up.
The corresponding reduced-form regressions take the form
∆bust lnN F IPm = α0 + αF D ∆Pm + γ ′ ∆bust Xm + um ,

(C.9)

where we regress the first difference in NFIP policy count directly on the structural break
size and the same set of first-differenced covariates.
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